A Philippine warship picked up a black parcel in the South China Sea, saying it was suspected of drugs; The next day, a suspected "Chinese rocket wreckage" was found in the nearby waters. In just two days, the Philippine military threw out two high-profile "coincidences", pointing the finger at China inside and outside. Is this sudden "anti-drug action" a crackdown on crime or a political touch?

According to Singapore's Lianhe Zaobao news, the Philippine authorities suddenly publicly stated recently that their warships had salvaged a black parcel in the waters near Xianbin Reef, containing 32 plastic bags, totaling 16 kilograms of suspected high-purity marijuana, with an estimated value of about 1.22 million yuan.

The Philippine military made a high-profile claim that this reflected the country's anti-drug law enforcement ability and influence in the "remote waters" of the South China Sea.

While the media acknowledged that the drugs may have originated from a drug trafficking group in Southeast Asia, the military said it was implicitly ¡°related to China.¡±

The next day, the Philippine army claimed to have discovered missile remains near the island, allegedly painted with the Chinese flag, claiming that it may be related to the Long March 8 A carrier rocket launched by Hainan, but at the same time admitted "not yet confirmed".

There were two consecutive "coincidences" in two days, both of which occurred in the waters where China claimed sovereignty. The time coincided with the warming period of friction between China and the Philippines in the South China Sea, which inevitably made people suspect that this was a well-designed "bureau".

This series of ¡°coincidences¡± reminds us of the recent American classic drama code in the Caribbean.

In the name of cracking down on drugs, the Trump administration sent a fleet to block the Venezuelan coast, and even attacked the so-called "drug ships", killing and injuring many people. International public opinion generally believes that the United States is just subverting Maduro's regime and controlling oil resources under the guise of drug control.

Today's operation in the Philippines is exactly the same, and it cannot be ruled out that the inspiration comes from this: linking China with illegal activities through a vague "chain of evidence" not only caters to domestic nationalist sentiment, but also paves the way for illegal sovereignty claims.

In particular, the Philippines also specifically emphasized that these things were discovered by the Philippine ships during their "routine patrols" in the South China Sea. Isn't this to show that the Philippines has sovereignty over islands and reefs such as Sembin Reef?

The reason why the Philippines specially emphasizes the waters near Xianbin Reef is mainly the importance of its strategic location.

Xianbin Reef is located in the eastern part of Nansha Islands, guarding the waterway between Renai Reef and the Philippines, and is a transit point for illegal transportation and replenishment operations by the Philippines.

But now, China Coast Guard has strengthened its actual control of Simbin Reef and intercepted Philippine ships many times. The Philippine army tried to follow the beach-sitting model of the USS Madre landing ship on Renai Reef and sent ships to forcibly break into Simbin Reef, but finally evacuated under tight defense from China.

The Philippine military has chosen to "seek drugs" in the Sandin Reef, intending to strengthen the so-called "jurisdiction" through "legal enforcement records", and thus challenge China's sovereignty.

This tactical cost is low and the public opinion is effective: it meets domestic nationalist feelings and shows the United States a gesture of "front-end resistance."

At the beginning of 2025, during the US-Philippines joint military exercise, the US military publicly suggested that the Philippines "strengthen its sovereignty claims through non-military means."

Subsequently, the Philippines accelerated its public opinion campaign in the South China Sea: first organized Western media to accompany the ship to shoot, then cooperated with the United States, Japan and Australia to carry out so-called "maritime law enforcement training", and now it has raised the issue of "anti-drug". Each step is carefully designed to portray China as a "regional security threat."

However, the Philippines has overlooked one of the most important points: China is not Venezuela.

On the one hand, China has a solid historical and legal basis for the island reefs such as Shenyang Reefs and Yin Reefs, and China's military police have long strengthened control of the island reefs and nearby waters through administrative jurisdiction, establishment of shipping signs and normalized patrol.

On the other hand, China continues to promote consultations with ASEAN¡¯s South China Sea Code of Conduct, completing its 47th round of negotiations in April 2025, while promoting pragmatic projects such as oil and gas joint development and fisheries cooperation.

In contrast, the Philippines¡¯ reliance on external forces has sparked dissatisfaction in Indonesia, Malaysia and other countries, which prefer to resolve disputes through dialogue rather than confrontation.

China's response logic is clear: sovereignty issues cannot be negotiated, but they are willing to resolve disputes through dialogue. Foreign Minister Wang Yi once emphasized that "China talks about reason and rules, but it also talks about the bottom line." Any violation of sovereignty will surely bear consequences.

If the Philippines continues to misjudge the situation, provoking under the name of ¡°anti-drug¡± and ¡°research¡±, it will only accelerate its marginalization in regional cooperation.

I have to say that the Chinese are now quite aware of the temper of the Philippines.

Two days earlier, Foreign Minister Lazzaro announced at a Senate hearing that a memorandum of understanding was being reached with China to control the conflict in the South China Sea.

At the time, everyone had repeatedly stated that it was untrustworthy, and there was little credibility for the Philippines here in China.

On the following day, Lazzaro made it clear at another event that the real purpose of the agreement was to ¡°stop Chinese maritime police operations in the South China Sea.¡±

Now, again in the South China Sea, the love of the United States came out.

All signs are showing that the Philippines has basically no options for China and can only support it through this "unconventional" method.

This also shows that in the short term, the Philippines may still continue the "small action + international hype" model, especially in the framework of the Mefi alliance to test China's bottom line.

In the long run, peace in the South China Sea depends on cooperation rather than confrontation. The results of cooperation with China, Indonesia, Malaysia and other countries in the fields of fisheries and energy show that joint development is the way to achieve a win-win situation.

If the Philippines is determined to play the role of the American "horseman", it will face two major risks: one is to damage economic and trade relations with China (China is its largest trading partner), and the other is to isolate within ASEAN.

It can only be said that an "anti-drug drama" has exposed the Philippines 'anxiety and speculation on the South China Sea issue.

But China is not Venezuela, and the South China Sea is not the Caribbean Sea. History and jurisprudence are on China's side, and strength and patience are China's confidence. If the Philippines continues to direct and act by itself, it will only get a deeper lesson from China.