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Publisher: Painting Elliot
In October 2025, South Korea's political arena was shaken by President Lee Jae-ming's public statement. This was the fourth time that he had made a clear statement on related issues since taking office in 2025, marking that South Korea is systematically promoting the "strategic autonomy" line in a complex major-power game pattern.
In the context of the continuous escalation of the U.S.-China game, the leader, known for his pragmatic style, has continuously spoken out on defense autonomy, alliance relations and regional security issues, and his core demand is to recover the command power of the Korean army, which has been under U.S. control for more than 70 years, and explicitly refuses to incorporate South Korea into the U.S.-led anti-Chinese alliance system.
Preliminary
On October 1, 2025, a celebration of the 77th anniversary of the founding of the South Korean Army was held in Seoul’s Longshan Presidential Palace Square, and President Li delivered a keynote speech in Ming, the fourth time since he took office in 2025 to openly illuminate his position on defense independence and alliance relations.
In the face of more than 5,000 military and political officials and veterans representatives on the scene, he reiterated clearly that “South Korea will not join any military alliance aimed at a specific country, the core task of the Korean military is always to deal with the security threat on the Korean Peninsula”, while promoting the goal of withdrawing the Korean military command during the war to the “operable stage”, sparking high attention from the public opinion at home and abroad.
This speech came only a month after U.S. Army Secretary Driscoll's remarks at the end of August that "the US military stationed in South Korea should simultaneously respond to the threat from China and North Korea." At that time, the South Korean Defense Ministry had issued a written statement refuting that the statement was beyond the framework of the U.S. -South Korea alliance, and Lee Zai-ming's speech further strengthened his position as head of state.
In his speech, he mentioned that “relying on foreign troops to defense security is submissive thinking,” which was interpreted by the South Korean Central Daily as a direct response to U.S. pressure.
After the speech, the joint staff headquarters of South Korea subsequently announced the details of the defense budget for 2026, of the 66.3 trillion yuan budget, 35% will be invested in the field of independent defense technologies such as AI combat robots, drones, to provide substantial support for the shift in position.
Economic Binding and Security Priorities
The deep logic of South Korea's refusal to join the US-led anti-China alliance is rooted in the dual realistic considerations of economy and security. At the economic level, China has maintained its status as South Korea's largest trading partner for 20 consecutive years. In 2024, the trade volume between China and South Korea will reach US $328 billion, accounting for 26% of South Korea's total foreign trade. Among them, the dependence of the semiconductor industry is particularly prominent-Samsung's Xi'an factory is responsible for 28% of the world's NAND flash memory production capacity, and SK Hynix's Wuxi factory produces 15% of the world's DRAM chips. These two major companies contribute 62% of South Korea's semiconductor exports.
In 2025, the United States required South Korean companies to stop exporting advanced process equipment below 14 nanometers to China. If the ban is implemented, the annual losses of South Korea's semiconductor industry will exceed US$40 billion, directly affecting 120,000 jobs.
In terms of security strategy, South Korea has always placed North Korea threats at the top of its priority. The deployment planning, equipment system construction and annual exercise subjects of the Korean Army's 500,000-strong troops are all designed around peninsula defense. The Army alone has three armored divisions deployed near the 38th Parallel all year round.
According to a report released by the South Korean National Defense Institute in September 2025, North Korea has resumed its nuclear facilities at Ningbo, with a nuclear warheads holding of 50 or more, and has established a dedicated drone reconnaissance brigade, accelerating the modernization of conventional military forces.
In this context, Li made it clear in the Ming government that "the Korean army can not bear the two-line response pressure", and repeatedly openly stated that "the affairs on the other side of the Strait have nothing to do with South Korea", avoiding the mismatch of strategic resources.
In order to balance the alliance between the United States and South Korea, South Korea adopted a limited concession strategy. During Li Zaiming's visit to the United States in August, he agreed to increase the defense spending to 3.5% of GDP, and allowed the US strategic nuclear submarine to call at Busan Port again after 10 years. At the same time, he injected the US $150 billion shipbuilding fund into the US market in exchange for the US's continuous attention to the North Korean issue.
This operation of "security compromise for strategic autonomy" makes the United States dissatisfied with South Korea's refusal to join the anti-China alliance, but it has not taken substantive retaliatory measures, and the two sides still maintain basic cooperation such as joint military exercises.
The Seventy Years of Sovereignty Theme
Reclaiming the wartime command of the Korean army is not a sudden appeal, but a sovereignty issue that has lasted for more than 70 years. After the Korean War Armistice Agreement was signed in 1953, the operational command of the Korean army was handed over to the United Nations Army. In 1978, it became dominated by the US-South Korea Joint Command. In 1994, South Korea only took back its peacetime command. Once a conflict broke out on the peninsula, 500,000 Korean troops still had to obey orders from the US military command in South Korea.
This state of "having an army but no fingers" has long been regarded by Korean public opinion as a "hidden pain" of national sovereignty. In October 2025, tens of thousands of people gathered on the streets of Seoul, shouting "national dignity is higher than alliance" to promote the government. Reform provides a basis for public opinion.
The first step is to complete the establishment of the Strategic Command by the end of 2025 to integrate the ground and air troops, which will be equipped with 200 core commanders, responsible for formulating the plans for independent operations during the war.
