From October 9, when Pakistan suddenly launched air strikes on many places in Afghanistan, to October 19, when the two countries reached a ceasefire agreement in Doha, the capital of Qatar, this round of renewed cross-fire on the 10th border between Pakistan and Afghanistan was the fiercest and deadliest since the Afghan Taliban came to power in 2021. As the latest trend in the ongoing bilateral friction in the past two years, this conflict has pushed the tense relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan to a new climax.
On October 19, 2025, Doha, Qatar, Pakistan's Defence Minister Khwaja Ashiv (middle-right) and the Defence Minister of the "Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan" Mohamed Jacob Mujahid signed a ceasefire agreement.
Looking at the latest conflict alone, the direct cause is Pakistan's determination that Afghanistan is harbouring militants of the terrorist organization "Pakistan Taliban"(TTP, referred to as "Bata"). The fundamental reason still lies in counter-terrorism and security, sovereignty, territorial boundaries, refugee and human flow, ethnicity, religion, economy and trade and many other factors are superimposed, resulting in multiple contradictions. The outbreak of the conflict coincided with the first visit of Afghan Foreign Minister Mottaki to India, which objectively added to the situation on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border.
Under the mediation of Qatar, Turkey and other countries, the two sides first agreed to a ceasefire in Doha, and then agreed to discuss specific mechanisms for security cooperation in Istanbul, Turkey.But the never-before-lasting ceasefire efforts show that small-scale conflict terror is still the norm in the border areas of the two countries, and the participation of countries outside the same period means that the future situation variation fear will be beyond the control of both parties.
Traditional contradictions again.
This border exchange is not an isolated incident, but an integral part and new development of the ongoing military conflict between the two neighboring countries of Pakistan and Afghanistan in 2024, especially since September last year. To put it more broadly, the border friction between the two countries has been constant since 1949. It is conceivable that Pakistan took the lead in launching an attack again on October 9, largely due to the recurrence of inherent contradictions. It can be seen from the official rhetoric and public opinion exchanges between the governments and militaries of both sides thatCounter-terrorism and the old contradiction between security and territorial sovereignty are still the main reasons for restarting military strikes.
Pakistan has long accused Afghanistan of hiding "Bata"(as well as the "Balochistan Liberation Army" and "Islamic State" militants),The latter supported the launch of terrorist attacks on Pakistan.The first wave of Pakistan's air strikes on 9 October, in addition to striking Hoest, Jalalabad, and Paktika in the border areas of the Arab Republic, also targeted Abdullah Hak Square in its capital Kabul, attempting to "cut the head" of "Bata" leader Noor Vali Mahsud (in 2020 was included in the UN's terrorist sanctions list).
It is rumored that Mehsud was killed in the air raid, but "Bata" immediately released the "unverified" audio of the parties, saying that he survived, but this also proved the fact that "Bata" was active in Afghanistan again from the side. However, Afghanistan neither accepts Pakistan's rhetoric nor military strikes against itself. The Taliban never admitted to hiding terrorist organizations and attacking Pakistan. Instead, it accused the Pakistani government of spreading fake news on the one hand and hiding "Islamic State" militants on the other, with the intention of undermining Afghanistan's sovereignty and national stability.
Two days after the Taliban made a counterattack, the Arab Army led by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, Kari Fashidine, launched a counterattack on several Pakistani military positions in the border area on the night of the 11th, and the two sides engaged in a fierce fighting. Subsequently, the Arab Defense Ministry announced the end of the retaliation operation, warning that any future violation of the al-Qaeda airspace would be a decisive response.
The confrontation between the two armies that lasted from the night of the 11th to the early morning of the 12th alone pushed this round of conflict to the most intense since the Taliban returned to power in 2021. Judging from casualties alone, the Pakistani side claimed to have killed at least 200 "Bata" militants and 23 of its own people were killed; The Afghan side said that the exchange of fire killed 58 Palestinian people and 9 others on its own side. At this point, the friction between the two sides has been out of control, military operations have escalated, and ground operations and air strikes have alternated for several consecutive days, affecting Kabul, Kandahar, Khost, Kunar, and Paktika. The entire border area and the capital of Afghanistan are shrouded in the cloud of possible war.
