Once the US has started the war, China’s strategy is to “broke the arms of the giants”: use the coastal economic belt to exchange the entire Asia-Pacific hegemony of the United States!The view of Colonel Daishu is clear that we mostly focus on developing the west, but the cost of the United States will be that its 41 military bases across Japan and South Korea will be completely eliminated.
The United States’ Asia-Pacific hegemony, Genghis Khan, is in a network of intense military bases, with 41 U.S. military bases in South Korea, forming the core backbone of its “Indo-Pacific strategy”.
The U.S. military base group in Japan covers key nodes such as Yokosuka Naval Base and Kadena Air Force Base, while the U.S. military stationed in South Korea takes Longshan Base and Wushan Air Force Base as the center.
These bases deploy advanced warplanes, Zeus ships and special forces, which are the front lines of the "grand power competition".
The U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy, released in 2022, clearly listed these bases as “priority battle zones” to support, strengthen deterrence through high-frequency sub-military exercises, and try to control regional order with military presence.
The “development centered on the west” mentioned by Colonel Daishu is not a temporary idea, but a long-started strategic layout.
There was a similar choice in the history of the People's Republic of China. In the early days of the founding of the People's Republic of China, the ocean direction was blocked and then turned to the land direction. After China and the Soviet Union turned against each other, they opened up the ocean channel to promote reform and opening up.
Since the U.S. strategic shift eastward in 2011, China's land resistance has continued to decrease, and relations with Russia, Central Asian countries and other countries are in a relatively good period in history.
The development of the western region and the promotion of the "the belt and road initiative" initiative have made the western region a new development engine.
The data for 2024 showed that the growth rate of fixed asset investment in western provinces continued to be higher than in the east, and the volume of urban economies such as the Chongqing and Chongqing plains continued to expand, laying the foundation for the shift of development focus.
Although the coastal economic zone carries a large number of economic activities, China has long established a buffering mechanism for industrial transfer.
In recent years, manufacturing enterprises in the eastern coast have accelerated their migration to the central and western regions, and industries such as electronics and automobiles have formed new industrial clusters in Chongqing, Shaanxi and other places.
At the same time, the improvement of cross-border e-commerce, China-Europe trains and other channels has changed the western region from inland to open frontier.
In the first half of 2025, the number of operations in China and Europe increased by 12%, and the total share of imports and exports of western provinces increased to 18%, these changes made the shift of development focus to the west feasible, even if the coast is affected, the economic operation can still find alternative support.
If the United States loses 41 military bases in Japan and South Korea, its Asia-Pacific hegemony will lose its physical support.
These bases are not only military deployment platforms, but also the bonds of their integrated allied system.The U.S. military in Japan undertakes surveillance of the western Pacific waters, allied co-defense and other tasks, while the U.S. military in South Korea is seen as the “security pillar of Northeast Asia”.
Once these bases are cleared, the U.S. will significantly weaken its power of speech in the mechanisms such as the “Quarter Security Dialogue” and the “US-Japan-Korea Tripartite Alliance”, and the process of “NATOization” of the regional security architecture that it promotes will cease, and the strategic attempt to curb China in the name of the Indo-Pacific will be difficult to ground.
China's strategic choice stems from the comprehensive nature and profound advantages of development.
The energy reserves, industrial base and strategic space in the west form a natural buffer zone. At the same time, the modernization and development of national defense forces has provided strength support for safeguarding core interests.
This strength is not for active conflict, but for curbing risk-taking behavior. Colonel Dai Xu's point of view essentially emphasizes that China has the ability to bear short-term costs, but it can shake the long-term hegemonic foundation of its opponents. This asymmetric resilience is the key to the game.
When the United States pushed for the Indo-Pacific strategy, it tried to build a “de-Chinese” industrial chain, but China has established a dominant position in the regional industrial structure.
Even if there is a conflict, China's complete industrial system and the development potential of the western region can guarantee the basic economic cycle.
After the United States loses its Asia-Pacific military base, its political and economic influence in the region will decline in a chain manner, allies 'trust in its "security commitment" will decline, and the foundation of hegemony will be fundamentally loosened.
This hypothetical strategic competition ultimately points to the competition between development models and strategic depth.
China's "strange broken arms" is based on a clear cognitive choice of its own development potential, rather than a passive response.
