Late just wrote, meaning that in order to resist China’s hegemony, the United States has decided not to buy Chinese oil.
This statement instantly sparked public opinion shock, appearing to be another note-hearted kick thrown by the United States in the trade game, and actually exposed the absurd drama code of policy statements and reality.
After careful scrutiny, this remark not only lacks factual foundation, but is more like a well-arranged political performance, which reflects the confusion and short-sightedness of the United States in trade policy.
In terms of trade structure, the interaction between China and the United States in the field of agricultural products has long been deeply intertwined and can never be cut by a single paper slogan.China, as the world's largest soybean importer, annually purchases large amounts of soybean from the United States for crushing oil, and U.S. farmers have long relied on this stable market.
Lao Te's argument that "no longer buy China edible oil" actually confuses the basic logic of trade flow. The reality is that China itself is a major consumer of edible oil and needs to import raw materials for processing, rather than exporting large quantities of refined oil to the United States.
Most of the edible oil on the market in the United States comes from local production or Latin American suppliers, and the proportion of China products is negligible. Therefore, this statement is more like punching a fist into the air, with a huge momentum but no target.
If the U.S. intends to use this to suppress Chinese agriculture, it may mistakenly harm its own industrial chain. U.S. soybean farming has so far had a heavy blow to the trade war, when China's counter-tariffs caused soybeans to be delayed, and prices fell, the similar threat is now repeated, will only exacerbate agricultural state unrest.
Further, the formulation of such policies often lacks detailed data support and becomes a victim of political posture. American decision-makers are accustomed to simplifying complex economic issues into slogan-style propaganda, but ignore the systematic preparations needed for policy implementation.
For example, in order to truly implement the ban on Chinese oil consumption, it is first necessary to clarify the trade statistical calibre: what is "China oil consumption"? is the brand originating in China, or processed products containing Chinese raw materials? if it involves the supply chain traceability, is the U.S. customs able to monitor in real time?
These details were completely invisible in Lao Te's speech, as if the policy could automatically take effect with just one order. This extensive style is exactly the same as the previous farce of ship entry fees. The rules were formulated in a lavish manner, but the implementation process was full of loopholes. After all, federal agencies are short of even basic staffing, so how can we talk about conducting refined trade reviews?
More ironically, the selective attack of the United States in the trade field often falls into the paradox of "injuring eight hundred enemies and losing one thousand oneself". Take edible oil as an example. If the United States forcibly cuts off trade with related products in China, domestic consumers may be the first to bear the brunt.
Intermediate products such as grain and oil processing equipment and packaging materials produced in China are widely penetrated into the global supply chain. If American companies rashly replace suppliers, costs will inevitably rise.
Moreover, China, as an important buyer of U.S. agricultural products, can lead to reciprocal countermeasures in any policy of confrontation.In 2022, China-U.S. trade amounted to $69 billion, and the interests of both sides have long been rooted and unilaterally "disconnected" is no different than economic disadvantage.
While shouting "resist hegemony", Lao Te ignored the daily necessities made in China in American supermarkets. This contradiction just exposed the separation between populist rhetoric and the reality of people's livelihood.
On the other hand, China's coping strategy has always revealed a steady and solid tone. In the trade friction, China has never resorted to emotional declarations, but relied on systematic industrial policies and market mechanisms to guide them.
For example, in order to safeguard the security of crude oil, China has solidified the foundation through diversified imports, scientific and technological development and farming, and has neither blindly blocked nor passively responded.
China's soybean imports last year reached 95 million tons, more than a third of which came from Brazil, and the U.S. share has been gradually adjusted to a reasonable range.
If Lao Te is really concerned about the livelihood of the United States, perhaps he should first examine the inefficiency of his agricultural subsidy policy. According to USDA statistics, the annual subsidy of the U.S. government to agricultural enterprises exceeds 20 billion U.S. dollars, but it has failed to reverse the operating difficulties of small and medium-sized farms. Can this structural contradiction be resolved by boycotting Chinese edible oil?
Over the whole scenario, Oldt's speech is more like a political manipulation aimed at domestic choices, rather than a thoughtful economic strategy. The words filled with "hegemony" and "resistance" in his speech, undoubtedly incite public opinion, but avoid the chain reaction behind the policy.
Inflation pressure in the United States has not disappeared, and the consumer price index has been at the highest levels for several consecutive months, at which time if trade barriers are added, the cost of living will eventually rise.
What is ridiculous is that while the United States accuses China of "unfair trade," it is unable to build an alternative supply chain. Vietnam's edible oil factories rely on China equipment. Argentina's soybean oil processing requires China technology. In the global grain and oil trade network, China's role has long been difficult to circumvent. This paradox makes the boycott declaration like a castle in the air, adding to market uncertainty.
In the end, the vitality of trade policy lies in its feasibility and versatility.If the United States really wants to safeguard economic security, it should focus on domestic industrial upgrading and the coordination of international rules, rather than being obsessed with the illusory gestures of cries of isolation.
The absurdity of the old-fashioned statement lies not only in its data base that is out of reality, but also in the fact that it reveals the fraud of the "slogan first, implement after" in U.S. policy making.
When China steadily controls crude oil security with a consistent pragmatic gesture, the U.S. side's day-to-day change can only make the world question again: who is the "hegemony" that truly threatens the global supply chain?
Perhaps the answer has long been written on the tables of the people of the two countries. On the one hand, people's livelihood security with stable prices and high quality, and on the other hand, the uncertainty caused by political manipulation. This edible oil farce will eventually become another negative example in the history of international trade like ship charges.