The second step is in the joint military exercise “Freedom Shield” in 2026, the Korean-led command process, the U.S. military only bears a supporting role; the third step is to promote the amendment of the relevant provisions of the “Korea-U.S. Joint Defense Treaty” to clarify the division of responsibilities after the transfer of command.
At present, the South Korean army has realized the export of K9 self-propelled howitzers to 11 countries, and the localization rate of weapons has increased from 68% in 2019 to 75% in 2025, laying a technical foundation for the transfer.
The U.S. side has a complicated attitude towards the handover process. On the surface, it supports the improvement of the Korean army's capability, but in fact it is delayed on the grounds that "the Korean army lacks nuclear missile response capability". The U.S. military stationed in South Korea deployed MQ-9 "Reaper" drones at Gunsan Air Force Base, upgraded a new defense system at Osan Base, and tilted its strategic focus to the Indo-Pacific direction. At the same time, South Korea was required to bear the US $5.8 billion in the cost of the U.S. military stationed in South Korea in 2025, which was higher than The previous year increased by 20%, and 60% needed to be used to purchase U.S. weapons.
This strategy of "both pressure and containment" has caused the command transfer negotiations to be deadlocked many times. At the US-South Korea Security Consultative Meeting in September 2025, the two sides only reached preliminary consensus on the evaluation criteria of "core defense capabilities", and the specific handover schedule has not yet been finalized.
The chain reaction triggered by strategic autonomy
Li Zaiming's policy adjustment triggered multiple chain reactions at home and abroad. At the domestic level, there are obvious differences between progressives and conservatives: progressive supporters believe that taking back command is the key to "breaking the submission system", and the Common Democratic Party, the largest opposition party in South Korea, has publicly stated that it will promote relevant budget deliberations in Congress.
Conservatives warned of risks. Kim Jong-hyuk, the former supreme member of the National Power Party, asked, "What's the use of economic and conventional weapons in the face of nuclear weapons?", worried that independent defense would weaken the deterrence against the DPRK.
There is also resistance within the military, since 1954, only one non-Army head of the Joint Staff headquarters, and the problem of the troops' resource acquisition has not been fully resolved, which may affect the efficiency of the integration of the command system.
North Korea's Foreign Ministry said through official media that the withdrawal of command power "may create new opportunities for negotiations on denuclearization of the peninsula", suggesting a willingness to resume the dialogue.
Japan, on the other hand, strengthens cooperation with the U.S. security, plans to deploy "Standard-6" air defense missiles by 2026, and the U.S. analyzes that the U.S. might compensate for the change in the role of the U.S. military in South Korea by strengthening Japan-Korea cooperation.
China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs said at a regular press conference that it "welcomes South Korea's adherence to an independent foreign policy." The Chinese and South Korean special envoys held talks in Beijing in mid-October to coordinate their positions on the North Korean nuclear issue. Russia issued a warning that relevant developments may undermine the strategic balance of Northeast Asia.
The response of the United States is characterized by "both soft and hard". The Pentagon continued joint military exercises and other forms of cooperation. In October 2025, the "Ulchi Freedom Shield" exercise was still held as planned, but the high-level interaction was deliberately cooled down. When Lee Jae-myung visited the United States, the United States only sent the Assistant Secretary of State to pick up the plane, and the meeting time The original 90 minutes were reduced to 40 minutes.
At the same time, the United States has put pressure on the South Korean economy through policies such as the "Inflation Cutting Act", South Korea's steel exports to the U.S. fell by 32.1% in August 2025, and modern automobiles in the U.S. market suffered losses due to subsidy exclusion terms, trying to force South Korea to adjust its position at the cost of the economy.
Real obstacles to the path to autonomy
South Korea's advancement of strategic autonomy is still facing multiple real obstacles. military and industrial technology autonomy is short-lived, the highly anticipated KF-21 fighter aircraft, its engine, phase-controlled radar and other core components still depend on U.S. and European imports, the independent development of the "H" type of trainers only 2 hours, and the gap with the U.S. Army's same type is obvious.
The pressure at the economic level is superimposed. South Korea's economic growth rate in 2025 is expected to be only 1.8%, and the unemployment rate among young people will reach 21%. A substantial increase in the defense budget may squeeze spending on education, medical care and other areas of people's livelihood, causing public dissatisfaction.
conclusion
The deep contradictions of the US-Korean alliance are more difficult to resolve.The US side always sees South Korea as an Indo-Pacific strategic hub, the U.S. military base in South Korea is an important leapboard for its grip on the DPRK, if the Korean military loses command during the war, the U.S. military will lose the legal basis without the consent of South Korea to mobilize troops, and the strategic leverage in Northeast Asia is weakened.
The Trump administration has proposed that South Korea bear an annual "protection fee" of $5 billion, although it has not landed, but reflects the U.S. "cost transfer" idea that in the future it may be pressured through more areas.
Reference sources
Can Li Zai-ming regain the wartime command of the Korean army?"-- Xinmin Weekly--
http://www.xinminweekly.com.cn/guanchajia/2025/10/14/35556.htmlU.S. troops in South Korea attempted to expand the scope of their missions from defending North Korea to "distracting China", Li expressed clear dissatisfaction with this.
https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1845307828978927058&wfr=spider&for=pcVideo: “Michiko assesses the role of its allies in China: Japan’s “good use is low risk” South Korea is rejected!” — International Financial Times —
https://v.douyin.com/YiZV0aUoat4/