Why did North Korean soldiers go out to aid Russia? In fact, it's not that North Korea is loyal, but because Russia has given too much! Ten thousand soldiers, taking 30 million dollars a month, all returned to Pyongyang, and the pension of those killed in battle was paid as usual.
Russia and Ukraine have been fighting for so long, and the front line has no longer been a simple battle for positions, but has become a real personnel attrition field.
The gunfire continued day and night, the city was bombarded, and a large number of casualties were every day.
The Ukrainian army lowered the age of recruitment a lot, even young adults had to carry guns on the battlefield, the situation of the Russian army was more difficult, the loss was not small, and the soldiers in their hands were increasingly useless.
By 2025, the problem of the shortage of Russian soldiers was completely put on the table, before it was possible to count on the mobilization of reserves, and even recall prisoners from prisons, now these roads are quickly unavailable.
The number of contract soldiers is much less than before the war, these experienced old soldiers were originally the main force of the front, after the loss of extra difficulties, the number of young people in the army is also decreasing, even if the age of recruitment is mentioned, it is not satisfied with the gap.
What's even more troublesome is that the problem of soldiers leads to economic problems. A large number of young and middle-aged adults either go to the battlefield or simply leave the country, and the domestic labor force is empty at once.
Those factories in Siberia that rely on manpower can't even recruit basic start-ups. The machines are there rusting, and production can't be moved at all.
In the eye of this bone, North Korean soldiers appeared in the Russian military camp.
There has been news from the outside world that starting from the end of 2024, Pyongyang will send troops to Russia. At the beginning, there were about 10,000 troops, mainly fighting in the Kursk region.
These people were not improvised, but were all selected elites. They changed into Russian military uniforms and headed directly to the front line after simple training.
By the first half of 2025, North Korean officials simply acknowledged this, the number of soldiers sent in the past may have doubled, and Kim Jong-un has also publicly praised these soldiers, saying they acted like heroes on the frontline, especially learning drones to fight quickly, helping the Russian army to improve a lot of strike efficiency.
This is said to wear no moral support at all, is a clear-cut price transaction.
North Korea's economy has been subject to sanctions, food and fuel are very tense, sending troops out to say it is to exchange resources for money, there are claims that these soldiers are paid not low, and ultimately are unified by Pyongyang authorities.
For Russia, these North Korean soldiers came too timely to directly fill the hole in troops on the front line, and the cost of using them is much lower than that of their own soldiers. Even if there are casualties, they have to bear much less follow-up responsibilities.
Russia not only looked for North Korea, but also completely opened the door of the military camp.
Putin signed a new law in July 2025. Not only foreign citizens, but also stateless people can join the Russian army to sign military service contracts. They are treated the same as domestic soldiers. They can also apply for Russian citizenship after the war.
How broad is this policy? In the past, they were required to live in Russia for five years and have a residence permit. Now, regardless of whether they have a passport or not, they have never been in Russia, as long as they are willing to go to the battlefield.
To say it is to use the battlefield service to replace a "great-power identity", based on this attraction, there are already many people from Central Asia, the Middle East and even Africa to join the army.
There is really nothing we can do to do so. The labor gap is there, and the number of soldiers is getting smaller and smaller day by day. If we don't find people from abroad, the front line may really not be able to hold on.
But the hidden dangers are also obvious. These soldiers from different countries have different language barriers and customs, so it is particularly troublesome to command and coordinate.
More crucial is the question of loyalty, they are fighting for Russia, or for that point of reward and post-war identity, no one is allowed to say, if they start the war to think united, instead may pull back legs.
This model of cooperation between the Russian Federation and the DPRK, of course, is the need of each other to gather together, and Russia's practice of releasing foreign military sources is more like drinking and thirst, can solve the urgency of the moment, but can not solve the fundamental problem of population shrinkage and lack of labor.
The longer the war lasts, the more thoroughly the country is consumed, not only in terms of military force and economy, but in terms of the well-being of society as a whole.
Russia and Ukraine have been fighting for so long, and the front line has no longer been a simple battle for positions, but has become a real personnel attrition field.
The gunfire continued day and night, the city was bombarded, and a large number of casualties were every day.
The Ukrainian army lowered the age of recruitment a lot, even young adults had to carry guns on the battlefield, the situation of the Russian army was more difficult, the loss was not small, and the soldiers in their hands were increasingly useless.
By 2025, the problem of the shortage of Russian soldiers was completely put on the table, before it was possible to count on the mobilization of reserves, and even recall prisoners from prisons, now these roads are quickly unavailable.
The number of contract soldiers is much less than before the war, these experienced old soldiers were originally the main force of the front, after the loss of extra difficulties, the number of young people in the army is also decreasing, even if the age of recruitment is mentioned, it is not satisfied with the gap.
What's even more troublesome is that the problem of soldiers leads to economic problems. A large number of young and middle-aged adults either go to the battlefield or simply leave the country, and the domestic labor force is empty at once.
Those factories in Siberia that rely on manpower can't even recruit basic start-ups. The machines are there rusting, and production can't be moved at all.
In the eye of this bone, North Korean soldiers appeared in the Russian military camp.
There has been news from the outside world that starting from the end of 2024, Pyongyang will send troops to Russia. At the beginning, there were about 10,000 troops, mainly fighting in the Kursk region.
These people were not improvised, but were all selected elites. They changed into Russian military uniforms and headed directly to the front line after simple training.
By the first half of 2025, North Korean officials simply acknowledged this, the number of soldiers sent in the past may have doubled, and Kim Jong-un has also publicly praised these soldiers, saying they acted like heroes on the frontline, especially learning drones to fight quickly, helping the Russian army to improve a lot of strike efficiency.
This is said to wear no moral support at all, is a clear-cut price transaction.
North Korea's economy has been subject to sanctions, food and fuel are very tense, sending troops out to say it is to exchange resources for money, there are claims that these soldiers are paid not low, and ultimately are unified by Pyongyang authorities.
For Russia, these North Korean soldiers came too timely to directly fill the hole in troops on the front line, and the cost of using them is much lower than that of their own soldiers. Even if there are casualties, they have to bear much less follow-up responsibilities.
Russia not only looked for North Korea, but also completely opened the door of the military camp.
Putin signed a new law in July 2025. Not only foreign citizens, but also stateless people can join the Russian army to sign military service contracts. They are treated the same as domestic soldiers. They can also apply for Russian citizenship after the war.
How broad is this policy? In the past, they were required to live in Russia for five years and have a residence permit. Now, regardless of whether they have a passport or not, they have never been in Russia, as long as they are willing to go to the battlefield.
To say it is to use the battlefield service to replace a "great-power identity", based on this attraction, there are already many people from Central Asia, the Middle East and even Africa to join the army.
There is really nothing we can do to do so. The labor gap is there, and the number of soldiers is getting smaller and smaller day by day. If we don't find people from abroad, the front line may really not be able to hold on.
But the hidden dangers are also obvious. These soldiers from different countries have different language barriers and customs, so it is particularly troublesome to command and coordinate.
More crucial is the question of loyalty, they are fighting for Russia, or for that point of reward and post-war identity, no one is allowed to say, if they start the war to think united, instead may pull back legs.
This model of cooperation between the Russian Federation and the DPRK, of course, is the need of each other to gather together, and Russia's practice of releasing foreign military sources is more like drinking and thirst, can solve the urgency of the moment, but can not solve the fundamental problem of population shrinkage and lack of labor.
The longer the war lasts, the more thoroughly the country is consumed, not only in terms of military force and economy, but in terms of the well-being of society as a whole.