After three days of intense fighting, the two countries reached a 48-hour temporary ceasefire agreement, which was mediated by Qatar and Turkey, and the United Nations Aid Mission for Afghanistan also expressed concern. As planned, the delegations of the two countries will negotiate in Doha on 18 and maintain a ceasefire before the end of the negotiations.
Another traditional contradiction associated with the “terrorism theory” is a dispute over the legitimacy of the 2640-kilometre border “Duland line” between the two countries.After Pakistan's independence in 1947, the "Duran Line" artificially drawn by the former British colonists to dismantle the Pashtuns and their homeland continued to be the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, and was recognized by Pakistan and the international community. However, the "Duran Line" separates the Pashtuns on both sides of the border (the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan and the second largest ethnic group in Pakistan), which makes the total number of Pashtuns in Pakistan exceed that in Afghanistan. Therefore, successive Afghan governments, especially Pashtuns, refused to recognize the border line.
A large number of Pushtu militants have used easy-to-hide border mountains every year to traverse both sides of the “Duland Line” to carry out massive terrorist attacks in Pakistan, according to the Pakistan Institute for Conflict and Security Studies (PICSS), which reports that there were 212 armed attacks in Pakistan in August and September alone, with a total of 328 deaths, including the death toll in August (193 people), the highest record in 11 years.
In response, the Pakistani government has almost entirely surrounded the “Duland Line” with barricades, and has been very vigilant about the 3.5 million Afghans (including 1.3 million refugees) living in Pakistan, identifying a large number of terrorists hiding there.In addition to the large group of Afghans has put serious pressure on Pakistani public services, infrastructure, job market, and social governance, the Pakistani government has launched the “illegal foreign repatriation program” since November 2023, and has deported 800,000 Afghan refugees in a year, and more than 1 million refugees have been deported back to Afghanistan by 2025.
In Afghanistan's view, unilateral repatriation is forcing the Afghan side to accept the Pakistani government's narrative that "refugees are terrorists". The resurgence of refugees has overwhelmed the country's already fragile economy and infrastructure, and the problems of poverty, dropout and unemployment have worsened. Many Afghan refugees have already taken root in Pakistan, and being forcibly sent back to their motherland in the legal sense means that it is more difficult to make a living in the new environment. In addition, many of them are unwilling to live in Afghanistan under the Taliban. The Pakistani government's move has stimulated their hatred towards Pakistan.
India enters the arena, and the geopolitical situation is reborn
After 13 hours of negotiations in Doha, a delegation led by the defence ministers of the two countries finally signed a ceasefire agreement, handshake and reconciliation.According to the agreement, the two countries reaffirmed their commitment to peace, mutual respect andining strong and constructive good-neighborly relations, and pledged to resolve disputes through dialogue and not to take hostile actions against each other.The parties also confirmed that the two countries will meet again in Istanbul on October 25 to discuss the implementation of the ceasefire agreement and the details of strengthening security cooperation.
It is worth noting that even in view of the agreement that has been reached, the different expressions of the two countries still imply differences. Pakistan's emphasis is still on eliminating the "terrorist threat" in Afghanistan: Pakistani Defense Minister khwaja asif said that "cross-border terrorism from Afghanistan will stop immediately", and Pakistani Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar also said that he would put forward "the terrorist threat originating from Afghan territory and targeting Pakistan" in the Turkish meeting.
Afghan government spokesman Zabiullah Mujahid emphasized "peace, mutual respect and maintaining solid and constructive good-neighborly relations" and "both sides commit to resolving disputes through dialogue and refrain from taking hostile actions against each other", which is clearly intended to refer to this, namely, Pakistan's pre-emptive strike. As for Pakistan's concerns about terrorism, Mujahid maintained his usual diplomatic rhetoric, that is, Afghan territory would never be used to target other countries, but avoided the word terrorism and did not mention "Bata".
It can be seen that while the two sides are trying their best to build consensus, there are still differences around the root causes of existing conflicts, and the source of this problem may still continue to erupt and trigger conflicts in the future.As Elizabeth Threlkerd, director of the South Asia Program of the Stimson Center, an American think tank, pointed out, "Bata" and its affiliated organizations did not participate in the Doha negotiations, so the ceasefire agreement reached by the two governments is not binding on them; If the Afghan government is required to take measures to restrict the "Bata" operation, the current "riddled" border means that it is very difficult to contain its infiltration.
