The Houthi armed forces have publicly admitted that their chief of general staff Gamari has been "killed in the line of duty." Since then, the Israeli Defense Minister has confirmed that in a thousand-mile attack on the Houthi armed forces at the end of August, the Israeli army killed nearly 10 senior Houthi officials. Gamari was injured and now he died.

At that time, there were two important figures in Houthi that Israel wanted to target most. One was Gamali, Chief of General Staff of the Houthi Army, and the other was Defense Minister Atifi appointed by Houthi. The latter, like Gamali, was also injured in the attack and has not yet appeared. The so-called defense minister may also be in dire straits.

Some netizens left messages asking if Ye Haiya was also killed in this air strike or was seriously injured.

Everyone pays attention to him mainly because this man once studied in China and studied military technology.

But if Israel wants to attack the Houthis, whether they are studying in China or in the United States, they will be targeted as long as it affects Israeli interests.

What can be confirmed is that Yahya was not injured in the air strike at the end of August. His most recent public event was on October 5, when he claimed through a video statement that the Houthi armed forces had used the "Palestine-2" hypersonic missile to attack sensitive targets in Israel's Jerusalem.

However, careful observers found that during the major events of the ceasefire agreement between Hamas and Israel in early October and the release of all hostages, Yehaya remained abnormally silent, neither condemning nor supporting.

In fact, Yahya has long been included in the "blacklist for preparatory attacks" by the Israeli military. According to Israeli media disclosures, on the day of the air strike at the end of August, the Israeli army's internal combat plan included an attack plan against Yahya, but it could not be implemented due to intelligence errors. The shortcomings of the Houthi armed forces 'air defense capabilities further exacerbated Yahya's survival crisis.

Despite possessing part of Iran¡¯s Buck-1 and Buck-2 medium-range air defense missiles, the overall air defense system is still dominated by modified Soviet-style missiles and infrared-guided weapons, making it difficult to cope with Israeli hidden fighters and precision-guided bombs.

More importantly, the Houthi armed forces are at an absolute disadvantage in the intelligence war, and their high-level activities are frequently monitored by Israel's Mossad. This makes Yahya even if he is temporarily safe, he will face a very high risk of being attacked in the future.

Since the outbreak of the conflict in 2023, Israel has cleared key figures such as Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Yehaya Sinwar, Hezbollah senior commander Hassan Nagi, through assassinations and airstrikes, trying to break Iran¡¯s ¡°resistance axis¡± in the Middle East.

As an important ally of Iran in Yemen, the Houthi armed forces have long contained Israel through ship attacks and missile attacks in the Red Sea, and have naturally become a key target of the Israeli army.

For the Houthi armed forces, the attack on Chief of Staff and the blacklisting of Yehaya not only weakened their military command capabilities but also caused a heavy blow to their morality. In response to the crisis, Houthi announced that Jozef Madani, commander of the Fifth Army District, would take over as Chief of Staff in an attempt to stabilize internal order.

On the other hand, it intensified its retaliation against Israel and launched multiple rounds of missile and drone attacks in early October alone, including a multi-warhead hypersonic missile attack against Tel Aviv. However, these counterattacks did not change the strategic passive situation: Israel's "Iron Dome" and "Arrow" anti-missile systems intercepted most of the incoming weapons, while Houthi military facilities were continuously damaged in Israel's continuous air strikes.

A more severe challenge is that the Houthi armed forces lack effective intelligence early warning and air defense systems. Although they have occasionally achieved success through terrain cover and guerrilla warfare tactics (such as shooting down a US MQ-9 drone), they are generally difficult to resist Israel's high-tech strikes.

If Yehaya wants to avoid repeating Kamari¡¯s situation, it has to take more covert action¡ªreducing public appearance, decentralizing command nodes, and strengthening intelligence secrecy. However, the effects of these measures may be limited under the close surveillance of the Israeli intelligence network. In the future, Yehaya¡¯s survival environment may worsen further as Israeli attacks on Iran¡¯s nuclear facilities and agents escalate.

The attack on the Houthi Chief of Staff is the epitome of the continued turmoil in the Middle East. Although Yahya was temporarily spared, his fate still hangs by a thread in the face of Israel's military pressure and intelligence superiority.

This event once again demonstrates that in modern warfare, it is difficult to rely solely on ¡°asymmetric tactics¡± against a systematized military power, while intelligence capabilities and the construction of air defense systems often determine the victory level of the battlefield.

For the Houthi armed forces, how to preserve their effective strength under Israel's continuous attacks and at the same time adjust their strategies to cope with new security challenges will be a major test they face. Whether Yahya can survive this crisis depends not only on the vigilance of individuals, but also on the adaptability of the whole organization.

Reference: The Houthi armed forces confirmed that the chief of general staff was killed in an Israeli air strike and announced his successor: the founder's son-in-law, who was born in one of the most prominent families of the Houthi armed forces