Source: China News Weekly
After entering October, the suddenly escalating French political crisis once reached the verge of getting out of control, but it finally came to an end with Prime Minister Le Corney being reappointed, reorganized the government, and struggled to pass the first no-confidence motion.
However, this dramatic "salted fish turnaround" also paid a heavy political price. In his policy report, Le Corney formally promised to suspend the controversial reform of the retirement system until after the 2027 election in exchange for the key opposition party, the Socialist Party, not participating in the overthrow of the cabinet. The outside world agrees that, like the two previous governments that have collapsed in succession, the fate of the new government is still in the hands of the opposition party, and its power base remains extremely fragile.
Le Corny's statement is not the product of independent decision-making. This political decision must be made by President Macron himself. Therefore, the decision to suspend retirement reform is also regarded as a compromise that Macron has no choice but to make after weighing the pros and cons. Otherwise, he may face the gloomy prospect of dissolving the parliament for the second time, holding an early general election and collapsing the ruling foundation.
Even if Cancun kept the government away from the downfall, the next one-and-a-half-year term is still a big deal for Macron. On the one hand, the suspension of the reform of the retirement system sends a signal to political enemies: as long as the pressure is large enough and the situation is critical enough, the policies previously considered "untouchable" by the government are not to be abandoned. This makes it more difficult to clean up the "workplace" of other reforms (chantier, the common term used in French media). On the other hand, Macron's last reluctant implementation of the "political decision", namely dissolving the National Assembly in 2024 and holding early parliamentary elections, continues to ferment. In the absence of major changes in the parliamentary pattern, the more important issue
"Lame stage"
For most members of Macron's camp, it was undoubtedly a bitter feeling to hear Leclerc personally announce the suspension of retirement reform, despite the signs he had felt in advance. The reason is not difficult to understand: this is almost the only major reform that Macron's second term has seen so far, and has now stopped in the middle of the road and has been frozen to the presidential election, making Macron's second term's performance gloomy.
Of course, retirement reform is only a "pause" after all. It is too harsh to describe it as "halfway done" or "achieving nothing". On the one hand, it is not "cancelled" as the left initially advocated. After the passage of the retirement bill, the retirement age has increased from 62 years to 62 years for nine months, compared with the original plan to increase to 64 years; the contribution time required to obtain a full pension has been extended from 42 years to 42.5 years, which is half a year shorter than the original plan. The extension to 43 years is half a year shorter. In other words, even if this reform is less than 50%, it is still better than not being able to change it at all or returning to zero overnight. On the other hand, even if the reform is frozen in the next two years, there is still an opportunity to continue to advance after the 2027 election, after the new president comes to power and the new parliament is in place. To say the least, even if the left and even the extreme right come to power and want to completely cancel the retirement reform, they will still face huge resistance unless they win a "sweeping" victory in the parliamentary election.
Political losses, however, are difficult to calculate by merely tactical progress, and more importantly, the suspension of retirement reforms marks Macron’s reform ambition being defeated on a strategic level. Both he himself and the whole camp behind him have consumed enormous political momentum for this long-term reform over a period of five to six years, and now, just a year and a half from the next presidential election, it is difficult for them to re-accumulate enough momentum to push for more reforms.
As an example, in his statement after being renewed, Le Corni never talked about any ambitions. Instead, he targeted a relatively low position and formulated a new budget for France. In other words, at least until the end of 2025, the government's main energy will be on the budget and related measures. By 2026, the fiscal deficit issue will still occupy a considerable part of the government's energy. Others, such as administrative reform (which requires the abolition of civil servants), education reform (which offends trade unions), unemployment system reform (also suspended), and assisted death rights (the right-dominated Senate is hostile), may face greater resistance. With the successful experience of forcing a suspension of retirement system reform in the front and the hope of a "change of place" in the presidential election, it will be more difficult for the opposition to make compromises.
It can be said that in the face of the remaining year and a half of the term, although the government has been preserved by making concessions on the reform of the pension system, and has not fallen into greater chaos, Macron’s administration has entered the “fase of crumbling” early.