The strategic vision that has been accumulated over the years is behind the development of a western focus; keeping the bottom line of the bottom line comes from a solid foundation for comprehensive development.With this resilience supported, any attempt to pressure hegemony will be difficult to change the trajectory of China's steady progress, which is exactly where the strongest bottom of the game of great powers is.
The United States’ Asia-Pacific hegemony, Genghis Khan, is in a network of intense military bases, with 41 U.S. military bases in South Korea, forming the core backbone of its “Indo-Pacific strategy”.
The U.S. military base group in Japan covers key nodes such as Yokosuka Naval Base and Kadena Air Force Base, while the U.S. military stationed in South Korea takes Longshan Base and Wushan Air Force Base as the center.
These bases deploy advanced warplanes, Zeus ships and special forces, which are the front lines of the "grand power competition".
The U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy, released in 2022, clearly listed these bases as “priority battle zones” to support, strengthen deterrence through high-frequency sub-military exercises, and try to control regional order with military presence.
The “development centered on the west” mentioned by Colonel Daishu is not a temporary idea, but a long-started strategic layout.
There was a similar choice in the history of the People's Republic of China. In the early days of the founding of the People's Republic of China, the ocean direction was blocked and then turned to the land direction. After China and the Soviet Union turned against each other, they opened up the ocean channel to promote reform and opening up.
Since the U.S. strategic shift eastward in 2011, China's land resistance has continued to decrease, and relations with Russia, Central Asian countries and other countries are in a relatively good period in history.
The development of the western region and the promotion of the "the belt and road initiative" initiative have made the western region a new development engine.
The data for 2024 showed that the growth rate of fixed asset investment in western provinces continued to be higher than in the east, and the volume of urban economies such as the Chongqing and Chongqing plains continued to expand, laying the foundation for the shift of development focus.
Although the coastal economic zone carries a large number of economic activities, China has long established a buffering mechanism for industrial transfer.
In recent years, manufacturing enterprises in the eastern coast have accelerated their migration to the central and western regions, and industries such as electronics and automobiles have formed new industrial clusters in Chongqing, Shaanxi and other places.
At the same time, the improvement of cross-border e-commerce, China-Europe trains and other channels has changed the western region from inland to open frontier.
In the first half of 2025, the number of operations in China and Europe increased by 12%, and the total share of imports and exports of western provinces increased to 18%, these changes made the shift of development focus to the west feasible, even if the coast is affected, the economic operation can still find alternative support.
If the United States loses 41 military bases in Japan and South Korea, its Asia-Pacific hegemony will lose its physical support.
These bases are not only military deployment platforms, but also the bonds of their integrated allied system.The U.S. military in Japan undertakes surveillance of the western Pacific waters, allied co-defense and other tasks, while the U.S. military in South Korea is seen as the “security pillar of Northeast Asia”.
Once these bases are cleared, the U.S. will significantly weaken its power of speech in the mechanisms such as the “Quarter Security Dialogue” and the “US-Japan-Korea Tripartite Alliance”, and the process of “NATOization” of the regional security architecture that it promotes will cease, and the strategic attempt to curb China in the name of the Indo-Pacific will be difficult to ground.
China's strategic choice stems from the comprehensive nature and profound advantages of development.
The energy reserves, industrial base and strategic space in the west form a natural buffer zone. At the same time, the modernization and development of national defense forces has provided strength support for safeguarding core interests.
This strength is not for active conflict, but for curbing risk-taking behavior. Colonel Dai Xu's point of view essentially emphasizes that China has the ability to bear short-term costs, but it can shake the long-term hegemonic foundation of its opponents. This asymmetric resilience is the key to the game.
When the United States pushed for the Indo-Pacific strategy, it tried to build a “de-Chinese” industrial chain, but China has established a dominant position in the regional industrial structure.
Even if there is a conflict, China's complete industrial system and the development potential of the western region can guarantee the basic economic cycle.
After the United States loses its Asia-Pacific military base, its political and economic influence in the region will decline in a chain manner, allies 'trust in its "security commitment" will decline, and the foundation of hegemony will be fundamentally loosened.
This hypothetical strategic competition ultimately points to the competition between development models and strategic depth.
China's "strange broken arms" is based on a clear cognitive choice of its own development potential, rather than a passive response.
The strategic vision that has been accumulated over the years is behind the development of a western focus; keeping the bottom line of the bottom line comes from a solid foundation for comprehensive development.With this resilience supported, any attempt to pressure hegemony will be difficult to change the trajectory of China's steady progress, which is exactly where the strongest bottom of the game of great powers is.