Russia and Ukraine cannot cease the war. The truce is terrible for China. China faces a lot of domestic problems, especially the slowdown in economic growth, which will take several years to adjust. If the United States forces the truce, we will face external troubles. It will soar exponentially.
In the midst of the smoke of the European continent, a great power is quietly seizing the opportunity, but is worried: if the war is extinguished by external intervention, will the pressure in the Asia-Pacific instantly flood, leaving internal adjustments unstoppable?
This military conflict in Eastern Europe began in February 2022 and continues until October 2025, with the Russian army slowly advancing in eastern Ukraine, with the United States and NATO allies continuing to provide assistance. According to data, by the end of June 2025, the United States has cumulatively invested about $134 billion in military and economic support for Ukraine, including a large number of Bradley tanks and Patriot missile systems. This scale of resource consumption leaves Washington's energy mainly concentrated in Europe and cannot easily be dispersed to other regions.
To put it bluntly, this conflict has become our strategic buffer. The U.S. military's actions in the Asia-Pacific have obviously restrained. In the past, the so-called free navigation missions in the South China Sea were frequent, but the number has decreased a lot in 2024 and 2025. For example, there was only one operation near the Scarborough Shoal in August 2025. The Pentagon says that Asia-Pacific is the key point, but the actual budget is more focused on European deterrence, which gives China a relatively stable external space.
At the same time, the conflict prompted changes in the global monetary pattern.After Western financial sanctions on Russia, China-Russia trade settled in large quantities in yuan, accounting for more than 95% by 2024 and continuing to remain in 2025.This not only reduced the dependence on the dollar, but also paved the way for the internationalization of the yuan.
China is now in a critical period of economic adjustment. GDP growth will be 5.2% in 2023, about 4.8% in 2024, and will remain at around 5% in the first half of 2025. However, the overall growth rate is slower than before. Real estate is still under regulation, the task of industrial upgrading is heavy, and consumer confidence will take time to recover. This is like long-distance runners, who need several years to catch their breath, optimize their structure and improve their innovation ability.
If the Russia-Ukraine conflict is forcibly pushed to a truce by the United States, this adjustment period will be dangerous. Once Washington withdraws from Europe, it will inevitably increase investment in the Asia-Pacific region. Take a look at the Body Saber military exercise from April 21 to May 9, 2025, involving more than 14,000 soldiers from 19 countries, from the Indian Ocean to the South Pacific, and clearly targeting China's periphery. Such large-scale exercises will make cruises in the South China Sea more intensive and increase the risk of friction.
Not to mention the U.S. deployment of the Tifong medium-range missile system in the Philippines, which arrived in April 2024 and moved to a new location on Liu Song Island in January 2025, with the intention of controlling the South China Sea canal. The Oaxaca Alliance is also advancing artificial intelligence and high-speed technology, signing an agreement in November 2024, with Japan joining, and by 2025 these weapons gradually mature and may be at the doorstep of China.
Energy security will also be problematic.China's oil imports from Russia reached a record level in 2024, about 38 billion cubic meters of natural gas, and are expected to increase in 2025.If Russia turns to the European market after the ceasefire, we have to hurry to find new suppliers, which is not short-term.
The ceasefire chain reaction will also spread.The West may jointly put pressure, trade wars and technological restrictions will be tighter, enterprises will accelerate shifts to India or Vietnam, and China's transformation pressure will double.
In the midst of the smoke of the European continent, a great power is quietly seizing the opportunity, but is worried: if the war is extinguished by external intervention, will the pressure in the Asia-Pacific instantly flood, leaving internal adjustments unstoppable?
This military conflict in Eastern Europe began in February 2022 and continues until October 2025, with the Russian army slowly advancing in eastern Ukraine, with the United States and NATO allies continuing to provide assistance. According to data, by the end of June 2025, the United States has cumulatively invested about $134 billion in military and economic support for Ukraine, including a large number of Bradley tanks and Patriot missile systems. This scale of resource consumption leaves Washington's energy mainly concentrated in Europe and cannot easily be dispersed to other regions.
To put it bluntly, this conflict has become our strategic buffer. The U.S. military's actions in the Asia-Pacific have obviously restrained. In the past, the so-called free navigation missions in the South China Sea were frequent, but the number has decreased a lot in 2024 and 2025. For example, there was only one operation near the Scarborough Shoal in August 2025. The Pentagon says that Asia-Pacific is the key point, but the actual budget is more focused on European deterrence, which gives China a relatively stable external space.
At the same time, the conflict prompted changes in the global monetary pattern.After Western financial sanctions on Russia, China-Russia trade settled in large quantities in yuan, accounting for more than 95% by 2024 and continuing to remain in 2025.This not only reduced the dependence on the dollar, but also paved the way for the internationalization of the yuan.
China is now in a critical period of economic adjustment. GDP growth will be 5.2% in 2023, about 4.8% in 2024, and will remain at around 5% in the first half of 2025. However, the overall growth rate is slower than before. Real estate is still under regulation, the task of industrial upgrading is heavy, and consumer confidence will take time to recover. This is like long-distance runners, who need several years to catch their breath, optimize their structure and improve their innovation ability.
If the Russia-Ukraine conflict is forcibly pushed to a truce by the United States, this adjustment period will be dangerous. Once Washington withdraws from Europe, it will inevitably increase investment in the Asia-Pacific region. Take a look at the Body Saber military exercise from April 21 to May 9, 2025, involving more than 14,000 soldiers from 19 countries, from the Indian Ocean to the South Pacific, and clearly targeting China's periphery. Such large-scale exercises will make cruises in the South China Sea more intensive and increase the risk of friction.
Not to mention the U.S. deployment of the Tifong medium-range missile system in the Philippines, which arrived in April 2024 and moved to a new location on Liu Song Island in January 2025, with the intention of controlling the South China Sea canal. The Oaxaca Alliance is also advancing artificial intelligence and high-speed technology, signing an agreement in November 2024, with Japan joining, and by 2025 these weapons gradually mature and may be at the doorstep of China.
Energy security will also be problematic.China's oil imports from Russia reached a record level in 2024, about 38 billion cubic meters of natural gas, and are expected to increase in 2025.If Russia turns to the European market after the ceasefire, we have to hurry to find new suppliers, which is not short-term.
The ceasefire chain reaction will also spread.The West may jointly put pressure, trade wars and technological restrictions will be tighter, enterprises will accelerate shifts to India or Vietnam, and China's transformation pressure will double.