Zelensky directed his hand to Russia’s energy lifeline.
Instead of relying on fighting hard on the front lines or diplomatic calls, we use drones, speedboats, and long-range missiles to accurately strike refineries and offshore platforms-there is only one goal: to empty Moscow's purse first.
Reuters said: “Ukraine has finally found the right way to hurt Russia.”
This sounds sharp, but logical.
Nearly 50% of Russia's fiscal income comes from energy exports, and once the refining capacity is paralyzed, it is equivalent to the crude oil stack in the mountains can not become the diesel of the front tanks, the aircraft of the aircraft, and the gasoline in the people's cars.
This is not tactical harassment, it is strategic hanging.
Someone will ask: hasn’t anyone tried this trick?
During World War II, Hitler fought Stalingrad, divided his troops south, and his eyes were fixed on the Baku oil field.
He wants oil, not land.
As a result, they didn't win it, but were besieged and annihilated.
Today, Ukraine does not steal oil fields and explodes refineries.
The oil field can still produce, but it cannot be refined. Crude oil is just a pile of black mud.
Unable to sell, unable to move the front lines, unable to supply domestically—this is more fatal than losing a few cities.
Late at night on October 6, the Antipinsky oil refinery exploded in Tyumen Oblast, Russia.
Fire on the sky, smoke on the moon.
An Ukrainian drone flew 2,100 kilometers, crossing the Ural Mountains, directly into the heart of Asia.
This is not isolated.
Within six days, the Ukrainian army destroyed five refineries in a row, claiming to eliminate tens of millions of tons of annual refining capacity.
Even if it is half in half, it will be enough to shake the foundation of Russia's energy system.
Why choose Asia?
Because some parts of Russia's air defense in Europe are as dense as a spider's web, but east of the Ural Mountains is full of loopholes.
The land is vast and sparsely populated, with sparse radar coverage, and small low-altitude and slow-moving drones are easy to penetrate.
The Ukrainian army was not lucky, but calculated the weak bands of defense and quietly moved the focus of the strike to the "back yard".
What is even more ruthless is the choice of goals.
These refineries are not only the source of civilian fuel, but also the core source of aviation coal and military-industrial chemical raw materials.
The Su-35 is used for oil, the T-90 is used for diesel, and some intermediates for cannon explosives also rely on refinery by-products.
The refined chain is broken, the front line is not "lacking ammunition", it is "lacking legs" - the car is not moving, the machine is not flying, the supply line is paralyzed.
This kind of attack has a deeper, wider and more lasting impact than a bomb depot.
Repair?
almost impossible .
The core equipment of modern refineries-hydrocracking units, catalytic reforming reactors, special compressors, high-precision control valves-relies heavily on western technology.
Under the sanctions, key parts of confession were cut.
Russia is trying to replace itself, but it will take at least five years to rebuild the entire supply chain.
“It is not the oil tank that explodes in Ukraine, it is Russia’s industrial life for the next five years.”
This may be exaggerated, but the technical level is by no means empty talk.
The Black Sea is not idle either.
On October 10, the General Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine released a video: multiple unmanned speedboats approached the Russian-controlled offshore oil rig from the high seas, ejected FPV suicide drones, and accurately hit key structures.
Platform operation interrupted, some facilities damaged.
This is the second time.
On September 11, 2024, the "Tremur" Special Forces under the "Crave" group launched a FPV drone from a speedboat and attacked a near-sea gas platform near the Crimea.
The platform was transformed by the Russian military into a forward post, equipped with radar and communication equipment, and is a "nail" to the Black Sea surveillance network.
Remove it, cut off income, and cut off ears.
The essence of tactics is maritime guerrilla warfare.
The Ukrainian army has no aircraft carriers, no destroyers, simply combined with "fast boat + unmanned aircraft".
The speedboat has low cost, strong concealment, and can maneuver in radar blind spots.
FPV drones fly close to the sea to evade air defense.
