In August 2025, the latest study of the Western think tank showed that after more than three years of combat practice, the Russian military's "killing chain" response time has been reduced from the initial hours to minutes, and the efficiency of drones and precision-guided weapons has been significantly improved.

But all this progress came too late.

In the early days of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, mistakes caused by internal corruption, intelligence leaks, and chaotic command system have cost the Russian army a heavy price.

And now the lessons of the Russian military have also become a real lesson that China must study.Once the situation in the Taiwan Sea changes, China must first clear up three key categories of internal figures before taking action.

In 2017, Russian Army Lieutenant Lieutenant-General Valery Asapev was killed in a shotgun attack on the front line command in the Syrian region of Darzur. It is shocking that the attack was so accurate that it was clear that an internal person leaked its trajectory.

Similar problems have become more obvious in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. In the early days of the conflict, the Russian army's "kill chain" responded slowly. It took several hours from discovering the target to carrying out the strike. It often even used missiles to attack a small group of infantry but missed high-value targets.

Imagine the movement of missile forces, the deployment of logistics materials, and the adjustment of combat plans. If these core secrets are leaked in advance, no matter how advanced weapons are, they will inevitably become targets.

In addition, corruption within the Russian army has seriously weakened combat effectiveness. Russia's military expenditure alone is embezzled by one-fifth every year.

More seriously, there was confusion and discipline within the Russian army, let alone violent crimes in the Russian army, and even malicious incidents of officers abusing soldiers and filming videos uploaded to the network.

One of the most notable characteristics of modern warfare is that in the era of the network, in the era of short video, the public opinion is sufficient to play the rhythm of the battlefield and a hot search, enough to make the hearts of the people in the back more disturbed than the artillery in the front," and such power is no less than the attack of a cannon.

And this is also Russia's experience before and after. It begins to make people think that when China deals with the situation in the Taiwan Strait, it is afraid that it needs to be particularly vigilant about the influence of three types of people.

The first category is naturally the inside ghost who colludes with external forces and reveals state secrets.

These people may be hiding in critical positions, performing "obedience" at regular times, but once the time matures, they may become "time bombs".

The second category is people who spread divided opinions on the network, disrupting national identity.In the early days of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, the Russian public opinion field was chaotic, and the social platforms were filled with negative news, which seriously affected people's judgment and national cohesion.

Even in the late days of the Russian military¡¯s advances, there was still skepticism in the country, and this ¡°internal collapse of public opinion¡± was more destructive than external attacks.

The third category is those who undermine international cooperation and affect the image of the country. Part of the reason for Russia's diplomatic isolation in the early stages of the conflict was the chaos of its internal diplomatic system. Some officials spoke too aggressively and offended potential allies.

Simply put, ¡°emotional¡± officials will spread all over the world, such a power is insignificant.

However, it is gratifying for China to take precautions after all.

After all, in the current situation, China needs to establish a multi-level pre-control system. In the field of intelligence security, the revised Anti-Spying Law in 2017 and the anti-spying system integrating artificial intelligence in 2024 provide legal and technical support for clearing the ghosts.

In addition, in the public opinion position, from 2023, mainstream media will greatly strengthen the positive propaganda of unification on the two sides, especially in the youth group to promote the sense of national identity.The network information management regulations introduced in 2024 require platform algorithms to prioritize the "positive energy" content.

In the diplomatic field, China has significantly increased investment in the past two years. In 2023, we will deepen ties with ASEAN through the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement, and in 2024, we will provide infrastructure loans to the Philippines to ease disputes in the South China Sea.

It has to be said that eliminating three types of people is not the end, but more importantly, it is necessary to establish an institutional mechanism to prevent such people from emerging.

As Russia gradually adjusts its strategy on the Ukrainian battlefield, its military-industrial production capacity has increased to 3,000 armored vehicles a year, with drone and precision missile production capacity significantly increased.

The latest war situation in August 2025 shows that the Russian military continues to consolidate the battlefield advantage by turning highways into innovative tactics such as temporary airports. External forces will not stop interfering, but as long as the internal iron board is a piece, any challenges will be solved.

And Russia in exchange for blood and money: The real battlefield, only half of the gun rains, the other half of the inner ghosts, the rhythmists, the destroyer co-workers, are the three most dangerous mines.

Naturally, if they can be eliminated in advance, the front line will be spared three shocks.