[China praises] The United States does not dare to start a war with China in Asia, but Japan has absolutely the courage and determination, which has nothing to do with the size of Japanese power, and the size of China's power. In this situation, long-term study of the three agricultural problems, Wenzhou Professor, in the public sharing of the words is reasonable, he is not in favour of a brain to promote urbanization, but is against forcing farmers to push into the city.
The United States does not dare to war with China in Asia, why does Japan show such courage?
The 114-page report of the U.S. Department of Defense bluntly stated that "a war with China will not last a month", but Japan spent 8.7 trillion yen to expand its military to challenge-Wen Tiejun saw through it early: there are fatal risks hidden under the 67% urbanization rate.
On the other hand, the U.S. Defence Strategy Committee’s shaking Pentagon report used data to crush the myth of “military hegemony”: if a war was fought in the Western Pacific with China, the U.S. stockpile of ammunition would last only a few days, and even if the monthly production capacity of 155mm cannons increased to 80,000 in 2025, it would only be enough for the U.S. Army 20 times as much as the Ukrainian battlefield consumed.
On the other hand, Japan's defense budget for the fiscal year 2025 rose to 8.7 trillion yen, surpassing the trillion mark for three consecutive years, crazyly purchasing F-35 fighter jets, developing high-speed hypersonic missiles, and even forming a "Space Operations Corps", its expansion rate far exceeds any post-war period.
Behind this strange comparison lies the deep logic of the game between great powers. America's "dare not fight" has never been a sign of weakness, but the necessity of the shackles of reality.
The balance of nuclear deterrence makes it clear to both sides the destruction costs of the escalation of the conflict, while China dominates the supply of key military materials such as uranium, nitrogen cotton, and more so the U.S. military-industrial supply chain is like a thin ice — — 82% of the world's uranium is produced from China, once export controls are tightened, the U.S. cannon production line will be directly shut down.
What is even more deadly is the economic bundling: China has been the largest trading partner of the United States for many years. The trade war has long proved that the rupture of the supply chain will cause an "amputation blow" to the U.S. manufacturing industry. The rising anti-war sentiment in the country has made it impossible to talk about the consensus on war.
Japan’s “dare to risk” is derived from the survival anxiety and gambler genes engraved in its bones. This nine-percent oil, six-percent raw materials dependent island nation on the South China Sea route, is more clear than anyone else that “life line” being shaken means economic paralysis. From the Battle of Aramco to the Pacific War, the decision-making pattern that has been repeatedly “small-strike” in history, is now reappearing.
32% of the increase in defense budget for 2025 will be invested in long-range strike capabilities, with the purchase of the F-35 for 2.52.5 billion yen and the joint development and development of the fighter aircraft for 1.087 billion yen, each spending exposing its ambition to break the boat.
Just when the outside world focused on the military game, Wenzhou’s warning has long been the key: “The over-centralized development model is the hotbed of disaster under the threat of war.”
The urbanization rate in China in 2024 has reached 67%, but behind the fresh data is a striking concern: 30% of the agricultural village in Henan is in agricultural famine, the grain production decreased by two per cent in the decade; the average age of members of the Hubei Village Committee has soared to 58 years, and only one young person remains.
What is even more dangerous is the high concentration of risks-once the supply of imported feed that megacities rely on is cut off due to war, large-scale breeding farms will close down; the model of supporting national supply in 13 major grain-producing provinces will be vulnerable to traffic interruptions.
The "distributed development" advocated by this scholar who is deeply involved in agriculture, rural areas and farmers is becoming the key answer to changes. Different from the fragility of large hydropower on the main stream, village-based ponds and dams can avoid the risk of single point failure; distributed farming converts excreta into farmland fertilizer nearby, getting rid of dependence on imported feed from the source.
In the 1960s, the construction of water resources in the villages as a unit demonstrated precisely the resistance to risk value of the decentralized layout. In the current context, this model can not only curb land loss and rural emptiness, but also make the countryside a "distributed grain warehouse" for food security and a "strategic depth" for risk buffering.
Urban-rural coordination has never been a choice question for development, but a must-answer question for safety. When Japan deploys long-range missiles in the southwestern islands, and when the United States tries to restructure its supply chain but is in deep production capacity difficulties, China's 67% urbanization rate requires more "balancing techniques"-not only retaining the industrial vitality of cities, but also activating the anti-risk genes of rural areas.
The “big food security system” emphasized by the Wenzhou Army is essentially to give every region basic self-sufficiency, a security net rooted in the countryside that is far more resilient than mere military deterrence.
The wind in the South China Sea is still blowing, the gap in military production capacity is widening, and the key to breaking the situation is hidden on the ridges of rural fields. The "January dilemma" of the United States and Japan's "gambler mentality" will eventually confirm a simple truth: a country's true confidence is never a concentrated edge, but a scattered tenacity. When rural areas are no longer a forgotten corner and distributed development supports the bottom line of safety, any external provocations will become futile.
