U.S. finance minister Bessent only said that accusing China's rare-earth export control is not going with the world, shouting G7 to get rid of China's dependence for less than 24 hours, the UK announced that because of Russian-related sanctions on 11 Chinese enterprises, the pace is fast and the attitude is tough.
On October 15, the British government suddenly issued a list of sanctions, saying that there was a single entity that helped Russia’s energy and military industry with key items. The wording was unified, the doors were high, as if it were a “synchronous strike.” But the other G7 members did not link: no joint names, no synchronous actions, more of a cold-eyed side. This was not the first time. On September 12, Britain had engaged in a similar operation, when only the U.S. was publicly “supported” and the other members did not follow.
When Britain announced the sanctions, the French president's foreign affairs adviser Bonaire held a strategic dialogue with the Chinese side in Beijing, a high-profile statement, one sitting down and talking about cooperation. Back to the Canadian site of the June G7 summit, Taiwan, the South China Sea, the East China Sea and other issues related to China were thrown, China's "excess capacity" "market manipulation" hats down difficult to finish, views difficult to unify. At the EU level, Von der Leyen accused China of "armed" rare lands, but soon was questioned by European media in meeting Trump's agenda.
The United States hopes that its allies will stand side by side in rare earths, technology, digital trade, etc., but it has not really united for several months. German Finance Minister Lindner said that China's collective actions should be weighed as follows, so as not to hurt its own economy; EU Vice Chairman of Trade, Sevcovic, said that the EU will not engage in export control on China alone, but will coordinate with the United States, but it does not mean blindly following it. To put it another way, it is possible to talk about safety, but it won't work if the economic policy is moved, and the position will be divided into two factions.
The "First Tariff and Trade Agreement" signed by Britain and the United States on May 8th, tariffs and trade, included a large number of "security restrictions", and key industries such as steel and pharmaceuticals were involved. It was widely interpreted by the outside world as a special arrangement for China's supply chain. As a result, Britain's China policy has been "bound", and subsequent sanctions have a grasp. This time, it is more like "lighting up" the lights. Coupled with the tight economy after Brexit, inflation and financial pressure appear at the same time, the manufacturing base has to be rebuilt, and there must be a sense of presence on the international stage. The "China issue" has become the easiest rope to grasp. Attitude can change the right to speak, at least for Washington, the cards are not too bad, but sanctions are not clockwork tweets, they have real costs: AstraZeneca, Shell, and HSBC have large business plates in China, and when the wind changes, investment calculations, supply chain scheduling and project risks have to be recalculated, and the opportunity cost of cutting off scientific and technological cooperation will first fall on the high-end manufacturing that the UK wants to recover.
China responded quickly, and the British Embassy in China expressed its opposition, saying that this was a unilateral sanction without the foundation of international law, and the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese enterprises were hurt. China says it remains neutral on the Ukrainian issue and advocates dialogue to solve the problem; The export of dual-use products is strictly controlled according to law; Don't interfere with the normal economic and trade between China and Russia; Do not accept blaming and stigmatization. Dare to negotiate clearly, but do not take the initiative to expand issues or pull others into the market. Be stable and accurate, clearly define, do not lose your position, and rely on emotional upgrade.
There are cracks inside the G7, the surface is referring to "risk", falls to the implementation of their respective tablespoons: Japan wants to stabilize the manufacturing chain, Germany is guarding the order of China's car engines, France does not want to stop the energy price explosion of the mine, Italy also takes into account the resilience of infrastructure and small and medium-sized enterprises.
The rare earth, which is often discussed, is also a place where public opinion and reality are disconnected. The rare earth is not "rare", it is difficult to raise the threshold, the industrial cycle is long, the environmental cost is high. Who doesn't want to backup, the alternative ability is not dry. The first two years of Europe's crack money wants to "rebuild the supply chain", and the results are not great. Now the mention of the rare earth, must be the first to fight the public opinion war and slow follow-up. At this time, the UK raised sanctions, along with the words of rare earth and security, the voice is present, but there are few connections.
At the end of February this year, Prime Minister Stammer went to the White House to meet Trump, and was thought to send a "stand-up signal", after which the pace towards China was closer to the United States. but how much real interest can be exchanged, we have to see the data: the real flow of trade and investment will testify.
Look at this wave of disintegration, the triple logic, the first is the surface is the unilateral sanctions of the UK against Chinese enterprises, action fast, gesture hard; the second is the middle is the G7 internal differences against China, crying consistent, interests are different; the third is the deep is the global supply chain rebuilding long-term pull, rare earth, chip, green energy both as a game and as a code.
The industrial interests of Germany and France are there, and Shevcovic's "not separately regulating China" is leaving himself a way out. In the short term, Britain's actions are like a political declaration; in the medium term, the knock-on effect at the corporate level will calm people down; in the long run, whoever can come up with a stable answer to rules and efficiency will have a better say.
The interests of allies with the United States may not outweigh the losses of quarreling with China. AstraZeneca looks at the clinical market; Shell looks at energy projects; HSBC looks at financial channels; new benefits from new markets of the same size that are not of magnitude will not change. Policies can be fast, but industries cannot jump.
For our country, the key is to grasp the sense of discretion and keep the bottom line, or to act in accordance with international rules, promote multilateral cooperation, and enhance the resilience of the industrial chain itself. Rare earths, photovoltaics, lithium batteries, etc., the initiative of technology and industry is the foundation. Speak for themselves with facts, products, steady availability and reliable delivery, time will tell.
Does the G7 really want to wield the big stick of sanctions? Nowadays, it is not like the United States and Britain will do something separately, but the resistance and cost of "marching together" on a wider scale are great. You can get a few days of popularity, but it is difficult to get a long line of followers. Geopolitics requires posture, and economic cycles require patience.