Text | Jin Ruidian

edit| Jin Ruidian

Recently, a major event occurred in Russia. Putin officially signed a law to terminate the Plutonium Management and Disposal Agreement with the United States. This bill, which involves 34 tons of military plutonium, officially came into effect this week.

The US-Russia nuclear agreement is yellow, the 34 tons of uranium would be used to make nuclear bombs, enough to make 2,000, each of which is more than 30 times more powerful than the atomic bomb that bombed Hiroshima in 1945.

More importantly, this pile of dangerous things that used to be watched by the International Atomic Energy Agency is now completely ignored, and China is far away in Asia. Can we avoid this trouble?

Many people may not know that the termination of the plutonium agreement between the United States and Russia was not a sudden break-up, but a "tug-of-war" that had dragged on for nine years. As early as 2016, Russia suspended the implementation of the agreement because of the continuous sanctions imposed by the United States and NATO's efforts. These hostile operations to expand eastward have suspended the implementation of the agreement.

But at that time, Moscow still left room, saying that "as long as Washington resolves our dissatisfaction, the agreement can be reopened." But now, this room is gone. The lower house of the Russian parliament passed the termination bill at the beginning of this month, and the upper house then voted in favor. Finally, as soon as Putin signed it, the agreement officially expired this week.

Looking back at the origin of this agreement, it was a "milestone" in nuclear disarmament between the United States and Russia after the Cold War. In September 2000, in order to alleviate the security pressure of "too much nuclear materials to be used up", the United States and Russia signed an agreement. The core requirements are particularly clear. Both countries have to dispose of 34 tons of excess military-grade plutonium so that these materials can no longer be used to make weapons.

There were two ways to deal with it at that time. Either turn it into mixed oxide fuel for nuclear power plants, or use a fast neutron reactor to irradiate it to lose its value in building weapons. The entire process was watched by the International Atomic Energy Agency, and every step must be transparent and visible.

In 2010, the two countries also signed a supplementary agreement to specifically promote the implementation of the agreement. In order to help Russia build treatment facilities, the United States also promised $400 million in support at that time.

Judging from the later progress, Russia did do it as agreed. Now it has built a mixed oxide fuel plant in Seversk. This plant can process 1.5 tons of plutonium a year and convert military plutonium into fuel that can be used by nuclear power plants, fully meeting the requirements of the agreement.

But the United States has not moved, the promised $400 million follow-up has not been delivered, its own processing facilities since 2014, because of the domestic budget noise, and also on Russia to engage in technological blockade these matters have been suspended until the agreement has not been terminated.

Now that the agreement is invalid, the most direct consequence is that 34 tons of plutonium are no longer managed. On the day the agreement was terminated, the International Atomic Energy Agency issued an early warning report saying that if these materials are not managed, they may be illegally removed or even reused. Use to make weapons.

The nuclear cooperation between the United States and Russia has now reached this point. In the final analysis, Russia's determination to terminate the agreement is completely disappointed with the "unreliability" of the United States for many years. The United States has been upgrading its "anti-Russian" operation. When Russia suspended the agreement in 2016, the reason was US sanctions and NATO's eastward expansion.

But by 2024, the situation was not only better, but worse, after 2022, U.S. allies imposed several rounds of sanctions on Russia, energy and technology these key areas did not let go, while NATO also expanded to Eastern Europe, deploying military forces around Russia.

Russia clearly states in the bill that "the situation has completely changed", and Washington's "anti-Russian" policy has completely wiped out the basis of the agreement. The two countries have been opposite each other, and the cooperation that requires high trust in nuclear material disposal naturally cannot continue.

The United States unilaterally changed its treatment plan, which made Russia worry that "nuclear materials can make weapons again." Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov revealed to lawmakers this month that during the nine years since the agreement was suspended, the United States had wanted to bypass Russia and change its own treatment plan, and planned to use the "dilution method" to treat its own military plutonium.

This method is controversial, and experts in the international nuclear field say that after dilution of uranium, although it is not possible to make a nuclear bomb directly in the short term, it is possible to re-extract useful military uranium with simple technology, and so on to the "nuclear material rearmament" left the back door.

For Russia, this is clearly contrary to the core purpose of the agreement "totally out of military use" and also makes the Russian side no longer trust the American cooperation will.

The United States has been undermining the nuclear arms control system and completely destroying the trust between the United States and Russia. The termination of the Plutonium Management and Disposal Agreement is not an individual case, but the latest example of the continuous collapse of the U.S. -Russian military control system over the years.

The United States withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty signed in 1987 and the Open Skies Treaty in 1992. The former originally prohibited the two countries from deploying land-based missiles with a range of 500 to 5500 kilometers. After the United States withdrew, it quickly deployed relevant missiles in Europe, which allowed the two countries to send reconnaissance aircraft to inspect each other's military facilities. After the United States withdrew, the United States and Russia lost important channels for "military transparency."

Last month, Putin said at the Security Conference of the Russian Federation that, whether it was during the Soviet-American period or now, the agreement system on control of nuclear missiles and strategic defense weapons has almost collapsed.

The US-Russia nuclear agreement has gone through. As the world's second largest economy and a nuclear power, China has to face both direct security risks brought by nuclear proliferation and indirect effects from fluctuations in global nuclear energy cooperation.

Nuclear proliferation could affect the security of China's surroundings, and after 34 tons of missile, the biggest hidden danger is to be "unlawfully taken away", and there are a lot of geopolitically sensitive countries and regions around China, if these materials are caught up by extremist organizations or used by some countries to steal nuclear capabilities, it will directly threaten our border security.

China has alwaysined the international nuclear non-proliferation system, participated in many international atomic energy agencies' supervision projects, and the termination of the US-Russian agreement leads to the loss of nuclear materials, which will put a lot of pressure on China's work on nuclear non-proliferation, and will have to invest more resources to strengthen border control, participate in international verification, and prevent the flow of dangerous materials across borders.

Global nuclear energy cooperation fluctuations will also affect China's energy security, and some may not know that uranium can make nuclear bombs, but can also be used as fuel for nuclear power plants after processing.

China currently has more than 50 nuclear power plants in operation and plans to expand its installed nuclear power capacity in the future. The stability and instability of the international nuclear fuel supply chain are particularly important to the development of China's nuclear power.

The United States and Russia are important players in the global nuclear fuel supply. Their nuclear cooperation is yellow, which may cause price fluctuations and unstable supply in the international nuclear fuel market.

In addition, China and Russia have a lot of cooperation in the field of nuclear power, such as the Tianwan Nuclear Power Plant. Geopolitical tensions caused by the termination of the US-Russia nuclear agreement may indirectly affect the progress of these cooperation.

The United States and Russia terminated the plutonium agreement and left 34 tons of nuclear material unattended. It seems like a contradiction between the two major powers, which ultimately affects the safety of everyone in the world. As experts from the International Atomic Energy Agency said,"No matter what technology is used, the core is that dangerous materials cannot be used to make weapons."

Whether the United States and Russia will return to the track of dialogue in the future or fall into a vicious circle of "nuclear arms race" requires not only the political wisdom of the United States and Russia, but also the joint efforts of all countries around the world.

After all, no country can be immune to nuclear weapons. Maintaining nuclear security means safeguarding the future of each of us.