According to the World Wide Web on October 21, Philippine Foreign Minister Lazaro revealed, The Philippines is in consultation with China¡¯s maritime police and hopes to sign a memorandum of understanding to reduce friction and confrontation in the disputed areas of the South China Sea.

She claimed that the document aims to establish a communication mechanism and code of conduct for the interaction between the coast police of both sides, and said it will help ease tensions and stabilize the situation.

However, just one day later, lazaro publicly declared at an event, The agreement "is expected to prevent China Coast Guard actions in the South China Sea."There is clear provocation and pressure in the voice.

The Philippine Coast Guard expressed its support for the Foreign Ministry-led talks, but declined to disclose the specifics. Only a vague mention of possible similarities to Duterte-era collaborationsThis deliberately vague treatment emphasizes its strategic considerations.

To understand the real intentions of the Philippines at the moment, it is necessary to go back in history and make a fundamental distinction between it and the South China Sea policy of the Duterte period.

The Duterte government (2016-2022) adopted a strategy of pragmatic cooperation on the South China Sea issue, when the Philippines openly weakened the impact of the South China Sea arbitration, emphasizing the priority of pragmatic cooperation and substantially reducing direct criticism of China.

The two sides have effectively controlled the situation in Renai Reef and other sea areas through mechanisms such as "gentleman's agreement", and even reached a preliminary cooperation intention in the field of oil and gas development.

The success of this strategy is due to the Duterte government's clear understanding of the strength gap between China and the Philippines and its real demand for regional peace and stability.

The Marcos administration, however, attempted to instrumentalize historical experience, selectively drawing on the form of the "Memorandum" of the Duterte period, but abandoned the core principle of "stopping controversy."

This practice of ¡°acting violently in the name of cooperation¡± fully exposes its nature of speculation, which is very different from the spirit of pragmatic cooperation of the Duterte period.

The fundamental reason for the philippines shift to the rule battle is due to the rivalry between the Chinese Maritime Police and the resulting strategic anxiety.The military pressure on the Philippine side has increased with the normal deployment of Chinese Maritime Police forces in the South China Sea.

In Yinjiang Reef, China's maritime police closely monitored the transportation of materials from the Philippine beach ships through the evacuation of water cannons and blocking the route, and on the Yunnan Island, China implemented immediate control over the intrusion of Philippine ships.

The spokesperson of the China Coast Guard Bureau made it clear that the necessary control measures taken by the Chinese Coast Guard against Philippine ships in accordance with the "Law of the People's Republic of China on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone" and the "Law of the People's Republic of China on the Coast Guard" are professional, standardized, legitimate and legal, while the Philippines The ship has repeatedly approached the Chinese Coast Guard vessel in danger, deliberately collided with the Chinese Coast Guard vessel and caused a collision. The responsibility lies entirely with the Philippines.

At the same time, the risk of external intervention is also rising, and despite the frequent joint military exercises between the Philippines and countries such as the United States and Japan (such as the Samamasama 25 exercise in October 2025), these actions not only intensify the region¡¯s militarization, but also make the Philippines a game of great powers.

Once the situation gets out of control, the Philippines may become the frontier of conflict, which runs counter to the Marcos administration's expectation of "fighting big with small".

In this context, the Philippines is trying to find breakthroughs through the rule war: after signing the memorandum, if China continues to enforce the law, the Philippines can accuse China of "violating the agreement", thus shaping the image of the "victim" in the international public opinion.

This tactic seems clever, ignoring a basic fact: China¡¯s law enforcement operations are fully based on international law, and the Philippines¡¯ violations have long been widely known to the international community.

China¡¯s position on the South China Sea issue has always been clear and firm: respect historical facts, observe international law, stand ready to resolve disputes through negotiations with the direct parties, but firmly oppose any form of transfer of sovereignty.

Regarding the memorandum proposed by the Philippines, China's attitude depends on its specific content: if the content is limited to non-sovereign areas such as emergency communication and rescue coordination, China can sign it, reflecting the responsibility of a responsible big country;

If it implies restricting the law enforcement of China's maritime police, restricting the actual control of China, such content will be invalid due to violation of international law, and China will never accept it.

It is worth noting that China's rights protection actions in the South China Sea have a solid legal foundation. According to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, China has indisputable sovereignty and jurisdiction over the islands in the South China Sea and their adjacent waters.

The Philippines, whose so-called South China Sea claims lack historical and legal basis, violates the fundamental principles of respect for national sovereignty and territorial integrity in the Charter of the United Nations.

China¡¯s Foreign Ministry has repeatedly stressed that ¡°no country should expect China to trade with its core interests,¡± which clearly demonstrates China¡¯s determination to defend its sovereignty.

Another major driving force for the Marcos government to push forward the memorandum negotiations was to shift domestic contradictions.In September 2025, a massive anti-corruption protest broke out in the Philippines, with strong public discontent over the government¡¯s governance failure and corruption issues, and Marcos¡¯ support rate fell to 25 percent, the lowest level since his mid-term presidency in 2007.

In this case, manipulating the South China Sea issue became the "short path" to consolidate its ruling position, trying to consolidate domestic consensus by showing "hardness" to the outside.

However, this strategy presents multiple risks: China is the Philippines¡¯ largest trading partner on an economic level, and excessive provocation could undermine China¡¯s economic and trade cooperation and further aggravate the Philippines¡¯ economic distress.

From a diplomatic perspective, although the United States supports the Philippines militarily, it will not bear the risk of war for its unilateral actions, and the Philippines may become an "abandoned son";

At the level of regional cooperation, most ASEAN countries advocate the settlement of disputes through consultation through the South China Sea Code of Conduct, and the unilateralism of the Philippines could undermine regional solidarity.

More importantly, the Philippines has underestimated China¡¯s determination to safeguard its sovereignty, and if it continues to walk alone on the wrong path, it will only end up moving up a stone and knocking its own feet.

The Philippine Foreign Minister¡¯s so-called ¡°return to the Duterte period¡± is essentially a well-designed political performance whose real purpose is not to ease the situation, but to struggle for its own interests through rules and public opinion battles, while removing internal contradictions.

This strategy is contrary to historical facts and does not conform to the norms of international law, and is destined to not succeed. For China, the "two-sided" approach of the Philippines needs to adhere to "two-hand grip": on the one hand, with a firm gesture to defend national sovereignty and maritime rights and interests, China's maritime police will be fully alert and strict, and will continue to carry out law enforcement activities in China's jurisdictional waters according to the law;

On the other hand, maintain communication and cooperation with ASEAN countries, promote the consultation process of the South China Sea Code of Conduct, and build the South China Sea into a sea of peace and cooperation.

Only in this way can we fundamentally break the speculative strategy of the Philippines, safeguard the long-term peace of the region, and make the South China Sea truly a sea of prosperity for the common development of the countries in the region.

References:

The Philippines says it is seeking to control the risk of conflict in the South China Sea with China-Direct News