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Edited by^W.n
Starting from the end of February 2022, unknowingly the Russia-Ukraine War has entered its fourth year. This war with the largest number of casualties in Europe since World War II is still going on today.
At the beginning of the war, almost everyone thought that Russia would win by an overwhelming advantage. After all, Russia is the second largest military power in the world.
Although Russia's industrial production capacity and weapons and equipment are not as advanced as China's, Russia's weapons reserves, which have inherited a large amount of Soviet heritage, are far beyond what Ukraine can cope with.
Battlefield situation changes
In September 2024, data from the battlefields in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine showed that the Russian military’s average daily launch volume increased from 800-1200 to 1500-2000 in the first half of the year, and the proportion of precision missiles increased from about 10% to more than 25%.
During the offensive defensive battle in the Zaporozhye direction, the Russian army invested 30 drones in single-day deployments, almost doubling from before, and a number of new armored vehicles have been modified and equipped with electronic combat equipment.
The war report released by the Ukraine military mentioned that in the third quarter of 2024, the number of Ukraine armored vehicles destroyed by the Russian army increased by 35% compared with the second quarter, while the number of its own armored vehicle losses dropped by 20%.
This change is not only reflected in the quantity of equipment, but also reflected in the efficiency of equipment maintenance and replenishment. Previously, some damaged Russian tanks needed to be transported back to China for repair, with a cycle of 1 - 2 months. In the second half of 2024, In the front line, a number of temporary maintenance stations have appeared near the front line, and the repair cycle for damaged equipment has been shortened to 1 - 2 weeks.
These shifts in the position of the battlefield have made the outside world aware that Russia's weapons supply capabilities are recovering or even increasing. It should be known that in the early days of the war, due to Western sanctions, Russia's supply of parts of weapons was lacking, and even the media that the Russian military had to dismantle the seized Soviet-era equipment to obtain parts.
The improvement of this situation today must be backed by stable supply channels of weapons and parts.
Behind-the-scenes suppliers emerge
In October 2024, a report from the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) found that Russia has imported a large number of key components for weapons production from several Central Asian countries in recent years, including Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.
According to the report, the amount of mechanical parts exported by Kazakhstan to Russia between 2023 and the first half of 2024 reached $12.7 billion, a four-fold increase from 2021, most of which can be used for the production and repair of tank engines and cannon bodies.
Uzbekistan has supplied Russia with electronic components worth US$830 million. These electronic components can not only be used in civilian equipment, but can also be modified to be used in drone navigation systems and missile guidance modules.
In addition to the supply of parts, some Central Asian countries also provided Russia with assembly sites for weapons equipment. In a factory in northern Kyrgyzstan, employees assembled and modified parts of the armored vehicles according to the technical drawings provided by Russia, which were then transported into Russia by land and then deployed to the Russian Ukrainian battlefield.
According to relevant data, in the first half of 2024, the number of armoured vehicles entering Russia through this way will reach more than 200.
Central Asian countries can become a key link for Russian arms supplies, on the one hand because they have deep historical, economic and military ties with Russia, and on the other hand because Central Asian countries are not members of NATO and are not involved in comprehensive sanctions against Russia, so the supply of relevant materials to Russia is not in violation of their international commitments.
Reactions of Parties
While Western countries are aware of the Central Asian countries’ supply of arms-related goods to Russia, they have not taken substantial measures.In November 2024, a US State Department spokesman told a news conference that the United States had “expressed concern” about some of the Central Asian countries’ trade with Russia, but did not mention any specific sanctions.
The EU only issued a statement calling on Central Asian countries to "treat military-related trade with Russia with caution" and also took no further action.
From a practical point of view, the reason why the West has "no one" is multiple.
Central Asian countries play an important role in the global supply of energy and mineral resources, Kazakhstan is a major global producer of uranium ore, and Uzbekistan has a wealth of natural gas resources, and Western countries have a certain dependence on Central Asian countries in the field of energy and resources, and sanctions against these countries could affect their own energy security and economic interests.
The geopolitical landscape of Central Asia is complex and Russia has a strong influence in the region. If the West forcibly interferes with Central Asian countries' trade with Russia, it could lead Central Asian countries to further turn to Russia, rather than disadvantage the Western strategic layout in the region.
Moreover, the main focus of the Western countries is now on aid to Ukraine, with both economic and diplomatic resources relatively tense, making it difficult to extract enough force for substantial intervention in Central Asian countries.
For Russia, trade in weapons-related materials with Central Asian countries not only solves its own equipment supply problem, but also further consolidates relations with Central Asian countries.
In October 2024, Russia and Kazakhstan signed a new military cooperation agreement, which explicitly stated that it would enhance cooperation in the fields of weapons development, production and repair, which undoubtedly provides a stronger guarantee for the subsequent supply of materials.
conclusion
With the continuation of the Russian-Ukrainian war, Russia’s arms-related trade with Central Asian countries could expand further.
Currently, there is news that Russia is negotiating with Uzbekistan to establish a joint weapons production factory, mainly producing drones and artillery ammunition. The factory is expected to be put into production in 2025. After it is put into production, it will greatly increase Russia's weapons and equipment supply capabilities.
Whether Western countries can find effective response measures to this situation remains unknown.
http://m.people.cn/n4/0/2020/1026/c24-14513544_1.html
https://almaty.china-consulate.gov.cn/jmxx/202504/t20250402_11587406.htm
https://world.huanqiu.com/article/9CaKrnJz7tN
https://www.iiss.org/