At the end of the fight, no chance of retreat.
Despite the operation in 2024, the Russian military sinked eight fast boats, but the Ukrainian army, using "multi-wave, small-scale, high-frequency" harassment, forced the main force of the Black Sea fleet to withdraw 800 kilometers to the port of New Russk.
Odessa's shipping passage to Istanbul, Ukraine recovered part of the initiative.
The logic of the whole set of play is clear: if it is difficult to break through from the front, change the track.
If you can't compete with the number of tanks, you will fight for economic endurance; if you can't compete with the scale of manpower, you will fight for technological asymmetry.
Using low-cost, high-precision strikes continues to consume Russia's war potential.
This is not a traditional military confrontation, it is an economic war of precision surgery.
Ukraine is also struggling to fill the technical shortage.
The "Flamingo" long-range missile is about to enter service.
It has a range of 3000 kilometers and the cost is only one-third of that of its kind in the West.
The performance may not be top-notch, but it can carry a 1-ton warhead and is specialized in bombing large fixed targets such as refinery storage tanks and distillation towers.
Military enthusiasts estimate that the destructive power of a "Flamingo" ≈ the sum of more than ten ordinary drones.
It can be launched from inland, making it more survivable.
Once installed in batches, attacks will become the norm.
Several missiles fly to Volgograd, Samara, and Omsk every month. Even if Russia intercepts some of them, it will not be able to withstand long-term consumption.
Russia’s missile production capacity is sharply shrinking.
In September 2025, cruise missile and drone launches fell by 40 percent compared to August.
Western sanctions have blocked the supply of electronic components and propellants. Although North Korea has expressed its "full support", it is difficult to solve immediate thirst.
The situation in Northeast Asia is complicated and aid is limited, which cannot replace the western industrial system.
Russia is in an unprecedented embarrassment: the territory is not lost, but the purse is deflated first.
The war is about finance.
Soldiers need pay, tanks need oil, missiles need to be built, hospitals need to run-all supported by energy revenue.
Once the flow is cut off, the government must choose between "protecting the front line" and "protecting people's livelihood".
Which one you choose is death.
Priority is given to military spending, long row of gas stations, rising heating costs, social dissatisfaction and fermentation; priority is given to people's livelihoods, the supply of the front line is interrupted, and morality collapses.
This is more fatal than the loss of land.
Time is more deadly.
At the end of October, the cold winter will arrive.
Minus thirty or forty degrees is the norm in Siberia.
If the refining capacity cannot be restored, the shortage of diesel and heating oil will spread to Moscow and St. Petersburg.
The front-line armored forces lay down, and the back of the city was frozen - this contradiction is very easy to shake the heart of the people.
Netizens worry: “Will the Russians be in line this winter while listening to the news saying ‘Special military operations are victorious’?”
The Ukrainian army's strategic intention is clear: there is no hope of recovering Crimea in the short term, but the cost of the war will be too high for Moscow to bear, forcing it to return to the negotiating table.
Not by winning, but by winning.
Similar to the logic of the Vietnam War-the U.S. military equipment was crushed and eventually dragged down by domestic political and economic endurance.
Ukraine replicated this, transforming the battlefield from a jungle into a refinery and platform.
There are certainly risks.
Russia will take revenge.
If focused fire bombardment of Ukrainian energy facilities - Kiev transformation power plant, Lviv oil warehouse - the Ukrainian side is also under pressure.
More critical is whether Western aid can be sustained.
Trump was elected to the White House in January 2025.
He has repeatedly vowed to “end the war as soon as possible” and could pressure Ukraine to make concessions.
If U.S. aid decreases, high-tech methods are difficult to follow.
Drones, missiles, satellite intelligence, and burning money.
But the Ukrainian army has proved one point: small countries can severely injure large countries through asymmetric means.
There are no aircraft carriers, there are fast boats; there are no strategic bombers, there are 2100 kilometers of drones; there are no oil dollars, which can accurately hit each other’s oil dollar source.
