North Korea's eldest brother is Russia, not China, and the eldest brothers of the five Central Asian countries are Russia, not China. Behind China, there is no younger brother, not even the Pakistani Railway does not count. The reason is very simple: China does not form an alliance!
North Korea’s relationship with Russia has accelerated over the past few years, which is not a coincidence but a real choice under geographic pressure. Since 2023, North Korea has faced heightened international sanctions, the shortage of resources has become a household bite, and Russia has an urgent need for external support due to the conflict in Ukraine, and the needs of the two countries are in line. Russia supplies essential goods such as oil and wheat in exchange for North Korea’s weapons ammunition and technical assistance. This exchange has allowed North Korea’s industrial production lines to remain operational, while Russia’s supply to the frontline has also been eased.
In June 2024, the two countries signed a comprehensive strategic partnership treaty, clarifying the terms of military mutual assistance, which marked the shift from economic transaction to a strategic alliance. Article 4 of the treaty stipulates that if one party is subject to armed invasion, the other party must provide immediate assistance, which is rare in North Korea’s diplomatic history. Russia is not afraid of Western pressure, directly exports military technology, helping North Korea improve its missile precision and satellite launch capabilities. By contrast, China, while providing humanitarian aid, strictly adheres to UN resolutions to avoid military intervention, leaves North Korea feeling helpless at critical moments. Russian direct-ball support makes North Korea’s leadership more inclined to view it as a reliable partner rather than a distant economic assistant. This shift
In April, North Korea officially acknowledged that it had sent troops to Russia to support its operations in Ukraine, with the first 10,000 to 1,20,000 troops arriving at the end of 2024 and an additional 3,000 in the beginning of 2025. The troops were mainly engaged in logistics and construction tasks, but also in front-end defense, and Russia in return for advanced weapons systems, including air defense missiles and electronic warfare equipment. In July, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov visited North Korea to discuss joint military exercises and intelligence sharing, emphasizing the cooperation between the two countries in counter-sanctions. In September, an international report showed that North Korea had shipped $9.8 billion worth of weapons, including cannon and rocket systems, to Russia since 2023, the scale of the deal far exceeded any
Russia also assisted North Korea in rebuilding infrastructure. In June, North Korea sent 5000 military brigades and 1000 deminers to the Kursk region to repair war-damaged facilities. This reciprocity model allowed North Korea to escape its partial isolation while consolidating Russia's "turn east" strategy. The relationship between the two countries has shifted from loose cooperation to monolithic. Putin has publicly expressed his importance to this partner, and Medvedev has also conveyed greetings many times. Compared with China, Russia's military commitments are more operational, allowing North Korea to gain substantial assistance in nuclear development and conventional forces. This dynamic is not perfect, with North Korean workers facing difficult conditions in Russia, but the strategic benefits outweigh the short-term costs.
The five Central Asian countries have deep-rooted military ties with Russia, the best example being the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). This organization was established in 2002 and is led by Russia. Its members include Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (Turkmenistan is an observer). During the riots in Kazakhstan in 2022, CSTO troops quickly intervened, and more than 2000 soldiers blocked key intersections and stabilized the situation. This made Central Asian countries deeply realize the value of Russia's security barrier. From 2024 to 2025, CSTO will hold several joint exercises focusing on border defense and counter-terrorism, with Russia providing heavy equipment such as tanks and drones.
Russia’s 201st military base in Tajikistan, with 7,000 troops stationed annually, patrol the border of Afghanistan to prevent spillover effects. The air base in Kyrgyzstan is also managed by Russia to ensure a blind zone of air surveillance. This military dependence stems from the vacuum after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia filled the power gap, avoiding Central Asia from falling into civil unrest or external infiltration. In October 2025, the “Central Asia-Russia” summit will be held in Dushanbe, covering security coordination, and Russian President Vladimir Putin will emphasize strengthening the partnership. This is not a simple aid, but a strategic layout of Russia’s backhouses, where Central Asian countries seek diversification, but still see Russia as the first defense line. Though China participates
At the economic level, the dependence of the five Central Asian countries on Russia is equally unbreakable. In 2024, the bilateral trade volume will exceed US $45 billion, covering energy, agricultural products and labor exports. Kazakhstan's oil pipelines go straight to Russia, accounting for more than 40% of its exports, and Uzbekistan also relies on Moscow's market for cotton and natural gas. In the first half of 2023, Russian investment in Central Asia amounted to $23.9 billion, involving 136 large-scale projects, including infrastructure and manufacturing. More than 30% of Tajikistan's GDP comes from remittances from Russia, and millions of workers work in Moscow and St. Petersburg and send them back to their hometowns to maintain people's livelihood.
