On October 27th, according to Sputnik news agency & radio, Trump sent a meeting invitation to North Korean leader Kim Jong Un on a special plane, claiming that he could modify his plan and stay in South Korea for a longer period of time in order to meet.
So this seemingly improvised cry, can we interpret it again with the old perspective of 2018’s “Ice Breaking Journey”?
Obviously, not.
Today, what hangs between the United States and North Korea is no longer a negotiation on "whether to denuclearize", but a dangerous game aimed at avoiding conflicts and managing crises under the cold reality of "how to have a nuclear-armed North Korea."
Trump’s “trade art” this time hit the hard foundation of North Korea’s “nuclear state status.”
The first prerequisite for understanding the current situation is to acknowledge that the foundations of the US-DPRK negotiations have undergone a fundamental and irreversible subversion.
In the past, negotiations have been conducted around a clear ultimate goal: North Korea achieves “complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization.”
The U.S. holds the hand of sanctions and expects a "double track parallel" through extreme pressure and diplomatic contacts to ultimately lead Pyongyang to give up nuclear weapons.
And now, the nature of this negotiation has completely changed.
North Korea has made its nuclear force policy permanent and legal by amending its constitution.
In recent speeches, Kim Jong-un no longer regards nuclear weapons as a bargaining chip, but repeatedly emphasizes that they are "an absolute guarantee for national survival."
This means that the starting point of the negotiations is no longer to discuss how to eliminate nuclear weapons, but rather to discuss how to control its nuclear power, set a ceiling for its arms development, and what reward it needs to give Pyongyang for it, on the premise that it is already a “factual nuclear state.”
The focus of the negotiations has shifted from “disarmament” to “risk control”.
The Trump administration is well aware of this. Although it still publicly declares that denuclearization is the ultimate goal, its actual operational expectations have been greatly reduced.
In this call, Trump did not revisit the old premise of "denuclearization", but showed great flexibility, which in itself implied a subtle adjustment in the US strategy-they were testing whether a "interim agreement" could be reached with a nuclear-armed North Korea without changing its verbal goals.
Based on new negotiations, the cards in Trump’s hand are different.
The core of his new bargaining chip lies in some form of "strategic recognition."
While it is almost impossible for the United States to legally officially recognize North Korea as a nuclear power, it can “recognize facts” through action – for example, agreeing to sign a declaration of end of war to provide security guarantees, or partially lifting sanctions in key areas in exchange for North Korea’s freezing nuclear tests and intercontinental ballistic missile tests.
This is essentially a deal: the United States may be at the expense of implicitly allowing North Korea to maintain its existing nuclear arsenal in exchange for no further escalation of its nuclear threat.
However, what Trump relies on remains the familiar old approach – the sudden relief after “extreme pressure” and the “trade art” that relies heavily on leaders’ personal relationships.
He tried to replicate the "miracle effect" of the board store meeting by showing a personalized gesture of "I am willing to change the schedule for you", creating an atmosphere of "as long as we meet, everything can be talked about".
The weaknesses of this approach have long been exposed: when it comes to the exchange of core interests such as lifting sanctions, the lack of bureaucratic system support, the “chemical effect” that depends solely on the leader’s presence, will instantly evaporate.
Today, he faces a larger nuclear arsenal, a North Korea with a more firm position, whether the old way can push the new chess station, undoubtedly to draw a huge question.
Faced with Trump’s scream, Kim’s silence itself is a powerful response.His strategic patience stems from the “established facts” he holds in his hands.
Kim Jong Un’s new demands are to seek a development and security space for the country after its nuclear status is (at least by default) guaranteed.
He hopes to break the economic isolation caused by long-term sanctions through diplomatic dialogue, obtain assistance in energy, food and economic construction, and finally normalize relations.
In short, what he wants to talk about now is: "Since you can no longer take away my nuclear shield, let's talk about how to exchange the 'stability' of my shield for the 'possibility' of national development."
All this is based on an unshakable old bottom line: nuclear weapons, as the absolute guarantee of the survival of the regime, will never be given up. This bottom line goes beyond any leader's personal relationships or diplomatic commitments.
Therefore, any plan that requires North Korea to unilaterally abandon its nuclear program first is not only naive, but also hostile provocation in Pyongyang's view. Kim Jong-un's calculation is far smarter than in the past: instead of rushing for success, he has to wait for the United States to come up with a price enough to match its "nuclear status".
Trump’s scream, which opens up, is not another naïve “denuclearization” fantasy, but a difficult quest in the shadow of this cold reality of “nuclear possession.”
Both sides are clear that it is impossible to return to the pre-2018 dialogue pattern.
The realistic goal of any future dialogue will be very limited: perhaps a freezing of nuclear tests, perhaps a suspension of missile tests, and in exchange for a partial loosening of sanctions.
This is destined to be an extremely tough negotiation.
For the United States, accepting a nuclear North Korea means a profound defeat of regional strategy and a crisis of trust in the alliance system; for North Korea, any form of nuclear freezing could raise domestic doubts about self-defeat.
However, in the face of the ultimate risk of nuclear war, even on the hardest foundation, finding ways to coexist and manage crises has become the only rational choice.
This potential tango with Trump and Kim Jong-un will be extremely heavy, but the price of stopping dancing may be unbearable for both sides.