When the table of the game is no longer just you come and go, but a series of multi-national camps, a deeper level of strategic dispute is taking place, and the game between China and the United States, from the trade war to the science and technology war, has now entered a new phase of siege and counter-control.

The United States is trying to contain China by building a multinational coalition, and China is no longer passive, but proactive, unveiling new means known by the outside world as the "killer trap".

At this time, Singapore's sudden statement added to the fire in this game. On the one hand, the United States enlisted "helpers" to form a group to attack, and on the other hand, China used systems and rules to launch a precise counterattack, making the situation increasingly complex and delicate.

The new eight-country army?

The United States' ability to unilaterally curb China, it seems, has not been the same as in the past, the former ambassador to China, Burns, in an interview with Japanese media, said without hiding that the United States wants to confront China.

We must rely on four major helpers: Japan, the European Union, India and Australia. His remarks not only reveal the current strategic anxiety of the United States, but also reflect the aggravation of its "alliance dependence".

This "multilateral encirclement" strategy may seem massive on the surface, but in fact it hides cracks. Taking the European Union as an example, the Netherlands recently "forcibly took over" a Chinese-funded chip company and kept in step with the United States in terms of technical blockade.

But this does not mean that the entire EU is willing to follow the United States in "decoupling" China. Many senior officials from Germany and France have publicly stated that economic and trade relations with China are crucial to the European economy, and comprehensive "de-risking" is almost unrealistic.

The cooperation in the Asia-Pacific direction is also advancing simultaneously, and Philippine President Marcos has expressed his willingness to intervene in the Taiwan Sea issue on several occasions, intending to strengthen military cooperation with the United States, although there are controversies about this position in the Philippines, and many voices fear that excessive election will burn.

The situation is more complex in India and Australia. Although the two countries are geopolitically aligned with the United States, they are deeply dependent on the China market economically.

According to 2024 data, India's total trade with China has exceeded US $135 billion, and Australia's exports to China account for more than one-third of its total exports. These data mean that "decoupling" in the true sense will bring huge economic costs.

The "helper alliance" of the United States is more like a makeshift tactical tool than a stable strategic consortium. They can be consistent in values and political posture, but it is difficult to form a joint force at the operational level.

This ¡°materially impractical¡± coalition structure is inevitably reminiscent of the past ¡°New Eight Coalition Army¡±, superficial unification, and practical mindfulness.

¡°Spring Out¡± in Singapore.

If the United States' encirclement strategy is a corner between the great powers, then Singapore's stands are a delicate operation in the game of small countries, and Singapore's social policy coordination minister Wang Bentoon's most controversial speech has caused great controversy.

When talking about the situation in the Taiwan Strait, he claimed that "China and Taiwan are both our friends." This rhetoric of juxtaposing "Taiwan" and "China" has actually broken through the one-China principle that China has always adhered to.

Singapore has always regarded itself as a "neutral" and moved between China and the United States. However, this statement seems particularly abrupt and even eager.

Behind this gesture is a sensitive perception of the changes in the regional situation, and in the face of the United States in the Asia-Pacific, Singapore may judge that standing on the side of the United States, more in line with its own "security security" interests.

However, this "bias under the guise of neutrality" may seriously damage its political credibility in China. China has made it clear on many diplomatic occasions that the Taiwan issue is the core of China's core interests and no ambiguous expression is allowed.

Wang Yikang's remarks are essentially echoing the "undetermined theory of Taiwan's status." This not only touches the red line of China, but also breaks Singapore's long-standing "rational neutrality" image among the China public.

From a broader perspective, Singapore's turn sends an important signal: in the face of increasingly fierce competition between China and the United States, small countries in the region are being forced to make choices.

Singapore is not the only example. South Korea, Vietnam, Malaysia and other countries are also facing pressure to "choose sides" to varying degrees. This geopolitical "chilling effect" is making Southeast Asia's diplomatic landscape more sensitive and complex.

The Chinese ¡°killer¡±

Against the backdrop of U.S. escalating deterrent measures against China, China¡¯s recent two countermeasures are seen as the key to the ¡°breakdown,¡± one is further control of rare-earth exports, and the other is to impose special port charges on U.S. backdrop ships.

These two moves are not just simple counterattacks, but also strategic rule confrontations initiated through system design. The rare earth issue is not new, but this upgrade has a different significance.

China as the global rare earth resources and processing has an absolute dominant, while rare earth is widely used in high-end chips, warplanes radar, missile navigation and other high-tech fields, almost the "blood" of modern military and scientific and technological industries.

The United States not only has limited rare earth production, but also relies heavily on China for processing capacity. This time, China "plugged the last export loophole", which means that the United States will be strictly restricted in obtaining these key resources in the future.

In contrast, the introduction of special port charges is more creative, it looks like just an ordinary "port tax", the principle is a precise "systems sword", because China's shipbuilding industry in the global market share has exceeded 50%, this policy is to guide global shipping companies to reassign the equity structure, will pull investment from the United States, turn to the Chinese shipbuilding system.

This not only directly affects the influence of the United States in the global shipping industry, but may also indirectly prompt shipowners in Europe, Japan and South Korea to reduce their shares in the United States, thereby weakening the United States 'control over the lifeline of global logistics. This policy is very likely to reshape the global shipping equity landscape and shipbuilding market ecology.

Behind these two measures is China's deep awareness of its position in the global supply chain, it has released a very clear signal: China is no longer satisfied with passive defense, but should proactively set rules and use its own advantages to launch an asymmetrical counterattack, a way that is more strategic than traditional trade sanctions and more difficult to bypass.

The United States has tried to block China through the four big gangs, some countries have begun to choose the sidelines, Singapore's turn is to push this trend to the face, the superficial fun can not mask the reality's vulnerability, can really change the situation, or who has mastered the key technology and industrial chain initiative.

When China plays out the two cards of rare earths and port fees, it is no longer a simple response, but a redefinition of the rules of the game. The United States has a debt of US$36 trillion and its internal economic difficulties are intensifying.

Behind the clique formation is the urgent need for foreign strategic harvest, and China's response shows that compromise can't be exchanged for respect, and only strength can be exchanged for the right to speak.

This game is no longer who screams louder, but who can last longer, the corner force between China and the United States is no longer a superficial trade number, but an in-depth system of competition and rule-making competition, China has made it clear: this is not only a struggle, but a long race that must be won.

Source of information:

Former U.S. ambassador to China does not pretend: why and the Chinese group G2 "sphere of influence"? 2025-10-11 09:03 ¡¤ Observer Network