The “parliamentary majority”
Around the Leicester government, public opinion often criticizes Macron’s refusal to step down and, in a situation where he is politically clearly unpopular, still tries to influence the government’s staff and policy. The president, whose popular support rate has fallen to a new low (17-18%) seems to have become a “negative asset” for the prime minister and his cabinet team.
However, under the "semi-presidential and semi-parliamentary system" of the French Fifth Republic, the president itself is not a ceremonial role, but the real "keystone", the political center of gravity. The president chooses the prime minister according to his own wishes, which is the proper meaning given by the system, except that it can also be recognized by the parliament. This is the root cause of "co-governance between the left and right" in special circumstances: when the will of the president conflicts with the will of the parliamentary majority, the latter should be given priority. But otherwise, in the vast majority of cases, the president's will is the dominant factor in government personnel.
The question is precisely this: after early parliamentary elections in 2024 and the loss of the majority by Macron, France today faces a pan-left, middle-right, and far-right “three-foot” situation, or, more precisely, a “suspension parliament” formed by the far-left “Inevitable France”, the middle-left Socialist Party, the middle-left Renaissance Party and its allies, the middle-right Republican Party, the far-right National League and its allies “Five Strengths”.
In this fragmented situation, the "parliamentary majority" has become a metaphysical issue. The pan-left claims to be the first camp, but this is only a relative majority rather than an absolute majority. Moreover,"Indomitable France" and the Socialist Party are in conflict and are difficult to advance and retreat together; the National Alliance claims to be the largest single party group in the parliament, but in fact it only ranks third as a camp; The Ba 'ath Party and its allies are on the chopping block, trying to maintain the government and implement policies, but this requires the support or acquiescence of both the Republican Party and the Socialist Party to pass over half of the seats, and there is often a profound contradiction between the two. Therefore, the so-called "parliamentary majority" does not exist in fact and depends entirely on the specific issues, political situation, bargaining chips, and even the people involved.
Under such circumstances, Macron appointed one of his loyal supporters as prime minister and then selected multiple figures from Macron's camp, which was both out of his own interests and a last resort under restrictions. Since the current situation is not so serious that it is necessary to appoint a purely technocratic team, and there have been two failures in appointing right-wing figures to form a cabinet, appointing left-wing figures to form a cabinet may cause the Republican Party to immediately join the opposition camp, causing the "seesaw" of power to be unbalanced instantly. Then the safest choice is to appoint a team based on the Macron faction and compatible with technocrats and "civil society" to give it some new atmosphere. This is exactly what Le Corney's new government is trying to present.
In addition, there has been a number of “gambling” voices: since it is destined to be “unmanageable”, it is likely that the first major party “National League” will rule, and that either party chairman Baldray or parliamentary party leader Le Pen will fail as prime minister. In the last year and a half of Macron’s term, the extreme right should fully expose the shortcomings in exchange for the reversal of the voters in the general election in 2027, without losing a “retreat” strategy.
This strategy seems to be full of Machiavellian cunning, but it is difficult to pass the short-term test: if Macron really takes risks and takes the world's disapproval to let the National League enter the Prime Minister's Office, let alone it will be written into history with a shameful image. In reality, the left will not hesitate to launch the cabinet overthrow, and there is a high probability that it will be seconded by the centrists and the center-right. This will also mean the collapse of the ruling coalition. I'm afraid the National League will be ousted before the throne of prime minister is warmed up. At that time, I'm afraid the biggest loser of this personnel change will not be the far right (they will rightfully accuse the establishment of ignoring public opinion), but Macron himself, who has made another political mistake.
From "Centrist Storm" to "Centrist Curse"
Judging from the historical trajectory since taking office in 2017, Macron's support in the parliament has actually been on a downward curve. In 2017, he not only successfully won the Elysee Palace himself, but his newly established centrist "Kadima Party of the Republic"(LREM) also caused a strong storm, sweeping 308 seats, and the absolute majority of the parliament (289 seats) became in the bag. But three years later, in May 2020, just as the COVID-19 epidemic began to break out in France, the seat of the Kadima Party of the Republic dropped to 288 seats. Although the parliamentary majority is temporarily safe with the support of allies, the number of single-party seats fell below the landmark 289, still highlighting the downward trend.
