Exclusive text published in Tencent News
Author: The Sky
Assistant Professor, School of Politics and International Relations, Tongji University
Introduction
In the early morning of October 10 to 11, Afghanistan and Pakistan broke out of fierce arms at ports such as Tokham, Chaman: the Taliban claimed to have killed dozens of Pakistani soldiers, Pakistan retaliated with drones and airstrikes; the border blockade on the morning of the 12th, the Chaman border closed, thousands of people returned home on foot, the Balochistan line once interrupted.The reality is that the hundred-year conflict in South Asia has been repeated in the present.
After days of bloodshed and mutual accusations, the two sides reached a "temporary ceasefire for 48 hours starting from 18:00 local time" on the evening of October 15, which was regarded by the Palestinians as seeking a positive solution for this complex but solvable issue. attempt. Regarding "who proposed a ceasefire first," the Afghan Taliban government insisted that this was due to the insistence and request of Pakistan. No matter how public opinion struggles, this "short ceasefire" has not changed the structural causes of the conflict between the two sides.
In a sense, this conflict is the intersection of three levels of game.：
First, Afghanistan and Pakistan have chronic problems surrounding borders, security and national identity
Second, the Taliban’s strategic choice to restore legitimacy and deliberately cut off the old “God”.
Third, foreign forces such as the Sino-American Indian and Russian Federation are on the South Asian chessboard.
This is not only a border conflict, but also a reflection of a long-standing profound contradiction. “The current ceasefire provides a temporary relief to the situation and also reflects the complex game between Afghanistan and Pakistan on issues such as security, sovereignty and counter-terrorism.”Whether the ceasefire will last depends on whether the two sides can take practical measures in border management, combating cross-border armed organizations and building basic mutual trust. Historical complaints, territorial disputes and mutual distrust make it difficult for the two sides to quickly reach a lasting solution.
The Curse of the Duran Line: The Divided Pushto
To examine the relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan, we first need to look back to the "Great Game" at the end of the 19th century, when Britain and Russia wrestled around Afghanistan and artificially created a Durand Line between Afghanistan and British India. The line was delineated in 1893, with a total length of approximately 2,640 kilometers, dividing the Pustou settlement into two, half of which was then divided into British India (now Pakistan), and half left in Afghanistan.Abdul Rahman Khan, the then Emir of Afghanistan, "helplessly" accepted this demarcation under the dual pressure of resisting Russia and Britain at the same time, but never really recognized its legitimacy.
After the partition of India and Pakistan in 1947, Pakistan regarded the Duran Line as a legal border; Afghanistan refused to recognize it, and was even the only country that opposed Pakistan's joining the Union at the United Nations. During the Cold War, this "man-made border" became a stage for the United States and the Soviet Union to wrestle and regional turmoil: in 1979, the Soviet invasion triggered the mujahideen movement, and a large number of refugees poured into Pakistan. The United States and Pakistan recruited troops in refugee camps to fight against the Soviet army; the Taliban and al-Qaeda then rose.
When the Taliban came to power in the 1990s, Pakistan was one of the few countries to recognize their regime and is widely believed to have provided asylum support. Therefore, both sides of the Duran Line have maintained a kind of "de facto permeability" for a long time: tribes flow across borders and intermarriage and trade continue. The problem is that cultural and social ties have never been cut off, but sovereign borders have been rigidly drawn, resulting in the superposition of security issues and identity issues, forming structural tensions that are difficult to resolve. After entering the 21st century, this tension has not eased: on territorial and ethnic issues, successive Afghan regimes (including the Taliban) have not given up their objections to the Duran Line; border fences, outpost conflicts and control measures have repeatedly become flashpoints.
“This ceasefire is only temporary and will not solve the fundamental problems that have long existed between the Abbas.。 The two countries lack effective coordination mechanisms in border management, anti-terrorism cooperation and national identity. If a higher-level dialogue and cooperation framework cannot be established to properly handle cross-border ethnic groups and security demands, future conflicts may still happen again.
