The two undeniable realities, one is that as Singapore's prime minister, Yuan Yuan, said that the largest investor in Southeast Asia is the United States, not China.The second reality is that no matter how friendly we are to ASEAN countries, most ASEAN countries still stand for the United States.
Many people will ask, since China has destroyed so much infrastructure over the years, and the trade volume is rising every year, why are ASEAN countries still sliding toward the United States?
China is indeed ASEAN's largest trading partner. No one can do without the import and export of goods and the connection of industrial chains. However, this is a "soft binding". If it is broken, it will hurt for a while at most. There is always a remedy for factories to move and orders to turn.
The U.S. aircraft carrier squadron and missile defense network, once turned, could directly shake the regime's stability.
Think of those countries that rely on the sea, the South China Sea wind blows, the United States a warships cruise, can make the entire decision-making layer overnight, they are not not not not wanting Chinese money, but the calculation is fine: economic losses can be exchanged with time, the regime risk but can not withstand a loss.
The scale in the hearts of ASEAN countries has never been a purely economic ledger. The military structure left by the United States after the Cold War is like an invisible net covering old allies such as the Philippines, Thailand, and Singapore.
Even if China put forward the "Belt and Road" and Free Trade Zone 3.0 version, emphasizing win-win and inclusion, ASEAN decision makers will still be unconscious: if the United States is really angry, will it cut off intelligence, freeze assets, and even support domestic opposition?
On the other hand, no matter how much China emphasizes peaceful rise, its size is there, and its neighbors will inevitably murmur: Will cooperation today become dependence tomorrow? This psychological gap affects standing in line more than any data.
Some say that ASEAN is playing the counterparty, the left side, the two hands take the advantage, this is only half the counterparty, the premise of the counterparty is the equal strength of the two sides, but the reality is that the United States holds the security valve, China holds the economic valve, ASEAN can only find a balance point in the seam.
Economic projects are lively signed, security issues are quietly moving closer to the United States, Thailand is connecting with China's high-speed rail, and at the same time, the US military is allowed to use Uda to throw the airport; Vietnam took Chinese investment to build factories, but left Cam Ranh Bay to American ships for supply.
This "two-faced man" strategy may seem smart, but in fact it contains helplessness: no one wants to be a chess piece, but the chessboard is too big, and the chess pieces can only choose sides to stand.
After Trump came to power, the situation became even harder, he talked directly with Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam about the "unilateral agreement", the surface reduction of tariffs, and the actual requirement of purchasing American goods, combined with export control, is equivalent to turning the economic leverage into a secure rope.
ASEAN countries were shaking their hands when signing, and it was clear that this was not an equal deal, but “either obey or raise taxes.”
China's RCEP, the upgrading of the Free Trade Zone, the rules are transparent, and the coverage is wide, but there is no deterrent of that kind of "one-word".
ASEAN leaders privately lamented: Talking about business with the United States is like borrowing usury from a gang boss or doing projects with China, or signing a long-term contract with a big boss. The former is scary and the latter is stable. But when it comes to life and death, who dares to bet that the boss will not turn against him?
This choice of ASEAN is rational in the short term, but in the long term, it lays hidden dangers. Over-reliance on the American security umbrella is tantamount to giving the life door to others, relying too much on China's economic chain, and giving the rice bowl to others.
The real way out lies in ASEAN to unite itself and implement its centrality. Unfortunately, there are too many internal contradictions. Myanmar is in chaos, territorial disputes, and the South China Sea code. Everyone wants to be the boss and no one refuses to obey the other.
As a result, as soon as the United States provoked discord, unity became empty talk. China wanted to help, but it was labeled as "expansion". The more ASEAN hedged, the more opportunities it gave big countries.
If it were you, standing in the position of the leader of ASEAN, would you also put the security of the United States and the economy under pressure of China?
Many people will ask, since China has destroyed so much infrastructure over the years, and the trade volume is rising every year, why are ASEAN countries still sliding toward the United States?
China is indeed ASEAN's largest trading partner. No one can do without the import and export of goods and the connection of industrial chains. However, this is a "soft binding". If it is broken, it will hurt for a while at most. There is always a remedy for factories to move and orders to turn.
The U.S. aircraft carrier squadron and missile defense network, once turned, could directly shake the regime's stability.
Think of those countries that rely on the sea, the South China Sea wind blows, the United States a warships cruise, can make the entire decision-making layer overnight, they are not not not not wanting Chinese money, but the calculation is fine: economic losses can be exchanged with time, the regime risk but can not withstand a loss.
The scale in the hearts of ASEAN countries has never been a purely economic ledger. The military structure left by the United States after the Cold War is like an invisible net covering old allies such as the Philippines, Thailand, and Singapore.
Even if China put forward the "Belt and Road" and Free Trade Zone 3.0 version, emphasizing win-win and inclusion, ASEAN decision makers will still be unconscious: if the United States is really angry, will it cut off intelligence, freeze assets, and even support domestic opposition?
On the other hand, no matter how much China emphasizes peaceful rise, its size is there, and its neighbors will inevitably murmur: Will cooperation today become dependence tomorrow? This psychological gap affects standing in line more than any data.
Some say that ASEAN is playing the counterparty, the left side, the two hands take the advantage, this is only half the counterparty, the premise of the counterparty is the equal strength of the two sides, but the reality is that the United States holds the security valve, China holds the economic valve, ASEAN can only find a balance point in the seam.
Economic projects are lively signed, security issues are quietly moving closer to the United States, Thailand is connecting with China's high-speed rail, and at the same time, the US military is allowed to use Uda to throw the airport; Vietnam took Chinese investment to build factories, but left Cam Ranh Bay to American ships for supply.
This "two-faced man" strategy may seem smart, but in fact it contains helplessness: no one wants to be a chess piece, but the chessboard is too big, and the chess pieces can only choose sides to stand.
After Trump came to power, the situation became even harder, he talked directly with Malaysia, Thailand and Vietnam about the "unilateral agreement", the surface reduction of tariffs, and the actual requirement of purchasing American goods, combined with export control, is equivalent to turning the economic leverage into a secure rope.
ASEAN countries were shaking their hands when signing, and it was clear that this was not an equal deal, but “either obey or raise taxes.”
China's RCEP, the upgrading of the Free Trade Zone, the rules are transparent, and the coverage is wide, but there is no deterrent of that kind of "one-word".
ASEAN leaders privately lamented: Talking about business with the United States is like borrowing usury from a gang boss or doing projects with China, or signing a long-term contract with a big boss. The former is scary and the latter is stable. But when it comes to life and death, who dares to bet that the boss will not turn against him?
This choice of ASEAN is rational in the short term, but in the long term, it lays hidden dangers. Over-reliance on the American security umbrella is tantamount to giving the life door to others, relying too much on China's economic chain, and giving the rice bowl to others.
The real way out lies in ASEAN to unite itself and implement its centrality. Unfortunately, there are too many internal contradictions. Myanmar is in chaos, territorial disputes, and the South China Sea code. Everyone wants to be the boss and no one refuses to obey the other.
As a result, as soon as the United States provoked discord, unity became empty talk. China wanted to help, but it was labeled as "expansion". The more ASEAN hedged, the more opportunities it gave big countries.
If it were you, standing in the position of the leader of ASEAN, would you also put the security of the United States and the economy under pressure of China?