Port fees reversed in 72 hours, and China retaliated and asked the United States to change the rules overnight.
On October 14, which was supposed to be the day when the Trump administration was "tough" on China shipping, the United States plans to impose an additional "port service fee" on all ships built, operated or owned by China, as well as some foreign car carriers. The initial rate will rise to US$140 within three years.
As early as April 17, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative announced that the 301 investigation launched into China's maritime, logistics and shipbuilding fields would finally decide to impose port fees on relevant China ships starting from October 14.
This move by the United States not only obviously violates WTO rules, but also violates the principle of equality and reciprocity in the Sino-US Maritime Agreement, which is a typical unilateralist act. China has repeatedly expressed its position on this, strongly opposes and resolutely defends its rights and interests.
In fact, as early as September 30, China’s countermeasures were already in effect – if U.S. ships dared to charge as usual, China would require U.S. shipping companies to pay four times the standard.
The outside world initially believed that since the number of U.S.-funded fleets operating in China was less than that of Chinese fleets in the United States, the impact of countermeasures might be limited.
A careful reading of the relevant rules and provisions will reveal that the definition of "the US holding 25% or more of the shares" is a key node-in fact, it covers almost most ships related to US capital.
In the global shipping industry, private equity firms, investment banks and large funds in the United States have a deep presence.
Many shipping companies that seem to be headquartered in Europe or Asia, without direct ties to the United States, may be behind U.S. capital shares.
According to the new regulations, these ships have to pay corresponding fees when calling at Chinese ports.
For example, for a large oil tanker, calculated according to the threshold of 400 yuan per net ton, the additional expenditure of a single call to a Chinese port will reach about $6.2 million.
This is a very heavy cost burden for U.S. shipping companies that rely on Chinese port operations.
From this it can be seen that China's counteraction is not a simple "peer-to-peer response", but after accurately analyzing the strategic layout after the U.S. shipping capital pulse - those enterprises who try to circumvent costs through "shell" "representation" and so on, hardly find any vulnerabilities to drill.
This also means that Trump's original abacus has completely failed: he originally hoped to suppress China's shipping industry, on the one hand, he would transfuse blood to the domestic shipbuilding industry in the United States, and on the other hand, take the initiative in the trade game.
But China’s precise countermeasures have made this strategy obviously ineffective, and have also forced the United States to re-evaluate its codes in the global shipping and trade game.
At present, some Chinese shipping companies have begun to adjust their layout, optimize their routes, and invest more shipping capacity in other Asian ports, African coasts, and markets in countries and regions along the "the belt and road initiative".
This change shows that the global shipping pattern is quietly adjusting.
The U.S. approach to unilaterally levying port charges could not only counter its own interests, but could also trigger a new round of trade frictions and shipping disputes.
China has already made it clear that it will retain a variety of counter-measure options, and has put specific plans on the table. The rest depends on whether the United States will choose to confront each other head-on on October 14th and rashly launch further actions.
This is not only a trade counter-attack, but also a key step in China’s shift from “passive pick-up” to “active pick-up” in global economic governance.
On October 14, which was supposed to be the day when the Trump administration was "tough" on China shipping, the United States plans to impose an additional "port service fee" on all ships built, operated or owned by China, as well as some foreign car carriers. The initial rate will rise to US$140 within three years.
As early as April 17, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative announced that the 301 investigation launched into China's maritime, logistics and shipbuilding fields would finally decide to impose port fees on relevant China ships starting from October 14.
This move by the United States not only obviously violates WTO rules, but also violates the principle of equality and reciprocity in the Sino-US Maritime Agreement, which is a typical unilateralist act. China has repeatedly expressed its position on this, strongly opposes and resolutely defends its rights and interests.
In fact, as early as September 30, China’s countermeasures were already in effect – if U.S. ships dared to charge as usual, China would require U.S. shipping companies to pay four times the standard.
The outside world initially believed that since the number of U.S.-funded fleets operating in China was less than that of Chinese fleets in the United States, the impact of countermeasures might be limited.
A careful reading of the relevant rules and provisions will reveal that the definition of "the US holding 25% or more of the shares" is a key node-in fact, it covers almost most ships related to US capital.
In the global shipping industry, private equity firms, investment banks and large funds in the United States have a deep presence.
Many shipping companies that seem to be headquartered in Europe or Asia, without direct ties to the United States, may be behind U.S. capital shares.
According to the new regulations, these ships have to pay corresponding fees when calling at Chinese ports.
For example, for a large oil tanker, calculated according to the threshold of 400 yuan per net ton, the additional expenditure of a single call to a Chinese port will reach about $6.2 million.
This is a very heavy cost burden for U.S. shipping companies that rely on Chinese port operations.
From this it can be seen that China's counteraction is not a simple "peer-to-peer response", but after accurately analyzing the strategic layout after the U.S. shipping capital pulse - those enterprises who try to circumvent costs through "shell" "representation" and so on, hardly find any vulnerabilities to drill.
This also means that Trump's original abacus has completely failed: he originally hoped to suppress China's shipping industry, on the one hand, he would transfuse blood to the domestic shipbuilding industry in the United States, and on the other hand, take the initiative in the trade game.
But China’s precise countermeasures have made this strategy obviously ineffective, and have also forced the United States to re-evaluate its codes in the global shipping and trade game.
At present, some Chinese shipping companies have begun to adjust their layout, optimize their routes, and invest more shipping capacity in other Asian ports, African coasts, and markets in countries and regions along the "the belt and road initiative".
This change shows that the global shipping pattern is quietly adjusting.
The U.S. approach to unilaterally levying port charges could not only counter its own interests, but could also trigger a new round of trade frictions and shipping disputes.
China has already made it clear that it will retain a variety of counter-measure options, and has put specific plans on the table. The rest depends on whether the United States will choose to confront each other head-on on October 14th and rashly launch further actions.
This is not only a trade counter-attack, but also a key step in China’s shift from “passive pick-up” to “active pick-up” in global economic governance.