Text | Ruiguan Jingwei

Editor | Ruiguan Jingwei

On October 15, Syria's new President Julani will embark on a trip to Russia. The meeting with Putin has attracted the attention of many countries as soon as it was officially announced.

The new leader, who overthrew Assad's regime in December last year, came with a thorny request for Russia to return Assad back to Syria from exile in Moscow.

But for Russia, this choice is too difficult, and it is like killing an old ally, but the two military bases in Syria may not be sustained.

More importantly, in this dilemma, there are hidden lines related to China's energy security. How will Russia choose? Why does this game of chess involve our energy supply?

In fact, to understand the ins and outs of this matter, we must first see clearly the confidence and demands of Julani. The president, whose real name is Ahmed Shara, once led the Al Qaeda branch in Syria under the code name "Abu Mohammed Julani." He led rebels to capture Damascus at the end of last year, ending Assad's decades-old rule.

Now he is in a hurry to visit Russia, and his core goal is very clear. Relying on Russia's endorsement to enhance the international legitimacy of the transitional government is also a continuation of his shout to the UN General Assembly in September that "Syria wants to regain its legal status".

Asking for Assad is not only the need of the new regime to consolidate its authority, but also a direct test of Russia's attitude.

Assad, who was asked, has not lived a peaceful life. Since he went into exile in Moscow in December last year, he has become a "living bargaining chip" in Russia-Syria relations.

In September this year, the Syrian Human Rights Watch (SOHR) also hyped that he suffered a "poisoning incident" and was admitted to the hospital. Fortunately, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov promptly refuted the rumor that he had no security problems in his life.

This wave of operations is rather clarified than that Russia is publicly declaring control over Assad, but now that Julanis is looking for ¡°people¡± and Russia¡¯s control is instantly turned into a ¡°burden.¡±

Russia¡¯s roots are rooted in the two unmissable bases, the Tartus Naval Base and the Hermitam Air Force Base, which are not ordinary bases.

The former is Russia¡¯s only military port in the Mediterranean Sea, with a 49-year lease agreement that kills 60% of the Middle East oil transportation routes, and the S-400 in the base can also monitor the entire northern Middle East airspace.

The latter is the Russian air base in the Mediterranean, guaranteeing its ability to react quickly to regional conflict, these two places can be Russia's Middle Eastern strategy "defining the needle", once the consequences are unthinkable because of the refusal to make people watched by Julian.

The first option: Without Assad, it is quite possible that Julian will take the base residence right, after all, the new government will establish sovereignty, the most direct way is to fake the foreign military presence.

Once Russia loses these two bases, its influence in the Mediterranean Sea will go down, and its strategic deterrence against Europe will fall down, which will directly affect China¡¯s energy security.

China will import about 5.6 billion tons of crude oil by 2023, 60% of which will come from the Middle East countries such as Saudi Arabia and Iraq, most of which will enter the Mediterranean through the Strait of Hormuz and then pass through the Suez Canal.

At the time, the Russian base was able to balance regional extremist organizations and local conflict, which is equivalent to adding a layer of ¡°security lock¡± to the route.

With the base gone, once the situation in the Middle East is turbulent, routes may be affected at any time. Not only does oil prices fluctuate, but even supply stability has to be questioned.

Although China is building alternate channels such as the Central Asia Energy Pipeline and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, the former has limited transportation capacity, and the latter is also interfered by extremist organizations and cannot completely replace the Middle East maritime routes in the short term.

Look at the second option: returning Assad, which seems to be able to stabilize Julani and keep the base, but it will have to pay a longer-term price. Assad is an old ally supported by Russia for many years, and it is simply an open "treachery" to hand over as soon as he says.

Iran has asserted that the first thing not to promise, as a core partner of Russia in the Middle East, is that if Iran sees its allies being easily sacrificed, its trust in Russia will collapse completely.

The importance of Iran to China is not only small, it is both an important supplier of crude oil to China, but also a key partner of the Belt and Road in the Middle East, and the Russian-Iran relationship is a gap, which is likely to affect China-Iran energy cooperation and regional projects.

Not to mention what other Middle Eastern allies will think of Russia. Who will dare to sincerely ally with it in the future?

The cost of this credibility bankruptcy is far more fatal than losing two bases. In fact, Russia has been quietly balancing its layout for a long time.

In February, Putin expressed his support for "unity, sovereignty and stability" in Syria, and in July, Lavrov accompanied him to meet with Syrian Foreign Minister Shah Shahabani, and even to provide diplomatic support to Damascus during the Israeli air strike in Syria.

These moves are aimed at neither blaming the new government, nor giving up Assad, but now Julanis directly plays for "people", vague tactics can not play.

China has been very clear on this issue, supporting Syria¡¯s safeguarding of national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and advocating the solution of internal problems through dialogue.

After all, no matter what Russia chooses, China most needs stability in the Middle East, the region is chaotic, energy routes are unsafe, and the Belt and Road project is difficult to advance.

From this perspective, Russia¡¯s offshore scheme is the most likely outcome: neither directly nor hard-top Julan, but in exchange for co-operative terms by renting an extended base.

For example, allowing the new Syrian government to recognize the legitimate rights and interests of Russia in the base, while delaying the meeting time on the basis of "judicial procedures", leaving both sides on the ladder.

In the final analysis, Russia's dilemma is essentially a manifestation of short-term interests and long-term credibility, and every step of this game of chess affects China's energy import and export.

Every geo-discussion in the Middle East has never been just news from far away, but a reality that is closely related to every drop of oil we add and every electricity we use.

Russia's final choice will not only rewrite Syria-Russia relations, but will also quietly affect the "protective net" of China's energy security. This may be the most realistic logic of the international chess game. There is no isolated choice, only a chain reaction that affects the whole body.