The Triangle Paradox: Taliban – TTP – Pakistan
This conflict is not an empty hole, its direct clue can be traced back to the two sides’ recent agitation around the terrorist issue. Over the past two years, terrorist attacks in Pakistan have risen, and the main cause is known as “ Taliban Movement of Pakistan (TTP)TTP is the same source as the Afghan Taliban, but its goal is to overthrow the Islamabad authorities and establish the rule of the rule within the Pakistani territory. The Pakistani military has carried out several cleansing operations over the years, once expelled the TTP forces from the country. However, after the Afghan Taliban regained power in 2021, TTP resurged, not only to obtain asylum in Afghanistan, but also to intensify attacks on the territory. According to the Pakistani think tank statistics, the number of violent attacks in Pakistan has risen since 2024, and the situation could worsen further in 2025.
Faced with the deterioration of the domestic security situation, Islamabad authorities have repeatedly called on Kabul to take action to combat the TTP armed forces that have plagued eastern Afghanistan, but the Taliban government has vaguely denied asylum for any Pakistani militants, insisting that the TTP issue is a Pakistani internal issue.
This mutual accusation of sewing has recently reached a boiling point:In early October, Pakistani intelligence agencies locked the traces of TTP leader Nul Wali Mahasud and launched a drone strike in Kabul on the evening of October 9th, claiming that Mahasud and his two friends were killed in the target vehicle (after being audio denied). In other words, on October 10th, Pakistani aircraft launched a rare “Vietnamese military operation” against a target in eastern Afghanistan, destroying several shops in Pakistani province near the border. In addition, the Pakistani Air Force almost simultaneously hit the targets of several alleged terrorist organizations in the country. In other words, two days before the shooting, the Pakistani side launched a rare “Vietnamese military operation” against the target in the country. From the perspective of Pakistan, this is an un
The two sides announced a 48-hour ceasefire on the night of the 15th, with the intention of reserving a channel for dialogue and degradation.But in structural terms, the Taliban and the TTP have their roots in ideology and ethnic groups, and if the Taliban is strongly encircled, it could pay a heavy political cost on the domestic Pushto base plate and even stimulate extremist flows to organizations such as IS-K; if it is let go, it continues to conflict with Pakistani security concerns.
Asylum in TTP, The Duran line dispute remains sensitive under the Taliban.At the end of 2021, there was an incident in which Taliban fighters demolished the wire fence set up by Pakistan along the Duran Line. The Taliban Ministry of Defense denounced Pakistan's unilateral fence construction as "illegal" and said that Pakistan "has no right to separate the Pashtun tribes on both sides." At that time, Pakistan tried to detente through diplomatic channels, but the Taliban took a tough stance. It can be seen that, like previous Afghan governments, the Taliban have not made concessions to Pakistan on the territorial issue. In the past, Pakistan believed that as long as it supported a pro-Pakistan regime in Kabul, historical disputes and even border security between the two countries could be resolved.
However, the reality is that "returning the tiger to the mountain" has backfired on its owner: the Taliban does not intend to be Pakistan's puppet, and has taken a tough and independent stance on both the Duran Line and the TTP issue. Pakistan-Afghanistan relations seem to have completed the complete track from honeymoon to stranger. If the two sides lack the political courage to solve each other's most concerned issues, this vicious circle of conflict-denial-re-conflict may continue, and the Durand Line will continue to act as the "eternal crisis fault line" between the two countries.
03 External variable: Shadow and Line of US-India and Russia
Afghanistan and Pakistan have reached a brief ceasefire after a fierce border conflict, bringing a temporary relief to the situation in South Asia, but the geographic game continues to deepen, with major regional powers developing complex interactions based on their respective interests.
For the United States, the Abbas conflict is not due to its direct intervention, but is still within its strategic concerns.。
The Biden administration is reluctant to fall into the “Imperial graveyard” but is also reluctant to see Afghanistan again become a shelter for terrorists, especially concerned that organizations such as TTP use sub-territory to attack Pakistan and thus threaten regional stability. The United States has repeatedly urged the Taliban to fulfill its anti-terrorist commitments under the Doha Agreement, stressing that “no organization should allow Afghanistan to threaten the security of other countries.” Though the U.S. military has withdrawn, the U.S. side has continued to share extremist activity in Afghanistan with the Pakistani security department through intelligence cooperation and remote surveillance. At the same time, U.S. criticism of the domestic withdrawal policy has been raised.