The United States does not dare to war with China in Asia, why does Japan show such courage?
The 114-page report of the U.S. Department of Defense bluntly stated that "a war with China will not last a month", but Japan spent 8.7 trillion yen to expand its military to challenge-Wen Tiejun saw through it early: there are fatal risks hidden under the 67% urbanization rate.
On the other hand, the U.S. Defence Strategy Committee’s shaking Pentagon report used data to crush the myth of “military hegemony”: if a war was fought in the Western Pacific with China, the U.S. stockpile of ammunition would last only a few days, and even if the monthly production capacity of 155mm cannons increased to 80,000 in 2025, it would only be enough for the U.S. Army 20 times as much as the Ukrainian battlefield consumed.
On the other hand, Japan's defense budget for the fiscal year 2025 rose to 8.7 trillion yen, surpassing the trillion mark for three consecutive years, crazyly purchasing F-35 fighter jets, developing high-speed hypersonic missiles, and even forming a "Space Operations Corps", its expansion rate far exceeds any post-war period.
Behind this strange comparison lies the deep logic of the game between great powers. America's "dare not fight" has never been a sign of weakness, but the necessity of the shackles of reality.
The balance of nuclear deterrence makes it clear to both sides the destruction costs of the escalation of the conflict, while China dominates the supply of key military materials such as uranium, nitrogen cotton, and more so the U.S. military-industrial supply chain is like a thin ice — — 82% of the world's uranium is produced from China, once export controls are tightened, the U.S. cannon production line will be directly shut down.
What is even more deadly is the economic bundling: China has been the largest trading partner of the United States for many years. The trade war has long proved that the rupture of the supply chain will cause an "amputation blow" to the U.S. manufacturing industry. The rising anti-war sentiment in the country has made it impossible to talk about the consensus on war.
Japan’s “dare to risk” is derived from the survival anxiety and gambler genes engraved in its bones. This nine-percent oil, six-percent raw materials dependent island nation on the South China Sea route, is more clear than anyone else that “life line” being shaken means economic paralysis. From the Battle of Aramco to the Pacific War, the decision-making pattern that has been repeatedly “small-strike” in history, is now reappearing.
32% of the increase in defense budget for 2025 will be invested in long-range strike capabilities, with the purchase of the F-35 for 2.52.5 billion yen and the joint development and development of the fighter aircraft for 1.087 billion yen, each spending exposing its ambition to break the boat.
Just when the outside world focused on the military game, Wenzhou’s warning has long been the key: “The over-centralized development model is the hotbed of disaster under the threat of war.”
The urbanization rate in China in 2024 has reached 67%, but behind the fresh data is a striking concern: 30% of the agricultural village in Henan is in agricultural famine, the grain production decreased by two per cent in the decade; the average age of members of the Hubei Village Committee has soared to 58 years, and only one young person remains.
What is even more dangerous is the high concentration of risks-once the supply of imported feed that megacities rely on is cut off due to war, large-scale breeding farms will close down; the model of supporting national supply in 13 major grain-producing provinces will be vulnerable to traffic interruptions.
The "distributed development" advocated by this scholar who is deeply involved in agriculture, rural areas and farmers is becoming the key answer to changes. Different from the fragility of large hydropower on the main stream, village-based ponds and dams can avoid the risk of single point failure; distributed farming converts excreta into farmland fertilizer nearby, getting rid of dependence on imported feed from the source.
In the 1960s, the construction of water resources in the villages as a unit demonstrated precisely the resistance to risk value of the decentralized layout. In the current context, this model can not only curb land loss and rural emptiness, but also make the countryside a "distributed grain warehouse" for food security and a "strategic depth" for risk buffering.
Urban-rural coordination has never been a choice question for development, but a must-answer question for safety. When Japan deploys long-range missiles in the southwestern islands, and when the United States tries to restructure its supply chain but is in deep production capacity difficulties, China's 67% urbanization rate requires more "balancing techniques"-not only retaining the industrial vitality of cities, but also activating the anti-risk genes of rural areas.
The “big food security system” emphasized by the Wenzhou Army is essentially to give every region basic self-sufficiency, a security net rooted in the countryside that is far more resilient than mere military deterrence.
The wind in the South China Sea is still blowing, the gap in military production capacity is widening, and the key to breaking the situation is hidden on the ridges of rural fields. The "January dilemma" of the United States and Japan's "gambler mentality" will eventually confirm a simple truth: a country's true confidence is never a concentrated edge, but a scattered tenacity. When rural areas are no longer a forgotten corner and distributed development supports the bottom line of safety, any external provocations will become futile.