In late October, the German government announced that it would "postpone" the foreign minister's visit to China originally scheduled for two days, on the grounds that "the talks in China failed to be implemented". At the diplomatic level, such statements usually mean that sufficient mutual trust or arrangement has not been reached in advance, but in this case, the meaning behind them is even sharper.
The Chinese side has not adopted "delayed consultations" under diplomatic practice, but has chosen to respond to the reasons for the refusal with a clear stance.The Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman rarely used a highly coherent and strongly oriented expression at a routine press conference: "There is only one China in the world, there is no space for customization", "only talking about peace and not opposing 'Taiwan independence' is tolerating 'Taiwan independence'".
This is tantamount to publicly naming Wadfour's "strategic ambiguity" remarks in the media as unacceptable. The latter just declared in an interview that "Germany adheres to the China policy, but the specific implementation method will be decided by Germany," and added that "it does not support the use of force to change the status quo."
The core logic of this statement is an attempt to unwaveringly link “recognition of one China” and “intervention in Taiwan Sea” in parallel to maintain Germany’s political space for both enjoying the Chinese market and not being questioned by the United States’ “weakness toward China.”
However, China has made a clear statement that this vague space has ended.
Diplomatic clashes quickly tear German politics apart
The refusal not only terminated a foreign minister's trip, but also activated a long-standing conflict within German politics.
Wadefour's Chinese Union has always tried to promote the "value-hearted" line on China's policy, diplomatically attached to the United States, and frequently pressured China on Taiwan Sea, Hong Kong, Xinjiang and other issues.Mertz, the prime minister behind it, has repeatedly expressed support for "Europe's stronger consensus on China" in diplomatic occasions, but always avoided positive conflict in practical policy.
However, China's harsh counter-reaction to Vadouur's remarks has made this double-track strategy completely unbalanced.
A spokesman for the party’s foreign affairs, Akhmetovich, said: “Cancellation of the visit has released extremely bad diplomatic signals, and Germany needs a constructive dialogue with China at this time rather than a position show to replace diplomatic contact.”
This is not only the outbreak of a “coalition divide within the government”, but also the concentrated manifestation of the German policy-making dispute against China.There have been three long-standing lines within the German political elite: the hardships against China (such as Waldfur), the economic and trade pragmatists (such as the Social Democratic Party and the enterprise community), and the “geo-anxiety securityists” (most appearing in the Green Party and Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee).
Murts was caught up in two difficulties—within facing the split of the political coalition, and outside being forced to stand in the China-U.S. seam.The idea of easing German economic difficulties was originally planned by the foreign minister to visit China, and was completely bankrupt in diplomatic clashes.
Rare Earth and Market: "Voting with Feet" in the Business World
Political cracks are still on the table, and the reaction of the German business community has been judged by practical actions.
The business delegation that originally planned to visit China with the foreign minister included the chairman of the German Automobile Industry Association, heads of several top high-end machinery and equipment manufacturers, and rare earth-dependent manufacturing companies. After Wardfour's remarks, it collectively canceled the trip and made it clear that it did not want to be "forcibly bound" by the foreign minister's remarks.
This "withdrawal storm" marks a comprehensive collision between Germany's realistic logic of economic and trade dependence on China and diplomatic slogans. The rational choices of the business community in the face of key interests reveal that the German government's "dual-track policy" has become difficult to reconcile.
China is Germany’s largest trading partner for eight months before 2025 with a total bilateral trade of €16.34 billion, in the automotive, machinery and other industries, where China’s market sales share has exceeded a quarter, while in key raw materials, Germany relies on China for as much as 72 percent, with some high-precision processing unable even to be replaced by third countries.
What cannot be ignored is that China has launched a new round of reform of the rare earth export declaration mechanism, and the review of technical thresholds and buyer composition has become increasingly stringent. In this context, the last thing companies want to see is for the German government to replace negotiating rationality with ideology and further intensify confrontation.
France remains connected, Germany increasingly isolated
Germany's "diplomatic disconnection" is not a manifestation of the EU consensus, but has aggravated the differences within the EU on China.
Just a few weeks ago, French President Macron's special envoy just visited China to promote negotiations on cooperation projects in the field of new energy. Paris has always maintained the strategic framework of "contact-balance-coexistence of differences". After Italy withdrew from "the belt and road initiative", it privately conducted low-key communication with China on port logistics cooperation.
Germany’s position, on the other hand, is increasingly radical and isolated – pushing for a “unified and tough attitude toward China” within the EU, and falling into political divisions within the EU, while demanding “coordination across the EU” and becoming a typical negative result of one’s own diplomatic failure.
This gap raises a new question: ** Can the EU still maintain unified boundaries of its China policy? ** Judging from the current trend, the differences between France and Germany on "contact first" and "confrontation first" are widening, while other member states quietly choose sides based on their own interests.
Germany’s “diplomatic disaster” appeared at the EU level as the first bone-bone of a strategically vague breakdown.
Merkel's Prophecy and Murts' Misjudgment
In her last public speech before leaving office, Merkel emphasized that "full decoupling from China will cause serious harm to Germany and Europe" and called on her successor to handle relations with China "strategically wise."
She has visited China 11 times in her 16 years in office, maintaining the stability of Sino-German relations under the framework of the trinity of "competition, cooperation and partnership" and preventing economic risks from spilling over to the main axis of diplomacy.
However, the Mertz administration's China line tried to use the U.S. "Indo-Pacific narrative" to align policies, but failed to simultaneously coordinate the domestic industry and parliamentary forces. As a result, it resulted in policy jumps, route confusion, and failure to transfer risks.
More specifically, Merkel’s strategy toward China is to “predict and correct”, while the Murts administration is more like a “collision in the probation”, even the basic calibre of speech against China is difficult to unify.
China's clear delineation is equivalent to saying no to this kind of "policy speculation." Rejecting an appointment means a warning, and failing to make an appointment means breaking your promise.
Wadfur's cancellation of his visit to China is not an isolated incident, but a landmark moment when Germany's China policy hits the red line of reality in its strategic swing. It makes China clearly express a signal, and it also makes Germany have to face it: the cost of continuing to blur its positioning towards China will only increase.
The business community is no longer willing to pay for political gestures; the Social Democratic Party has begun to challenge its policy dominance against China; the EU’s internal consensus is also moving from “fuzzy coordination” to “expression of differences.”
Germany must answer a fundamental question: what does it want from China-Germany relations: to adhere to reality, to maintain cooperation, or to dominate values, to harm oneself?
For China, the rules have been set and the red line is clear. If you step on the line next time, I'm afraid it won't stop "refusing to meet".