Preliminary
On October 11, former U.S. ambassador to China, Burns, during an interview, a speech sparked public opinion around the world.
On the one hand, he admitted that "China's strength has been equal to that of the United States", but on the other hand, he said categorically: "The United States cannot form G2 with China, thinking that it would be a historic mistake", and even gave the reason that "the United States has four major helpers".
Which countries are his so-called four helpers? Is this a bluff or is it exhausted?
The identity crisis behind the G2 humiliation theory
Burns' fierce reaction to the concept of "G2" is actually quite telling.
His words of “humiliation” revealed the true starting point of this “alliance theory”, which is not rooted in how much confidence he has in his allies, but in his inner resistance to the fact of “set up with China,” and you see, his logic is full of contradictions.
He admitted verbally that the United States had to play a game with China now, and it was no longer enough to rely on "fighting alone". This was a clear understanding of reality, but when he turned around, he defined the G2 model of sharing global leadership as a "historic mistake".
This exposes a deep-rooted obsession among the American elite: there can only be one boss on this planet, and that is me. Under this mentality, the role of the so-called "four helpers" is very embarrassing.
They are more like strategic buffers and tools found by the United States to maintain its global leadership position and avoid directly facing the "embarrassing" reality of the balance of power between China and the United States, rather than equal partners.
Interestingly, China is not interested in G2 at all. It has long regarded it as a "sugar-coated cannonball" that restricts its own development and declined it.
Therefore, Burns 'high-profile opposition is more like shouting to the wall in his living room. It is mainly for the hardliners in the country to calm everyone's emotions.
Four helpers in a scattered mess
Burns's hand this "allied card", is it really so useful in his imagination? fear not necessarily, the so-called "countering China united front", because each member in the heart of his own small calculator, long filled with cracks, can not crush into a rope.
The most typical is Australia, its situation perfectly interprets what is called "spiritual division", national security expects the United States, but the economy is in the hands of China, iron ore, agricultural products and pillar industries, seriously dependent on the Chinese market.
So we see that the Australian prime minister has been quick to show goodwill to China, to promote the restoration of trade, and even to refuse to attend the NATO summit, this attitude is already evident.
It's similar in Europe. Established powerful countries such as Germany and France talk about "strategic independence" every day and clearly oppose economic "decoupling" from China. German car companies are playing well in China's new energy vehicle market. It's a great time to cooperate.
Militarily, Europe is hundreds of thousands of miles away from the Asia-Pacific region. British and French aircraft carriers occasionally drive around China, and are also careful for fear of accidental fire. Their posture is more like a sense of presence.
Who is a friend and who is a passer-by
If Australia and Europe are difficult to figure out their "economic accounts", then India is an out-and-out "independent." The United States has always wanted to cultivate India as a key pawn in South Asia to check and balance China, but India has always adhered to its independent diplomacy and refused to choose sides.
It refused to sign any legally binding security agreement, supported by U.S. opposition to continuing to import Russian oil, and also participated in the "quarter-party security dialogue" only on some painless issues, resolutely avoiding direct anti-China.
Not to mention, India and the United States are still quarreling about the tariff issue to this day. It is conceivable that it is difficult to turn such a "strategic partner" who goes his own way into an obedient pawn. The only one that looks the hardest may be Japan.
Militarily, the United States has indeed achieved a high degree of "partial integration", but the problem is that Japan's domestic politics follow the horse lights, and the internal contradictions of the ruling coalition are also heavy.
Today, the hawkish figure Takashi Saami's path as prime minister is blocked, and it is unknown who will come to power tomorrow. This greatly reduces the consistency of its policies. On the key issue of "something is happening in the Taiwan Strait", the Japanese government has always been vague and refused to give a clear commitment.
Don't forget, the tariff war launched during the Trump administration offended all these "helpers". The memory of "America first" makes these allies pay more attention to any call from Washington.
Single thinking hits multi-reality.
In the end, Burns’s “alliance theory” is essentially an outdated Cold War-style group confrontation mindset, which both underestimates China’s comprehensive strength and strategic determination and completely ignores the irreversible trend of world polarisation.
In terms of hard power, China's military modernization process is reshaping the balance of power in the Western Pacific. It is about to enter the era of three aircraft carriers. The People's Liberation Army's control has covered the second island chain, which makes any form of military containment, costs and risks extremely high.
In terms of soft power, China's multilateralism schemes such as "Community of Shared Future for Mankind" are increasingly attractive to many developing countries in the world that are unwilling to take sides, which just hedges the "clique-forming" strategy of the United States.
More importantly, the United States itself is not a piece of iron, China's recent counter-combination kick has been fairly accurate, strengthened rare-earth export control, imposed special port charges on U.S. ships, and the tricks are all on the weak rib of the U.S. supply chain.
For a country with more than 5,000 years of civilization and super strategic patience, how can its road to rejuvenation be stopped by wooing a few allies?
conclusion
Therefore, Burns's remarks are not so much a feasible strategic blueprint as an "anxiety report" of the United States facing the new normal.
The "encirclement network" he conceived was more like a phantom existing in PPT under the triple impact of allies' alienation from Germany, China's continuous growth of strength and the wave of global multipolarization.
The key to the future of the game may not be who has more "helpers", but who can better adapt and lead a world that is interdependent and pluralistic.
If you continue to be immersed in the zero-sum game of the gang, you will only end up sadly finding that you are on the opposite side of the historical trend.