In the past, trade frictions were frequent, and Trump and his predecessors repeatedly used tariffs as weapons. However, this type of industry has a deadly weakness: it was built in the era of global supply chain overlap, each other's dependence, high cost of replacement. Nowadays, China has accumulated deep advantages in the fields of rare earth, manufacturing chain, material processing, and other fields, and the opponents can no longer repress each other by raising tariffs.
Since the early years, China has been deeply engaged in the rare-earth industrial chain, controlling a number of key aspects from mining, metallurgy, magnetic manufacturing to recycling.In recent years, it has also started to incorporate foreign exports, technical licenses, overseas magnetic products into the regulatory track.These years of system and industrial reserves, so that it has the ability not to let the threat easily turn into real harm.
Trump first made a high-profile attack and agreed to "see the truth on November 1"; but when markets, capital and internal pressures gathered, he had to suspend action. Greer and Vance successively voiced their voices to cool down, in fact, to find a way out for themselves.
This "president playing bad cop + officials playing good cop" strategy is a way to control variables: first create an atmosphere of extreme pressure, and then give in to overflowing panic. Its purpose is not to tear the face apart, but to give China a sense of pressure and deterrence while reserving room for negotiation. After the United States makes concessions, China can also maintain a "tough but negotiable" situation.
China's response to risk is also accurate: neither soften the bottom line nor give the other party the space to face.Rare-earth control, technical control, export approval, these tools are left to China's institutional weapons.
What China has demonstrated in this confrontation is institutionalized counter-measures, not just export restrictions. Bringing magnets, rare earths, technical modules, etc. into global jurisdiction and stipulating export approval is not only protection, but also the extension of rule-making power to high-end links.
The average person may not be aware of the details of each policy adjustment, but will see cost or supply fluctuations in the fields of high-tech products, smart equipment, green energy equipment, etc. Some electric motors and components that rely on rare-earth magnets may face short-term tensions.
In addition, for other countries and enterprises, China’s deployment of rules is a warning: Dependence is a strategic weakness in key resources and high-end materials.
From Trump’s “extreme tariff threat” to the high-level emergency “fire extinction” to complete the jump-through evolution in two days, this is not a policy fluctuation, but a game of swords. China’s “not willing to fight, but not afraid to fight” gesture is to find a balance between the bottom line and negotiations. The US wants to create a repressive atmosphere with deterrence, but is forced to return in the face of market and internal pressure. The question is for you: how long can this “tariff threat – withdraw – negotiate” route go?