In 2022, although Macron is the president of *, his party's parliamentary seats have shrunk significantly, and his allies have only 245 seats in total. He has undoubtedly lost his parliamentary majority and must seek cooperation from the center-right Republican Party. After the setback in the 2024 European Parliament election, Macron dissolved the National Assembly and re-elected it in an attempt to curb the momentum of the far-right. The result was self-defeating, which not only led to further expansion of the far-right, but also plummeted to 166 seats in the ruling coalition. Today, Macron's faction plus two ally parties only have 162 seats. Compared with the highlight moment when one party won 308 seats alone, people can't help feeling "thirty years in Hedong and thirty years in Hexi".
This phenomenon is not a special example in France. Looking at the European countries and even the European Parliament, in the past decade there has been a similar phenomenon in different degrees of the mainstream political party popular opinion shrinkage, the rapid expansion of the momentum of extreme power, and even in Italy, the Netherlands and other countries, the extreme right has entered the chamber and hold power. But the unique thing in France is that the wave of "political polarization" is hit by a lack of grounded new intermediate force, despite the practical functioning of the right-wing characteristics of pro-business.
At that time, Macron took advantage of voters' dissatisfaction, "climbing high and gathering responders", and promised to meet their expectations with a brand-new middle road model, but at the same time, it planted the seeds of crisis. Voters' illusory expectations quickly failed in the concrete fulfillment process, and they felt cheated and betrayed. Even a few cents' increase in fuel surcharge would set off their emotions. After a short two-year "honeymoon period" from 2017 to 2019, the "yellow vest" movement, COVID-19 pandemic, immigration crisis, Russia-Ukraine war, and inflation crisis took turns to appear. During this period, there were terrorist attacks one after another, and the social mentality greatly deteriorated. The "centrist storm" of those days can be described as its rise and decline, but now it has become a "centrist curse", which has produced a more fierce backlash effect.
The collapse of the presidential camp
In this context, an important sign of the deepening of the political crisis is that the call of "Macron stepping down" has been transmitted from the angry slogans on the streets to the political marginal forces, and gradually spread, which has been echoed by the traditional mainstream political parties, and has even begun to erode the ruling coalition.
After Le Corny's dramatic resignation on October 6, Attal, the current Secretary-General of the Baath Party, publicly stated on French TV 1 in front of a national audience that "like many French people, I no longer understand the decision of the head of state" and criticized that after the dissolution of parliament in 2024, "some of (Macron's) decisions give people a sense of a stubbornness in wanting to firmly grasp power." For the former prime minister who was once regarded as Macron's successor, but was forced to leave the Matignon Palace because of the dissolution of parliament, this statement is not only confusing, but also a harsh accusation mixed with resentment, which is equivalent to publicly exposing the cracks and contradictions between the ruling elites to everyone.
In comparison, another former prime minister, Philip, was even more assertive. Following the outbreak of the crisis surrounding LeConnie's resignation, Philip publicly shouted that Macron should hold a presidential election after the budget was drawn up and leave. After LeConnie restructured the government and the crisis was temporarily calmed, Philip still reiterated that Macron should step down early, because it was the "only decent decision" to avoid falling into a political crisis again in the next year and a half. Though it is clear to the outside that the new party, "Horizon", has been determined to ignore Macron's will and participate independently in the 2027 general election, but the so determined "domestic" attitude, so unexpectedly to break with Macron, still leaves the outside.
If the radical left-wing and far-right calls for "Macron to step down" can also be regarded as a means of pressure from political opponents, then the noise from within shows unprecedented signs of the collapse of the ruling coalition. Corresponding to the "lame" state nearing the end of his term of office, this symptom of collapse is difficult to gradually disappear, but it will intensify with the passage of time and the game around the qualification of "Macron's successor". The Macron camp, which grew up from the cracks between the left and right camps, is not a "political family" with deep roots, both at the ideological level and at the organizational level. Once this cracking process begins, it may be even more thrilling.
(The author is a doctor of law and a media person living in France)
by FU2025.10.27 total 1209th edition of China News Weekly magazine
DifficultyThe title: The "lame stage" of Macron's administration
The Author:by nick