In other words, at the level of implementation of the agreement, it is difficult for the Arab government to control the armed personnel such as the “Bata” and the “Balochish Liberation Armed Forces”. This is the traditional “route dependence” of the Pakistani government – bombing Afghanistan, kidnapping and civilians – is more likely to stop the thirst. According to Kabul political analyst Abdullah Bashir, “Bata” has developed in the Pakistani territory earlier than the Taliban took power in A (second time), hoping that the Taliban’s blocking of “Bata” is not feasible in time and space, and this conflict shows that the Pakistani military bombing has not been effective in weakening “Bata” and can only harm Afghan civilians.
In addition to,Compared with previous conflicts, this Pakistan-Afghanistan border conflict has new external incentives.On the 9th of October, when the Pakistani airstrikes began, Arab Foreign Minister Amir Khan Mutaki arrived in India for his first historic visit. In 2001, India supported the overthrow of the Taliban regime. At the time of the political turmoil in Afghanistan in 2021, India closed all its consulates and evacuated Indian citizens, retaining only one technical team.
During the talks between Indian Foreign Minister Sujaysen and Mottaki, India announced the resumption of its embassy in Afghanistan, Mottaki's visit to Deobband in Uttar Pradesh (home of India's largest Islamic Academy), and the appearance of an Indian female journalist in the front row of the Afghan Foreign Minister's press conference. In scenes that attracted global attention, India and Afghanistan announced the resumption of full diplomatic relations. This scene can be said to be like a lifetime ago: historically, the Pakistani military and the ISI deeply supported the Taliban, so India has long been hostile to the Taliban; now the Taliban are not controlled by the Pakistani government and relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan are tense, but India and Afghanistan have come together because of Pakistan, a common opponent.
After the outbreak of the conflict in India and Pakistan in May this year, there have been more and more adverse signals in the Indian diplomatic environment, including traditional partners Russia’s attitude to self-reliance and not cold and cold, China-Pakistan strategic partnership steadily developing, U.S.-Pakistan interactions, U.S. indigenous trade friction and the “H-1B” visa dispute.
With few friends around us and poor relations with major countries outside the country, India finally realized that the result of not engaging with the Taliban in the past was to hand over the leadership of the Afghan issue to Pakistan. As Pakistan-Arab relations become tense, India has extended an olive branch at the right time. Conversely, the Taliban, who have been in power for four years, urgently need diplomatic recognition, improve their domestic and international status, break international sanctions, and win international assistance. At this time, it is undoubtedly a good time to win diplomatic support from major South Asian countries, and its significance is self-evident.
After the outbreak of the shooting in the town of Pahalgam in Kashmir in April, India blamed Pakistan for the attack, and Afghanistan was one of the few countries that strongly condemned the attack in India's position. Pakistan is undoubtedly highly sensitive to this: once the Indian alliance, India expands its influence in Afghanistan, the worst result is the formation of a "anti-Pakistan strategic circle", which leads to an enmity.
As a result, Afghanistan may become another "proxy battlefield" in the dispute between India and Pakistan, and the Indian factor adds variables to the prospects of the regional situation.What's more, India is not the only country involved in the region in the near future: on September 17th, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed a common defense strategic agreement in Riyadh, the capital of Saudi Arabia, stipulating that the third party's attack on either country will be regarded as "aggression against the two countries", which obviously increases Pakistan's confidence in dealing with regional armed conflicts; On the one hand, the Trump administration interacted closely with Pakistan; on the other hand, it threatened to take back Bagram Air Force Base in Afghanistan, triggering the association of "the United States returning to Afghanistan".
Behind the Pakistan-Afghanistan border conflict, there are both traditional contradictions and new variables; it is not only the outbreak of structural problems between the two countries, but also the indirect effects of external factors. It is difficult to solve the root cause of the problem. What is even more difficult is that border security issues have exceeded the control of the two countries involved. It is foreseeable that intermittent conflicts are likely to become the norm on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border; the regional situation cannot be separated from the intervention of foreign countries, but it will become increasingly complex due to such intervention.
(Hu Yukun, international political columnist and member of China Translation Association)