In order to welcome Trump’s visit, Tokyo’s 18,000 police were waiting, and the precautionary measures against high-altitude snipers were strengthened, and even Tokyo’s landmark buildings were lit up. The ceremony was in place, but would the meeting eventually not evolve into a badminton?
According to Global News, Trump's special plane landed in Tokyo, opening his first visit to Japan for his second term, a total of three days.
The Japanese police dispatched 18,000 people to wait for battle, and even the high-altitude sniper points became the focus of prevention and control. All Tokyo landmarks were lit up to welcome Trump's visit.
I have to say that this security scene is indeed enough, but what should be more noted is the strategic intention of Trump's trip:
First of all, the first meeting with the new prime minister, High Market, was a strategic conspiracy around rare land.
At the end of October, U.S. rare earth company REAlloys signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Japan’s State-owned Energy and Metal Minerals Support Organization (JOGMEC) announcing that it would jointly promote the vertical integration of its mining plant from Canada to the U.S. and build an uranium refinery in Western Australia.
Japan even pledged to transfer rare-earth separation and magnetic manufacturing technology to the U.S. in an attempt to create a “de-Chinese” supply chain closure.
This action is not an isolated event.
Just a week ago, the United States signed a $8.5 billion rare-earth cooperation agreement with Australia to build a heavy-earth refinery in Texas and expand uranium production capacity in mainland Australia.
The three sides joined forces to form the Western alliance of "resource-technology-market" on the surface:
Australia provides 45% of the world's rare earth exploration resources, Japan contributes refining and recovery technology, and the United States is backed by defense orders and financial capital-the Export-Import Bank of the United States intends to raise $2.2 billion, and promises to purchase rare earth products at twice the Chinese market price.
To be honest, the three countries’ “rare-earth alliance” is essentially an emergency response to geopolitical anxiety.
According to information disclosed in the fifth round of Sino-US trade negotiations, the United States has strongly demanded that China expand rare earth exports, but China has made it clear that it is "firm in safeguarding interests."
Against this background, the Trump administration has instead accelerated its rare earth alliance with allies, trying to forcibly restructure the supply chain through the "state capitalism" model.
However, this massive "anti-rare earth dependence" battle exposed the West's fatal weakness in the field of rare earths from the beginning: without China's technology chain, global rare earths are just sleeping ores; without decades of industrial ecology, the so-called "independent supply chain" is just a blueprint on paper.
But the problem is that the Western rare earth industry has shrunk in the past two decades, which are the two decades in which China has established absolute advantages through "cascade extraction theory" and large-scale production.
Today, the separation cost of rare earths in China is only 1/10 of that in the West, but the purity can reach 99.9999%; 92% of the world's high-purity refining capacity of heavy rare earths is concentrated in China, especially dysprosium, terbium and other key materials used in F-35 fighter jets, Patriot missiles and new energy vehicle motors.
In the US-Japan agreement, although Japan promised to transfer magnet manufacturing technology, the core of high-end NdFeB permanent magnets-high-purity rare earth oxides-relies on precise control of hundreds of extraction processes, dynamic adjustment of impurities and decades of process databases.
Australia has the fourth largest reserves in the world and the highest grade in the world. The grade of the "Shankou Mine" in the United States is not low. Canada, India and other places also have considerable mineral deposits.
But this is still not able to break the rare-earth situation, the root reason is the double barrier between cost and environmental protection.
A new U.S. rare earth refinery will need to invest $2 billion, take 10 years, and environmental protection approval is about ten years; while China, with the synergy of the entire industrial chain, will cut the cost of separation to the extreme.
Even if the US-Japanese Australian crashed $10 billion, its production capacity will still take 5-8 years, and the good rates are difficult to control, and the cost is high.
These “hidden factors” can’t be copied through a paper protocol, much less breakthrough in the short term.
Secondly, in addition to the rare earth, the high market has also given Trump a “big package” of purchases – U.S. liquefied natural gas, pickups, soybeans, and even Toyota may announce that it will buy back domestic cars from the U.S.
But the Japanese Economic News revealed that behind these sweetheads are sharp contradictions: the US-Japanese trade agreement reached in September required Japan to invest $55 billion in the U.S. industry, involving key areas such as semiconductors and artificial intelligence, while the Japanese Consortium has clearly opposed the use of huge financial funds.
In addition, sanae takaichi pointed out that the agreement was "unfair" during the election campaign, but now he has stated that he will not restart negotiations. Behind this compromise is Japan's passive situation under the framework of Japan-US alliance.
And Trump’s speech on the George Washington aircraft carrier pushed the game to its culmination.
He asked Japan to achieve the goal of defense expenditure accounting for 2% of GDP ahead of schedule, and may even follow the example of pressure on NATO and raise the quota to 5%.
However, the depreciation of the yen and the tax reduction plan have left Takashi's defensive ambitions in suspense. If the budget is forcibly increased, it may trigger a domestic backlash.
In the face of Trump's Asian layout, China played a combination kick.
The first-line confrontation is in Malaysia's economic and trade talks.
The United States tried to use "restrictive measures" to exert pressure, but the China delegation refused to give in. The existence of new regulations on rare earth exports and a tracking system further proved that China's attitude was tough.
Rare earth control has become an invisible trump card-not only a bargaining chip, but also a strategic countermeasure weapon. If China concedes here, Trump is likely to follow the trend and push for a "tariff siege" and force Asia-Pacific countries to sacrifice their interests in China.
The second front is directed at ASEAN.
China visited Singapore simultaneously and attended a series of East Asia summits in Malaysia, forming a "mirror confrontation" with Trump's ASEAN itinerary.
China's annual trade with ASEAN exceeds $9700 billion, which is more than twice the volume of trade between the United States and ASEAN, and the "Belt and Road" project has been rooted in Southeast Asia for many years, and iconic projects such as Indonesia's high-speed railway and China's old railway have allowed China to have economic ties that are difficult to reach by the United States.
When Trump wanted to pull an anti-China camp in ASEAN, China proved with practical cooperation that regional prosperity is inseparable from Beijing.
The APEC Summit on the Third Front is even more turbulent.
South Korea's president, Li Ying Ming, proposed "to be a bridge between China and the United States", but due to the North's nuclear issue and U.S. and South Korean tariff negotiations fell into difficulty.
And even more headache to Trump is that the Canadian prime minister has openly called for free from the dependence on the United States and seek to establish a strategic partnership with China.
It is worth noting that the Japanese government emphasized the "Japanese-American alliance above all", while quietly communicating with the Chinese side.This two-sidedness indicates the general mentality of Asia-Pacific countries: reliant on the United States for safety, and reliant on China for economy.
It can be said that Trump's trip to Asia has exposed the inherent contradiction of American strategy: it is necessary to deter China and ask Asia-Pacific countries to bear the cost. Japan's defense expenditure dispute, South Korea's fence-sitting attitude and ASEAN's economic pragmatism are all diluting the influence of the United States.
When Trump returns, he may be able to take away a bunch of purchase agreements and defense commitments, but it is difficult to reverse the overall situation. China's counter-measures on three fronts have made Asia-Pacific countries see clearly that the cost of choosing sides far exceeds the benefits.
At present, journalists have repeatedly asked about the fact that "China has not sent a message", and the Foreign Ministry's answer is the same as always: make appropriate arrangements in accordance with diplomatic practice.
To put it simply, for Japan, if the high-market early morning can not make the right decision, then I am afraid the end is that the Chinese message has not been sent, she has gone.