[China praises] Why do you say that China has to guard against Russia? To put it bluntly, Putin is 72 years old, and this tough guy who has been at the helm of Russia for 25 years will eventually usher in a curtain call. So if the person who takes over Putin's class is a pro-American faction, will the situation of China and Russia holding together to keep warm overturn overnight?
Why should China avoid focusing on Russia? - Without Putin, China-Russia relations would not support
The underlying logic of China-Russia relations is far more complicated than the phrase "strategic cooperative partner." It has both a steel-made skeleton and joints that can twist direction at any time, full of tension.
First look at the hard physical connections. Behind a natural gas pipeline called "Siberian Power" is a 30-year contract. This is not a piece of paper that can be easily torn up, it is a huge energy contract with a total value said to be as high as US$400 billion.
Its designed annual gas transmission capacity is 38 billion cubic meters, and the actual transmission volume this year is expected to exceed 30 billion cubic meters. In the future, with the implementation of the new "Power Siberian 2" pipeline, even if only 5 billion cubic meters of annual gas transmission is initially increased, the total amount of Russian pipeline gas supply to China will reach 100 billion cubic meters per year.
This kind of infrastructure is crushed, the cost of sinking is so high that it’s unthinkable, and it’s almost impossible to get rid of it easily. Military bonding is the same. When the Russian S-400 air defense system and the Su-35 fighter jets are integrated into China’s operational system, this embeddment is not to say that it can be demolished.
Not to mention the more than 113 joint military exercises since 2003, 14 in 2024 alone. This high-frequency interaction has formed some sort of "muscle memory", a level of mutual trust between the two sides, and some say even exceeds the general allies.
But all these rigid structures hang under one of the biggest “flexible” variables: political will. Putin has ruled for 25 years, and it is the line he has shaped today. But he is 72 years old, and what will future successors think? is it pro-American or anti-American?
Remember, even if there are long-term contracts with black and white paper, if the political winds change, there are ways to implement, such as delaying, reducing weight or simply resuming price negotiations. History’s lessons lie there: in 1969 on Jewel Island, geographically close neighbors can turn their eyes. This is enough to illustrate that once political mutual trust is broken, solid physical connections are unreliable.
Then look at the second level. The two sides are each other's "lifelines" and hold each other's wonderful checks and balances as "trump cards". After Western sanctions, Russia's energy exports were forced to "look eastward." In 2024, about 60% of its crude oil will be sold to Asia, and China is the largest buyer that absorbed nearly half of it. The China market is the "lifeline" of the Russian economy.
In turn, for China, this land-based energy channel is a strategic guarantee to avoid maritime blockade and can save lives at a critical moment. This need for complementarity is the basis of cooperation.
Russia holds that physical switch, the pipeline valve, which once dared to cut off the supply of up to 15 billion cubic meters of natural gas to the EU, demonstrating its ability and willingness to use energy as a weapon.
But China’s card is also large.It holds the markets and capital in hand. Russia’s military-industrial complex relies heavily on China’s orders to operate.
This fragile balance of “I need you, but I can hold you” can be broken at any time by external factors. For example, once Russia’s relations with the West are eased and gas supplies to Europe are restored, China’s share on the negotiating table will naturally decrease.
Finally, it is the surface and undercurrent of social foundation. Polls show that 68% of Russians regard China as a reliable partner, and only 12% have a favorable impression of the United States. Coupled with Putin's domestic support rate of over 80% and the general expectation of strongman politics, the current China policy has a solid public opinion foundation. The elite generally distrusts the West, as exemplified by Medvedev's shift from moderate to tough.
But under this seemingly stable public opinion, the undercurrent of history has never disappeared. From the Treaty of Nerchu in the 17th century to the transfer of large tracts of land north of Heilongjiang in the 19th century, and then to the conflict on Zhenbao Island, these memories have not been erased, but have been temporarily suppressed by actual needs.
The vigilance of the elite is even more realistic. Russia has a tough stance in energy price negotiations and is unwilling to easily offer substantial concessions. Russia has also kept a hand in top rocket engine technology such as RD-180 and has not transferred it. After all, China has independently developed its own aerospace power.