This kind of "expanding with the small" may become a new paradigm for future conflicts.
Energy wars are also reshaping the global landscape.
Russia, once the largest supplier of oil to Europe, is now limited in production capacity, and Europe shifts to the United States, the Middle East, and Africa.
U.S. LNG exports surged sharply, the voice in the Middle East rose, and Norway and Azerbaijan took the opportunity to expand their shares.
Russia was forced to turn to Asia, but India and China pressed prices hard, resulting in high transportation costs and a sharp decline in profits.
In the long run, its global energy status is unlikely to decline.
For Uzbekistan, this is a crisis and a turning point.
If Russia's energy system is really dragged down, it will not only change the battlefield situation, but also increase the bargaining chip in post-war negotiations.
Even if the ceasefire line remains unchanged, the threat of a neighboring country with exhausted finances, damaged industry and unstable people is far less than that of an opponent with abundant energy and abundant military expenditure.
The premise is that the strike must be continuous, accurate and efficient.
We can't stop, we can't accidentally injure civilians.
At present, the objective of the Ukrainian military is clear – only to hit energy facilities, not to touch residential areas.
This restraint, instead, earned more international sympathy.
Netizens review: “Ukraine is fighting a smart war, not a barbaric war.”
The effects of psychological warfare cannot be ignored.
Every time the refinery explosion video leaked, global oil prices fluctuated, the ruble exchange rate jumped, and the Moscow stock market fell.
Chain reactions worry the Kremlin more than missiles.
The Ukrainian army's strike not only destroyed physical facilities, but also shaken market confidence in the Russian economy.
Once confidence is broken, it is hundreds of times harder to repair than a refinery.
Looking back in 2022, who would expect this to happen?
At that time, the focus was on the Tank Wars, the siege of Mariupol.
Who could have thought that three years later, it was not the ruins of Bachemuth that decided to go, but the refinery in Akimino?
The form of war has completely changed.
The core of Ukraine’s path is “the smallest cost, the greatest strategic gain.”
Not one city, but one economy.
This idea, which does not exist in traditional military textbooks, is unusually effective in mixed warfare in the 21st century.
Modern warfare is no longer a pure military confrontation, but a comprehensive competition of economy, science and technology, information, and psychology.
Some people say that the Russian family has a rich background and can survive for several years.
War is dynamic.
We are progressing, Western technology is flowing in, tactics are iterating.
Today drones blow up refineries, tomorrow AI guides precision strikes, and the day after tomorrow cyber attacks may become the norm.
Russia, however, has been upgraded by sanctions and technology, and military industry will rely on old-fashioned products, and the gap will only grow.
What's more crucial is the nature of the war.
Ukraine is fighting the battle for survival, Russia is fighting the battle for expansion.
The former is strong and the latter is tired.
Working hard to protect and defend the country, the energy burst out is astonishing.
Behind those drones that traveled 2100 kilometers, engineers, operators, and intelligence officers fought day and night.
This resilience, incineration in artillery, is not a slogan.
Don't underestimate the sound of refinery explosions.
They are heavy hammers, hitting the Russian war machine one by one.
Each destroyed refinery is accelerating the consumption of Moscow's strategic patience; Every platform attack weakens the Russian maritime presence.
The quantity will change, and the quantity will change.
This winter will be long for Russia.
Black smoke was emitted from the ruins of the refinery, and front-line armor was lying down due to lack of oil; the Ministry of Finance was worried about revenue and expenditure, and people lined up in long lines at the gas station.
Internal and external difficulties are more dangerous than failure in any battle.
The defeat of the battlefield can compensate for the increase of troops, the economic vitality is crushed, and it is not easy to recover.
Zelensky, this game of chess, was fiercely uncompromising, decisively bloodshed.
He knew that as long as Moscow's purse was emptied first, the turf problem would turn for the better.
History has repeatedly proved that a war cannot be fought without financial support.