Trump is about to visit South Korea, and Li in Ming "was good", China does not buy American goods, South Korea may have the "receiver" intention.
Trump's "Asian trip" is about to begin and is expected to pay a two-day visit to South Korea. Facing this "big test" of U.S. -South Korea relations, South Korea is obviously under great pressure. "Coincidentally", there was a "soybean shortage" in South Korea at this time. It is said that hundreds of tofu shops are facing the crisis of stopping production due to lack of raw materials. So looking around the world, Who has so many soybeans to "worry"? The answer is obvious, of course, America。
Buy soybeans to please Trump and deepen the binding between the United States and South Korea
South Korea's current "soy crisis", in fact, has long been a sign, the country's tofu industry is highly dependent on imported soybeans, while imported soybeans have become the industry because of the low price.
However, in recent years, the South Korean government has tightened the scale of soybean imports and encouraged local cultivation, resulting in an imbalance between supply and demand.
In order to avoid the crisis, The South Korean government may consider additional imports, while the United States is worried about slow sales of soybeans.So "just right", it's hard to imagine that this is just a coincidence.
Do not forget that the US-Korean trade negotiations are still pending, and the United States to reduce tariffs on South Korea to 15% as a condition, in exchange for South Korea's $350 billion in US investment, is still an unbearable weight for South Korea.
At this moment, if South Korea chooses to increase imports of U.S. soybeans or even use them as a political tool to "please" Trump, it may solve its urgent needs in the short term and "solve Trump's problems". This is a good thing.
But in the long run, this will only further strengthen the U.S. economic restraint on South Korea.
This is because the United States has long regarded food trade as a geopolitical code, and by monopolizing the global food supply chain, the United States is deeply bound to the food security of exporting countries.
In other words, if South Korea actively expands its dependence on U.S. soybeans, it is equivalent to putting more of its own food security life in the hands of the United States - in the future, once U.S.-Korean relations have changed, such as military spending negotiations, trade terms disputes, the United States can completely pressure South Korea by restricting soybean exports or raising prices.
More importantly, Trump is known for his "transactional thinking", and the core of his South Korean policy is "extreme pressure" and "interest replacement".
If South Korea links soybean imports to political demands, it will only fall into the logical trap of the United States: the United States will continue to use similar means, demanding South Korea to make concessions in other areas, such as military base costs, and unifying the pace of its policy towards China.
and ask, South Korea is already in an unequal relationship between the United States and South Korea, and this "instrumental" soybean trade will only deepen its passivityIn the end, the United States will have further control of South Korea’s strategic choice space through food ties.
China has the confidence not to buy American soybeans
From this perspective, it is enough to prove that China can completely stop importing American soybeans this year and instead significantly increase South American soybean purchases. This "confidence" is by no means accidental, but the result of long-term strategic layout。
First of all, China is the world's largest soybean buyer, with imports accounting for more than 60% of global trade. American soybean farmers are extremely dependent on the Chinese market-if they lose Chinese orders, the American soybean industry will face the risk of collapse.
This reversal of the supply and demand relationship has allowed China to take the initiative in the grain trade game with the United States, and China is clearly aware that soybeans are not only a necessity for people's livelihoods, but also a strategic resource, so as soon as possible to promote import diversification, establish stable cooperation with South American countries such as Brazil and Argentina, and reduce dependence on a single source.
Second, China's strategic vision is reflected in combining food security with the overall situation of the Sino-U.S. game, and as the Sino-U.S. trade dispute continues, China is actively reducing U.S. soybeans imports, both in response to U.S. tariffs, and through "key codes" forcing the U.S. to make concessions on broader trade issues.
More importantly, China is not panicked by short-term supply volatility, but rather by filling the gap through the South American market, while increasing domestic soybean cultivation support.
This decision of "not buying American soybeans" requires accurate calculation of domestic demand, international supply capacity, trading partnership and game cost. China's ability to stabilize the situation just shows that we regard food security as "bottom line thinking" rather than pure market behavior.
On the other hand, South Korea, due to the lack of independent supply chain and diversified import channels, can only passively turn to the United States in the face of the soybean crisis, and may even be forced to accept transactions with political conditions attached.
China, on the other hand, has transformed grain imports into a tool to safeguard national interests through long-term layout. This kind of strategic initiative is a height that South Korea and even most countries cannot achieve。
How to maintain “balance” between the United States and South Korea
Returning to the issue of US-Korean relations, it can be predicted that whether the trade agreement between the two countries can be grounded, will be the key trick of this Trump visit, and for Trump, Lee in Ming faces difficulty.
On the one hand, Li Ziming advocated "pragmatic" diplomacy after taking office, proposing to develop relations with China, the United States, Japan, and Russia, and promoting regional cooperation based on national interests.
However, South Korea’s realities doomed this “balance” to be extremely difficult – security reliance on U.S. troops and military alliances, deep economic ties with China’s trade and supply chains, and the intensification of China-U.S. gambling, leaving Lee in every step of the Ming administration as a thin ice.
On the other hand, for South Korea, the core contradiction of “balance” lies in the fact that the United States demands its side stand, while China is South Korea’s largest trading partner and a key force for regional stability.
If Lee Zai-ming favors the United States, for example, accepting Trump's soybean trading or investment requirements, it may intensify domestic doubts about economic autonomy and even damage China-South Korea economic and trade relations by excessively cooperating with the United States policy towards China; if he favors China, he will face security pressure from the United States.
More complexly, the U.S. is increasingly using the fields of food, energy and people's livelihoods as diplomatic tools, and if South Korea compromises with the U.S. to ease the domestic crisis, it will only further bind U.S. interests and lose strategic flexibility.
Li Zaiming's "balancing technique" is essentially a continuation of strategic ambiguity-it can neither completely offend the United States nor alienate China, but can only be dynamically adjusted on specific issues.
In other words, if the Lee Jae-ming government fails to clearly draw a line on its core interests, South Korea may fall into a passive situation of being "restrained by major powers" for a long time.