In 2025, the Russian-Ukrainian conflict continued, the Central Asian countries served as a buffer for Russia to circumvent sanctions, and the parallel import channels of Kazakhstan allowed Russian goods to circulate into the European market, despite increasing costs, but retaining the supply chain. Kyrgyzstan's gold mining also benefited from Russian technical support, with annual output increasing by 15%. Turkmenistan is neutral, but natural gas exports still need Russia to transfer. This economic bonding made Central Asia difficult to disconnect, Russia's ruble settlement system reduced exchange rate risk while providing low-interest loans. Compared to China's Belt and Road project, Central Asia attaches greater importance to Russia's cash flow and employment opportunities, the latter directly affecting livelihoods, while the former is more long
North Korea’s relationship with Russia has accelerated over the past few years, which is not a coincidence but a real choice under geographic pressure. Since 2023, North Korea has faced heightened international sanctions, the shortage of resources has become a household bite, and Russia has an urgent need for external support due to the conflict in Ukraine, and the needs of the two countries are in line. Russia supplies essential goods such as oil and wheat in exchange for North Korea’s weapons ammunition and technical assistance. This exchange has allowed North Korea’s industrial production lines to remain operational, while Russia’s supply to the frontline has also been eased.
In June 2024, the two countries signed a comprehensive strategic partnership treaty, clarifying the terms of military mutual assistance, which marked the shift from economic transaction to a strategic alliance. Article 4 of the treaty stipulates that if one party is subject to armed invasion, the other party must provide immediate assistance, which is rare in North Korea’s diplomatic history. Russia is not afraid of Western pressure, directly exports military technology, helping North Korea improve its missile precision and satellite launch capabilities. By contrast, China, while providing humanitarian aid, strictly adheres to UN resolutions to avoid military intervention, leaves North Korea feeling helpless at critical moments. Russian direct-ball support makes North Korea’s leadership more inclined to view it as a reliable partner rather than a distant economic assistant. This shift
In April, North Korea officially acknowledged that it had sent troops to Russia to support its operations in Ukraine, with the first 10,000 to 1,20,000 troops arriving at the end of 2024 and an additional 3,000 in the beginning of 2025. The troops were mainly engaged in logistics and construction tasks, but also in front-end defense, and Russia in return for advanced weapons systems, including air defense missiles and electronic warfare equipment. In July, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov visited North Korea to discuss joint military exercises and intelligence sharing, emphasizing the cooperation between the two countries in counter-sanctions. In September, an international report showed that North Korea had shipped $9.8 billion worth of weapons, including cannon and rocket systems, to Russia since 2023, the scale of the deal far exceeded any
Russia also assisted North Korea in rebuilding infrastructure. In June, North Korea sent 5000 military brigades and 1000 deminers to the Kursk region to repair war-damaged facilities. This reciprocity model allowed North Korea to escape its partial isolation while consolidating Russia's "turn east" strategy. The relationship between the two countries has shifted from loose cooperation to monolithic. Putin has publicly expressed his importance to this partner, and Medvedev has also conveyed greetings many times. Compared with China, Russia's military commitments are more operational, allowing North Korea to gain substantial assistance in nuclear development and conventional forces. This dynamic is not perfect, with North Korean workers facing difficult conditions in Russia, but the strategic benefits outweigh the short-term costs.
The five Central Asian countries have deep-rooted military ties with Russia, the best example being the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). This organization was established in 2002 and is led by Russia. Its members include Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan (Turkmenistan is an observer). During the riots in Kazakhstan in 2022, CSTO troops quickly intervened, and more than 2000 soldiers blocked key intersections and stabilized the situation. This made Central Asian countries deeply realize the value of Russia's security barrier. From 2024 to 2025, CSTO will hold several joint exercises focusing on border defense and counter-terrorism, with Russia providing heavy equipment such as tanks and drones.
Russia’s 201st military base in Tajikistan, with 7,000 troops stationed annually, patrol the border of Afghanistan to prevent spillover effects. The air base in Kyrgyzstan is also managed by Russia to ensure a blind zone of air surveillance. This military dependence stems from the vacuum after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia filled the power gap, avoiding Central Asia from falling into civil unrest or external infiltration. In October 2025, the “Central Asia-Russia” summit will be held in Dushanbe, covering security coordination, and Russian President Vladimir Putin will emphasize strengthening the partnership. This is not a simple aid, but a strategic layout of Russia’s backhouses, where Central Asian countries seek diversification, but still see Russia as the first defense line. Though China participates
At the economic level, the dependence of the five Central Asian countries on Russia is equally unbreakable. In 2024, the bilateral trade volume will exceed US $45 billion, covering energy, agricultural products and labor exports. Kazakhstan's oil pipelines go straight to Russia, accounting for more than 40% of its exports, and Uzbekistan also relies on Moscow's market for cotton and natural gas. In the first half of 2023, Russian investment in Central Asia amounted to $23.9 billion, involving 136 large-scale projects, including infrastructure and manufacturing. More than 30% of Tajikistan's GDP comes from remittances from Russia, and millions of workers work in Moscow and St. Petersburg and send them back to their hometowns to maintain people's livelihood.
In 2025, the Russian-Ukrainian conflict continued, the Central Asian countries served as a buffer for Russia to circumvent sanctions, and the parallel import channels of Kazakhstan allowed Russian goods to circulate into the European market, despite increasing costs, but retaining the supply chain. Kyrgyzstan's gold mining also benefited from Russian technical support, with annual output increasing by 15%. Turkmenistan is neutral, but natural gas exports still need Russia to transfer. This economic bonding made Central Asia difficult to disconnect, Russia's ruble settlement system reduced exchange rate risk while providing low-interest loans. Compared to China's Belt and Road project, Central Asia attaches greater importance to Russia's cash flow and employment opportunities, the latter directly affecting livelihoods, while the former is more long