On the day of the meeting with Trump, Japan suddenly received a call from Foreign Minister Wang Yi, what Japan should do now, the heart has a little number.

Recently, the President of the United States Trump visited Japan, with the new Japanese prime minister, high-market early shake hand, high-market and Trump's first face-to-face conversation lasted 40 minutes, talks high-market cling to Abe's "heritage", not only thank Trump and Abe's "during friendship", but also ready to send Abe's used golf balls, even to nominate Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize, fill the "emotional cards".

Trump also reciprocated the favor, praising Takashi for "becoming a great prime minister", talking about "the unprecedented strength of US-Japan relations", and boasting of receiving a large number of orders for military equipment from Japan. After the talks, the two also signed a tariff and rare earth agreement.

However, just as Takaichi and Trump were busy signing agreements, giving away golf clubs, and making high-profile declarations to open a "new golden era of Japan-US alliance", Japan's new Foreign Minister Toshimitsu Motegi received a call from Foreign Minister Wang Yi.

In the phone, Wang Yi congratulated Momoi Agong on his return to the post of Foreign Minister, stressed the "continuity and stability" of China's policy towards Japan, and hoped that the new Japanese cabinet will take the "first step" in its exchanges with China, and hold the "first button".The "first button" metaphor is remarkably fine, and China is obviously reminding the Japanese side that the beginning of the Sino-Japanese relationship cannot be wrong, and the key to wrong and right is precisely the bottom line of the two matters related to the historical problem and the Taiwan issue.

It is worth mentioning that China made this phone call at the right time. The call came on the day of the meeting between Takashi and Trump to make Japan clear that the United States '"sugar-coated bullets" cannot be exchanged for security and that China's concerns are an insurmountable red line in Sino-Japanese relations.

In contrast, Momo's reaction was more pragmatic, stressing that "the prime minister of High City attaches great importance to Japanese relations" and "does not want to break the chain," and that such statements are obviously pragmatic for a "right-wing government".But this does not mean that the Japanese government must be "friendly to China", but that this attitude of the government of High City may be a compromise to reality.

First of all, China is Japan's largest trading partner, and Japan's pillar industries such as electronics, automobiles, and chemicals all rely on the China market. If "decoupling" is really carried out, Toyota and Honda factories will have to shut down. If the economy is really hurt, she will step down as the prime minister in a minute.

Secondly, even if Gaoshi wants to play the "Taiwan card" again, it must weigh China's counter-countermeasures. Needless to say, China's military strength, and the power of public opinion among the two countries is also very strong. Once diplomatic problems arise, Japan simply cannot bear it.

Finally, there are many pragmatists in the Liberal Democratic Party. These people know very well that "the deadlock between China and Japan is tantamount to cutting off the road". For example, Motegi Minshi's re-appointment as foreign minister is itself a victory for the pragmatists in the Liberal Democratic Party, and his statement towards China is also "stepping on the brakes" on Takashi's radical line.

Seeing these constraints clearly, what Japan should do is very clear: don't do the stupid thing of "trapped between China and the United States" and let alone be tied to the "anti-Chinese military vehicle" by the United States.

In fact, Wang Yi's call has already pointed the way clearly: keeping the bottom line of history and the Taiwan Province issue and being pragmatic in economic and trade cooperation is the way Japan should take. The four political documents of China and Japan are not decorations, but "security guardrails" gained with lessons in the past few decades; "Strategic reciprocity" is not empty talk, it is the "ballast stone" supporting the Japanese economy.

If we really put these behind us and follow the United States in a "small circle", we will only end up becoming a pawn in a game between major powers. The United States took the investment and left, and Japan had to clean up the mess left behind.