To put it bluntly, the door to nuclear deterrence is a knife that is only revealed at the last moment. Both the United States and Russia hold buttons that can drag each other into "mutual destruction", and no one dares to really press them. The calculation of war is originally to gain more benefits for oneself and at least preserve the basics; once we cross the nuclear threshold, the country becomes a nuclear wasteland, which is neither in the national interest nor in the personal interests of the leaders. History has long given the answer-during the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Soviet Union realized that the navy was not strong enough to support Cuba, and after weighing it, withdrew the missiles. This public rationality of "mutual restraint" has been written into the underlying logic of the game between major powers.
With this logic in mind, it is not surprising that Putin quickly made a nuclear gesture. Russia organized a three-unit strategic nuclear force exercise: an intercontinental ballistic missile "Ars" was fired from the Plesetsk space launch site to the Target of "Kura" on the Canadian Peninsula; in the waters of the Balentine Sea, the strategic nuclear submarine "Briansk" launched a "deep blue" ballistic missile; in the air, the air-based cruise missile was launched by the strategic bomber Tu-95MS. This series of actions is more like emphasizing to the outside world that the bottom line is still hard enough, while alsoining the strength and dignity of the domestic army.
Soon, Trump openly stated that he would not provide Ukraine with a “war-ax” missile.Nuclear exercises and a hard warning were not a decisive hit, but enough to force the other side to converge on scale – at least in the short term.
The Russian army remains offensive on the battlefield in Ukraine, but expanded to the economic and technological level, Russia is on the guard. The modern war is ultimately compared to the basis of industry and technology. Russia's economy is highly dependent on energy exports, a number of key components of the military system and high-end machinery can not be separated from the Western supply chain, these shortcomings are precisely figured by the opponents.
Because of this, this round of sanctions in Europe and the United States is directly at the door of life. The United States is taking aim at Russia's two largest oil companies-state-owned Rosneft and private Lukoil, which together account for about half of Russia's crude oil exports. The European Union banned Russian liquefied natural gas from entering its market, further pushing the Russian crude oil price ceiling to US$47.6 per barrel. At the same time, it imposed a comprehensive trading ban on Rosneft and Gazprom, expanding trading blockades on financial institutions in Russia and other countries, and included cryptocurrency platforms in the sanctions toolbox for the first time. The reason is straightforward: Russia will cut off its sources of war funding if it does not end the war.
The impact is visible to the naked eye. Foreign exchange income will fall off a cliff, and the funds for "special military operations" will be tight. For foreign exports, Russia can certainly sell energy to third parties, but any country's energy imports have a diversified structure, and no one can completely take over the gap between Europe and the United States; For internal supply, even if parts and machine tools bypass third parties, the core links are still controlled by Europe and the United States, and third parties do not have the motivation and ability to take risks at every turn.
Under this circumstance, the two lines of the Kremlin’s parallel advancement had clear logic: on the one hand, the U.S. issued a tough warning of “Do not attack Ukraine” – “If Russia is attacked with such weapons, the retaliation will be very fierce and even devastating”; on the other hand, the strategic nuclear force exercises, emphasizing the red line and the cost. This is both external deterrence and pre-negotiation gesture management: place to sit and talk.
And when the two sides repeatedly “break the wrist” on the battlefield and economically, the end will mostly go back to the rational zone – the window of a ceasefire on the ground is not non-existent. stop, is not the same as striking Russia to climb up. For greater geographic considerations, especially in the eyes of Trump “China is the biggest challenge”, Washington needs a not strong, not weak, controllable Russia to “unify Russia and control China.”
For Moscow, the armistice means a loss of face, but it may not necessarily suffer losses: it is not impossible to find a right hand in the new balance of power and restore some economic and trade channels. Putin wields the nuclear stick this time, fighting back more for dignity; when the outside world's satisfaction with dignity reaches the standard, the space for rational decision-making will be reopened.