The leader of the Syrian transitional government travels to Russia personally, and Putin faces a choice, but the abandonment of the car sheriff does not seem to be a difficult choice.

On October 15th, Syrian regime leader Ahmed al-Sharaa will meet with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow, the capital of Russia.

This is his first visit to Russia to meet Putin after overthrowing Assad's government at the end of last year.

According to Syria, Shara's personal visit to Russia has three main demands.

Restoring diplomatic relations between the two countries.

Second, the regional situation and ways of cooperation between the two countries, such as the survival of the Russian naval base in Tartus in western Syria and the air base in Khmeimim, will be discussed.

Third, formally demand that Assad be handed over to trial.

It is well-known that since Syria¡¯s ¡°changing¡± and the fall of the Assad regime, Assad and his family have traveled to Moscow to seek asylum.

Gossip broke the news that Assad usually stays at his residence and indulges in video games. But even so, he was "poisoned and assassinated".

Although Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov has denied the news, judging from the current situation, Assad's situation is always not good.

Because Putin is now facing a choice, and his choice will determine the fate of the Sad family.

As early as January this year, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Bogdanov had a special visit to Syria to meet with Saleh.

In July, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov talked with the diplomatic head of the new Syrian regime in Moscow again.

Now it is directly upgraded to a meeting between Shala and Putin. Such intensive interaction is obviously not as simple as "talking about where a person is going."

For Salad, who has just been in power for 10 months, and Putin, who wants to hold the fulcrum of the Middle East, the real core has long been hidden in the "list of needs". The "appeal" brought by salad, financial help is the exterior, and security anxiety is the interior.

The Syrian regime is in a very concrete situation, with GDP at just 50 percent before the war, youth unemployment at 40 percent, and the United Nations estimates it will need at least $100 billion to rebuild after the war.

During Bogdanov's visit to Syria, Shala mentioned $8 billion in debt relief to Russia, but until this visit, the Russian side did not give permission.

Looking at another detail, from October last year to October this year, Israel bombed Syria at least 17 times on the grounds of "attacking Iranian forces."

The most recent one was on October 5, when the Israeli Army's 210th Division directly carried out an air raid on a newly built air defense position in Dar'a province in southern Syria. The Syrian military later admitted that "three air defense systems were damaged and two soldiers were injured."

Every time the bombing ends, the Syrian Defense Ministry will call for international air defense support, but who will be able to meet their needs the fastest?

The U.S. West has only given "verbal recognition" and no substantive action; although the Arab countries have restored diplomacy, the reconstruction of investment is also more than a piece of cake.

After all, only Russia, which has military bases in Syria, can immediately take out anti-aircraft weapons.

The debt relief of $80 billion is important, but how can the legitimacy of the new regime remain stable if the country is unable to maintain it?

As for the requirement of ¡°delivering Assad,¡± it looks more like an additional code.

At the end of September, a Syrian court issued a search warrant for Assad.

This timing is a coincidence, just after Salad returned from his visit to the United States.

Indeed, this is the first day of the day in which the people will be strengthened; the first day in which the people will be strengthened, and the second day in which the people will be strengthened.

But Salad never said "no cooperation until Assad is handed over", which itself shows that the priority has been set long ago.

Of course, Putin also has a ¡°account.¡±

Those two bases are much heavier than an exiled president.

For Putin, Salad's appeal is not new. Russia's response logic has never been to "meet demand" but to "exchange demand for benefit".

What does Russia want most?

Some people will think of the economy first. Russian companies have obtained the exploration rights of Syria's Deir ez-Zor oil field. It is expected that the trade volume between Russia and Syria will increase by 40% in 2025.

But compared with the two military bases, this income can be considered "an addition" at best.

The Tartus naval base, the only Russian military port in the Mediterranean, controls 60% of the Middle East oil transport routes, and a 49-year lease agreement with Russia is equivalent to a "Mediterranean life line."

More importantly, the Hmeimim Air Force Base is not only a platform for bombing extremist organizations, but also a "transit point" for the Wagner Group to deploy troops to Africa.

Shipping weapons from here to the Sahel saves 30% of the time and cost than starting from Russia. The S-400 in the base can also monitor the entire northern Middle East airspace.

How can Putin easily give up this strategic value?

As for Assad¡¯s departure, it¡¯s hard to say.

Following the search warrant issued by the Syrian court, the Russian foreign minister only denied the rumors of ¡°Assad poisoning¡± at a press conference on October 13, but refused to mention ¡°the refusal to hand over.¡±

If Russia really wants to protect Assad, why didn't it just "refuse to surrender"? Instead, leave fuzzy space?

The answer may be very realistic-Assad is no longer an "ally that must be protected", but a "bargaining chip that can contain Salad".

If Shara is willing to make concessions on bases and oil fields, Russia will continue to "house arrest" Assad in Moscow; if the talks fail, will Assad become an "abandoned son"? No one knows.

In the final analysis, Syria wants security and aid, Russia wants bases and strategic pivots. As for Assad's fate, it is just an "episode" in this game of interests.

Can Syria and Russia continue to cooperate in the future? Will Assad stay in Moscow forever? The answer may depend on how long those two military bases can be stable-after all, in international politics, strategic interests will always outweigh personal destiny.