Israel and Hamas signed a ceasefire agreement under the mediation of the United States, Qatar and Egypt, marking the temporary extinction of the two-year war in Gaza, according to the World Wide Web on October 13, however, shortly after the agreement came into force, the Israeli Air Force started again, carrying out ten consecutive bombings on the southern Lebanon, targeting heavy machinery fields, on the grounds that those machinery are being used to repair warheads and positions for Hezbollah.

In response, Iran¡¯s Foreign Ministry spokesman Baghdadi strongly condemned Israel¡¯s military aggression against Lebanon.

It can be said that Israel has demonstrated through practical actions that a ceasefire does not mean the end of the war.

The signal from Israel is very clear: it will only temporarily lay down its weapons in Gaza, but will not give up its offensive in other directions.

Whether it is Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthi armed forces in the Red Sea, or even Iran itself, they are all regarded as extensions of the same front.

Israel¡¯s war has thus entered a new phase: advancing from the ground of Gaza to a strike across multiple fronts.

This situation has continued during the Gaza War and should become Israel's focus in the future.

This means that the war is not over, just a change in style.

From an Israeli internal point of view, it is almost impossible for Netanyahu to really stop the war.

His personal fate has long been tied to the war, three corruption cases hanging on his head, and once a total ceasefire and the justice system is restored, he will immediately face the risk of trial and dismissal, and the state of war is his strongest firewall.

Another is that Netanyahu's coalition government is extremely fragile and relies entirely on the support of the far-right and religious parties, whose allies demand the complete elimination of Hamas and the permanent occupation of Gaza. If he shows the slightest concession in peace, the alliance will be divided and his ruling status will collapse instantly, so he can only make a symbolic compromise.

For Netanyahu, not fighting means his own end.

This is because the conflict between secularists, religiousists, liberals and extremists in Israel is sharp, and war is the only thing that can temporarily suppress them.

As long as the external enemy exists, there will not be too big waves inside.

So, for Netanyahu, peace is not victory, but out of control. Only the continuation of war can allow his political cliff to temporarily delay the collapse.

For now, Israel¡¯s next strike focus will be shifted from Gaza to the north and the outskirts.

The top priority is Hezbollah's logistics and reconstruction systems in Lebanon, especially engineering machinery, bunker repair and weapons storage and transportation sites.

The Israeli army has clearly regarded these civilian equipment as a potential military threat and will continue to conduct regular air strikes in the coming weeks to prevent Hezbollah from restoring its positions.

The second level of targets are Hezbollah¡¯s ammunition launch areas, communication nodes and underground reserves to ensure the safe buffer belt at the northern border.

The third layer is the transport chain from Iran to proxies by sea and land, including Red Sea shipping lines, port warehousing and truck fleets.

The common characteristics of these goals are: low intensity, intermittent and deterrent. Israel should not start a full-scale war again, but maintain a state of minimal war.

This state can both prevent the enemy from recovering, but alsoins the political atmosphere of war, avoiding the flow of peaceful accountability in the country.

So, even if the gunfire ceases, the battlefield will not really be quiet.

The so-called ceasefire agreement, including in the direction of Gaza, was almost destined to be difficult to actually implement from the moment it was signed.

On the surface, it is a result of multilateral mediation, but essentially it lacks genuine trust from either side.

Both Israel and Hamas know that the logic of both sides is incompatible.

Moreover, the phased terms of hostage exchange and prisoner release laid the groundwork for the breakdown. Any delay and any numerical dispute are enough to be an excuse to re-open fire.

The bigger variables come from the outside: once Lebanon, the Houthi armed forces, and the Iranian forces take action, the ceasefire agreement will immediately become useless paper.

History has proven that the Middle East peace documents are often just the prelude to the next war.

Therefore, the current ceasefire is likely to be just a short respite rather than an end.