On October 14, local time, Trump suddenly accused China of “not buying U.S. soybeans intentionally” and vowed he would consider ending business with China in the oil and certain areas of trade in retaliation.
However, these harsh words contradict his recent statement that "Sino-US trade frictions are expected to ease", directly leading to the S & P 500 index turning from a rise to a fall, causing market chaos.
On the surface, the aggressive threat exposed the US president's weakness and strategic misjudgment in dealing with the Sino-US trade game. What he doesn't know is that he is facing a China that can calmly deal with any threat on the basis of full preparation.
Trump's threat is based on an outdated assumption: China is still as dependent on U.S. soybeans as it was a few years ago.
However, the global soybean trade pattern has undergone a fundamental change, and Trump doesn't seem to realize this.
When Trump complained on social media that China "deliberately refused to buy" U.S. soybeans, he selectively ignored a key fact: it was his own government's increasing tariff threats and restrictions on China that led to China's suspension of purchasing U.S. soybeans.
China's response was a well-prepared strategic adjustment rather than a last-minute emotional response.
China has not experienced a supply shortage because it stopped buying U.S. soybeans.
Instead, China has long planned to diversify soybean imports and successfully shifted import sources to South America.
Of course, these changes did not happen overnight, but were the inevitable result of China's long-term strategic planning.
Trump's threat is not only weak internationally, but also faces a severe implementation crisis in the United States. The biggest weakness of his threat is that he can't effectively appease even his core voters.
American soybean farmers, many of whom are Trump's political base, are caught in a "battle for survival".
Faced with the loss of China, a market that accounts for more than half of U.S. soybean exports, the Trump administration promised to launch the agricultural subsidy rescue plan, but was delayed due to the federal government’s stagnation.
This failure of domestic governance makes the threat to the outside seem more empty.
Many farmers have bluntly said that they only want orders from China, not subsidies. The reason is simple, because subsidies can only temporarily relieve symptoms, and the market is the key to long-term survival.
How can a leader who is unable to preserve markets for farmers create markets for them by threatening them?
There are obvious logical flaws in Trump’s decision-making cycle: initiating a radical trade policy that triggers Chinese counter-repressions, then promising subsidies to soothe affected farmers, and finally turning only to more intense external threats when subsidies are not implemented.
Compared with Trump's chaotic decision-making and empty threats, China has always shown strategic determination and tactical precision in the Sino-US struggle.
China's confidence comes from years of strategic preparation and diversified layout.
When the United States was capricious in the trade war, China solidly promoted the joint construction of the "Belt and Road" and strengthened trade exchanges with countries along the route.
At the same time, China also holds other counter-trunks.
Trump specifically mentions the trade in edible oil, which is actually the U.S. imported waste edible oil (UCO) for the manufacture of biofuels.
What is even more ironic is that the China cooking oil that Trump threatened to ban imports is precisely a card that he simply cannot afford to play. He may not know or deliberately ignored a key fact: the U.S. biofuel industry's dependence on China's spent edible oil (UCO) is deeply rooted.
Data show that the U.S. biofuel industry relies on waste edible oil supplied by China as raw materials for production. If the United States itself suddenly cuts off this supply chain, the result will be that related industries in the United States will suffer heavy losses.
In other words, Trump threatened to cut off imports, nothing like “moving a stone and knocking on your feet.”
And even if the United States stops importing, the pressure on China will be very limited.
Trump's move seems to be domineering, but it is actually a pale paper tiger, exposing his ignorance of the actual structure of Sino-US trade.
His fantasy of forcing China to submit to the soybean issue by suppressing China's edible oil exports is simply "drawing water with a sieve"-misjudging China's counter-measure capabilities and overestimating its bargaining chips.
The soybean game between China and the United States is a trade dispute on the surface, but it is a contest between two governance models at the deep level.
On the one hand, it is impulsive, short-sighted, and decision-making based on social media; on the other hand, it is steady, long-term, and strategic planning.
Behind this position is China's understanding of the flexibility and strategic depth of the international trading system, and it is also the embodiment of China's increasing maturity in the game of great powers.
During Trump's first term, he claimed to "disconnect", but today, what super tactics has the U.S. government come up with?
The United States has gradually lost its advantage in areas such as chips and trade that it once thought could control China.
Instead, China has begun to counter with more precision, so that the United States is unable to do so.