However, the current strategic focus of the United States is focused on great power competition, especially in the context of responding to the challenges of China and Russia, and its willingness to invest in South Asian affairs is limited. Although the relationship between the United States and Pakistan has eased due to the common interests of anti-terrorism, it is difficult for Washington to dominate the regional agenda as it did in the past, and it can only exert its influence indirectly, waiting and watching it become a realistic choice.
India’s role in Afghanistan is also remarkable.
In the past two decades, India has established close relations with the former republican government of Afghanistan through a large number of economic assistance, infrastructure projects and diplomatic layout, but its relations with the Taliban have been tense. After the Taliban came to power, India did not completely alienate itself, adjusted its strategy and tried to influence the Taliban regime through humanitarian assistance, development cooperation and informal channels. New Delhi's move is intended to weaken Pakistan's long-term dominant position in Afghanistan and break its concept of "strategic depth".
However, India’s approach to the Taliban has made Pakistan highly alert.His long-standing accusations that India has used its consulate facilities in Syria to support the Baluchist separatist forces, and now the Taliban could be viewed by Pakistan as a direct threat to its national security if it deepens its relationship with India.Some Indian strategists have even called for the Taliban to provide air defense systems or military support to counter Pakistan’s airstrikes, although the actual operational probability is low, but clearly with a strategic intention to pressure Pakistan.For India, a Taliban regime opposed to Pakistan has provided a geographic leverage to help it expand space in the South Asian Games.
Iran, on the other hand, looks at the current situation from a refugee and security perspective.
Millions of Afghan refugees have stayed in Iran for a long time, placing a heavy burden on its economy and society. Tehran is worried that the escalation of the conflict between Afghanistan and Afghanistan will trigger a new wave of refugees and impact border stability. Historically, Iran and the Taliban have had tensions over the killing of diplomats in 1998, but in recent years, the two sides have maintained limited cooperation due to the joint threat of the Khorasan branch of the Islamic State (IS-K). After the crossfire over water resources over the border in 2023, the two sides showed restraint and avoided full-scale confrontation. Currently, Iran calls on Abba to exercise restraint, advocates resolving disputes through dialogue, and uses its relatively smooth communication channels with the Taliban to promote the fight against extremist organizations that threaten Iran's security. At the same time, Iran firmly opposes the US military return to Afghanistan,Trying to “Westernize” Afghanistan.
Russia takes a cautious stance based on historical lessons and practical considerations.
The shadow of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has made it extremely cautious about direct military intervention, especially in the context of the deep conflict in Ukraine, and more reluctant to open new fronts in South Asia. But Moscow is still actively promoting multi-party contacts including Pakistan and the Taliban, advocating regional counter-terrorism cooperation and political settlement. Russia and the Taliban maintain informal but pragmatic relations, providing humanitarian assistance and energy support in exchange for its cooperation in the security of the Central Asian border and fighting IS-K. At the same time, Russia and Pakistan have improved in recent years, conducting military exchanges and energy cooperation, trying to maintain a balance between India and India.
In general, “ The short-term ceasefire provides a buffer period for Afghanistan-Pakistan relations and creates a window for regional powers to coordinate。」However, without substantial confidence-building and multilateral cooperation mechanisms, a ceasefire may be just a calm before the storm. The game between external forces will further affect Afghanistan's internal decision-making and Pakistan-Afghanistan interaction patterns.
Looking back at history, it is not difficult to find that the border conflict between Afghanistan and Pakistan stems from the Duran Line dispute left over by colonization and the long-term lack of mutual trust.
Although Pakistan once supported the Taliban, relations between the two sides deteriorated after taking power due to differences in sovereignty and counter-terrorism positions, and cross-border armed issues such as TTP further exacerbated conflicts. The current temporary ceasefire is only a short-term easing. If fundamental issues such as border management and security cooperation are not resolved, conflicts will still be prone to recurrence. Achieving stability requires substantive dialogue between the two sides and constructive participation by regional countries.
Author extended information
Hello, readers and friends of Tencent News! I am Luo Tianyu, a young scholar focusing on international political research. Usually, I am forced to "pretend to be calm and observe" in the midst of complicated situations, trying to sort out some logical clues from the game between major powers and security dilemmas. Here, I will share some thoughts and analyses, not seeking enlightenment, but seeking to rationally see the context of world changes with you. Welcome to pay attention and discuss together.