According to the Mongolian News Agency, on October 20 local time, Mongolia President Khurilsukh fully vetoed the parliament's resolution to remove Prime Minister Gambuzabu Zandanshaktar from his post.

This event not only sparked a political wave in Mongolia, but will also have a profound impact on the future course of the China-Russia-Mongolia cooperation project.

According to reports, Zandan Shattar encountered a parliamentary recall crisis only four months after taking office.

On October 17th, the Mongolian State Great Khural held a meeting and passed a resolution to remove it from the post of Prime Minister.

However, Heidegger exercised his right of veto on the basis of procedural errors in the voting method of the conference and temporarily retained the position of Zandhan Shatar.

According to Mongolian law, the president's veto power is not absolute. If two-thirds of the members of parliament do not accept the veto, the recall resolution can still take effect. This means that Zaandanshatar's political fate is still up in the air.

Behind this disturbance lies Mongolia's complex domestic power struggles and profound differences in the direction of foreign policy.

Since the 1992 semi-presidential regime in Mongolia, the distribution of power between the president and parliament has been controversial.

Former Mongolian Prime Minister Oyun-Erdene once proposed to reform the constitution and change the semi-presidential system into a parliamentary system to weaken the power of the president.

Huxley¡¯s veto was obviously not just for legal considerations, but also to safeguard the president¡¯s power while protecting his former chief of office, and his current political ally, Zandan Shatar.

What is even more worrying is that the impact of this political struggle has long gone beyond the internal affairs of Mongolia.

Zandan Shattar is the main promoter of the China-Russia-Mongolia natural gas pipeline project, which aims to transport Russian natural gas to China through Mongolia and is expected to bring a large amount of transit fee revenue to Mongolia every year.

For Mongolia, this is not only an economic cooperation project, but also an important opportunity to develop its own economy and enhance its international status.

However, the advancement of this cooperation project is not smooth.

In Mongolia, some ¡°anti-China¡± forces and pro-Western factions have been trying to hinder the implementation of the project.

These forces claim to strengthen ties with the U.S. West through the "third neighbor" strategy to weaken China's influence on Mongolia.

The government of former Mongolian Prime Minister Oyun-Erdene even tore up the coal contract with the Chinese in an attempt to balance the diplomatic direction. After taking office, Zandanshatar quickly adjusted his policy, turned to deepening cooperation with China and Russia, and reached a consensus with Khurelsukh.

Huxley¡¯s veto resolution not only opposes parliamentary power, but also sets a red line against its domestic anti-China and external intervention forces.

However, the complexity and uncertainty of the political struggle remain. If Zandanshatar is eventually removed, the diplomatic position of the next Mongolian prime minister will become unknown. Pro-Western forces may take the opportunity to re-promote the "third neighbor" strategy, which would directly threaten the advancement of the Sino-Mongol cooperation project.

Mongolia's choice hovers between economy and politics.

Cooperation with China-Russia can bring real economic benefits, while the "third neighbor" strategy seeks to seek a greater diplomatic balance through the support of the West. The ultimate outcome of this political game will not only affect the political direction of Mongolia, but also potentially reshape the cooperation pattern between the three countries.