This statement instantly sparked public opinion shock, appearing to be another note-hearted kick thrown by the United States in the trade game, and actually exposed the absurd drama code of policy statements and reality.
After careful scrutiny, this remark not only lacks factual foundation, but is more like a well-arranged political performance, which reflects the confusion and short-sightedness of the United States in trade policy.
In terms of trade structure, the interaction between China and the United States in the field of agricultural products has long been deeply intertwined and can never be cut by a single paper slogan.China, as the world's largest soybean importer, annually purchases large amounts of soybean from the United States for crushing oil, and U.S. farmers have long relied on this stable market.
Lao Te's argument that "no longer buy China edible oil" actually confuses the basic logic of trade flow. The reality is that China itself is a major consumer of edible oil and needs to import raw materials for processing, rather than exporting large quantities of refined oil to the United States.
Most of the edible oil on the market in the United States comes from local production or Latin American suppliers, and the proportion of China products is negligible. Therefore, this statement is more like punching a fist into the air, with a huge momentum but no target.
If the U.S. intends to use this to suppress Chinese agriculture, it may mistakenly harm its own industrial chain. U.S. soybean farming has so far had a heavy blow to the trade war, when China's counter-tariffs caused soybeans to be delayed, and prices fell, the similar threat is now repeated, will only exacerbate agricultural state unrest.
Further, the formulation of such policies often lacks detailed data support and becomes a victim of political posture. American decision-makers are accustomed to simplifying complex economic issues into slogan-style propaganda, but ignore the systematic preparations needed for policy implementation.
For example, in order to truly implement the ban on Chinese oil consumption, it is first necessary to clarify the trade statistical calibre: what is "China oil consumption"? is the brand originating in China, or processed products containing Chinese raw materials? if it involves the supply chain traceability, is the U.S. customs able to monitor in real time?
These details were completely invisible in Lao Te's speech, as if the policy could automatically take effect with just one order. This extensive style is exactly the same as the previous farce of ship entry fees. The rules were formulated in a lavish manner, but the implementation process was full of loopholes. After all, federal agencies are short of even basic staffing, so how can we talk about conducting refined trade reviews?
More ironically, the selective attack of the United States in the trade field often falls into the paradox of "injuring eight hundred enemies and losing one thousand oneself". Take edible oil as an example. If the United States forcibly cuts off trade with related products in China, domestic consumers may be the first to bear the brunt.
Intermediate products such as grain and oil processing equipment and packaging materials produced in China are widely penetrated into the global supply chain. If American companies rashly replace suppliers, costs will inevitably rise.
Moreover, China, as an important buyer of U.S. agricultural products, can lead to reciprocal countermeasures in any policy of confrontation.In 2022, China-U.S. trade amounted to $69 billion, and the interests of both sides have long been rooted and unilaterally "disconnected" is no different than economic disadvantage.
While shouting "resist hegemony", Lao Te ignored the daily necessities made in China in American supermarkets. This contradiction just exposed the separation between populist rhetoric and the reality of people's livelihood.
On the other hand, China's coping strategy has always revealed a steady and solid tone. In the trade friction, China has never resorted to emotional declarations, but relied on systematic industrial policies and market mechanisms to guide them.
For example, in order to safeguard the security of crude oil, China has solidified the foundation through diversified imports, scientific and technological development and farming, and has neither blindly blocked nor passively responded.
China's soybean imports last year reached 95 million tons, more than a third of which came from Brazil, and the U.S. share has been gradually adjusted to a reasonable range.
If Lao Te is really concerned about the livelihood of the United States, perhaps he should first examine the inefficiency of his agricultural subsidy policy. According to USDA statistics, the annual subsidy of the U.S. government to agricultural enterprises exceeds 20 billion U.S. dollars, but it has failed to reverse the operating difficulties of small and medium-sized farms. Can this structural contradiction be resolved by boycotting Chinese edible oil?
Over the whole scenario, Oldt's speech is more like a political manipulation aimed at domestic choices, rather than a thoughtful economic strategy. The words filled with "hegemony" and "resistance" in his speech, undoubtedly incite public opinion, but avoid the chain reaction behind the policy.
Inflation pressure in the United States has not disappeared, and the consumer price index has been at the highest levels for several consecutive months, at which time if trade barriers are added, the cost of living will eventually rise.
What is ridiculous is that while the United States accuses China of "unfair trade," it is unable to build an alternative supply chain. Vietnam's edible oil factories rely on China equipment. Argentina's soybean oil processing requires China technology. In the global grain and oil trade network, China's role has long been difficult to circumvent. This paradox makes the boycott declaration like a castle in the air, adding to market uncertainty.
In the end, the vitality of trade policy lies in its feasibility and versatility.If the United States really wants to safeguard economic security, it should focus on domestic industrial upgrading and the coordination of international rules, rather than being obsessed with the illusory gestures of cries of isolation.
The absurdity of the old-fashioned statement lies not only in its data base that is out of reality, but also in the fact that it reveals the fraud of the "slogan first, implement after" in U.S. policy making.
When China steadily controls crude oil security with a consistent pragmatic gesture, the U.S. side's day-to-day change can only make the world question again: who is the "hegemony" that truly threatens the global supply chain?
Perhaps the answer has long been written on the tables of the people of the two countries. On the one hand, people's livelihood security with stable prices and high quality, and on the other hand, the uncertainty caused by political manipulation. This edible oil farce will eventually become another negative example in the history of international trade like ship charges.