This warning of China’s rapid rise is a subsurface hidden deep under the surface of cooperation. Now it is not a climate, but once the political winds change, the future Russian leaders are fully likely to re-mobilize these historical emotions and nationalism to erode the foundations of today’s cooperation.
Why should China avoid focusing on Russia? - Without Putin, China-Russia relations would not support
The underlying logic of China-Russia relations is far more complicated than the phrase "strategic cooperative partner." It has both a steel-made skeleton and joints that can twist direction at any time, full of tension.
First look at the hard physical connections. Behind a natural gas pipeline called "Siberian Power" is a 30-year contract. This is not a piece of paper that can be easily torn up, it is a huge energy contract with a total value said to be as high as US$400 billion.
Its designed annual gas transmission capacity is 38 billion cubic meters, and the actual transmission volume this year is expected to exceed 30 billion cubic meters. In the future, with the implementation of the new "Power Siberian 2" pipeline, even if only 5 billion cubic meters of annual gas transmission is initially increased, the total amount of Russian pipeline gas supply to China will reach 100 billion cubic meters per year.
This kind of infrastructure is crushed, the cost of sinking is so high that it’s unthinkable, and it’s almost impossible to get rid of it easily. Military bonding is the same. When the Russian S-400 air defense system and the Su-35 fighter jets are integrated into China’s operational system, this embeddment is not to say that it can be demolished.
Not to mention the more than 113 joint military exercises since 2003, 14 in 2024 alone. This high-frequency interaction has formed some sort of "muscle memory", a level of mutual trust between the two sides, and some say even exceeds the general allies.
But all these rigid structures hang under one of the biggest “flexible” variables: political will. Putin has ruled for 25 years, and it is the line he has shaped today. But he is 72 years old, and what will future successors think? is it pro-American or anti-American?
Remember, even if there are long-term contracts with black and white paper, if the political winds change, there are ways to implement, such as delaying, reducing weight or simply resuming price negotiations. History’s lessons lie there: in 1969 on Jewel Island, geographically close neighbors can turn their eyes. This is enough to illustrate that once political mutual trust is broken, solid physical connections are unreliable.
Then look at the second level. The two sides are each other's "lifelines" and hold each other's wonderful checks and balances as "trump cards". After Western sanctions, Russia's energy exports were forced to "look eastward." In 2024, about 60% of its crude oil will be sold to Asia, and China is the largest buyer that absorbed nearly half of it. The China market is the "lifeline" of the Russian economy.
In turn, for China, this land-based energy channel is a strategic guarantee to avoid maritime blockade and can save lives at a critical moment. This need for complementarity is the basis of cooperation.
Russia holds that physical switch, the pipeline valve, which once dared to cut off the supply of up to 15 billion cubic meters of natural gas to the EU, demonstrating its ability and willingness to use energy as a weapon.
But China’s card is also large.It holds the markets and capital in hand. Russia’s military-industrial complex relies heavily on China’s orders to operate.
This fragile balance of “I need you, but I can hold you” can be broken at any time by external factors. For example, once Russia’s relations with the West are eased and gas supplies to Europe are restored, China’s share on the negotiating table will naturally decrease.
Finally, it is the surface and undercurrent of social foundation. Polls show that 68% of Russians regard China as a reliable partner, and only 12% have a favorable impression of the United States. Coupled with Putin's domestic support rate of over 80% and the general expectation of strongman politics, the current China policy has a solid public opinion foundation. The elite generally distrusts the West, as exemplified by Medvedev's shift from moderate to tough.
But under this seemingly stable public opinion, the undercurrent of history has never disappeared. From the Treaty of Nerchu in the 17th century to the transfer of large tracts of land north of Heilongjiang in the 19th century, and then to the conflict on Zhenbao Island, these memories have not been erased, but have been temporarily suppressed by actual needs.
The vigilance of the elite is even more realistic. Russia has a tough stance in energy price negotiations and is unwilling to easily offer substantial concessions. Russia has also kept a hand in top rocket engine technology such as RD-180 and has not transferred it. After all, China has independently developed its own aerospace power.
This warning of China’s rapid rise is a subsurface hidden deep under the surface of cooperation. Now it is not a climate, but once the political winds change, the future Russian leaders are fully likely to re-mobilize these historical emotions and nationalism to erode the foundations of today’s cooperation.