On October 9, China's Ministry of Commerce suddenly released six new rules in a row, the content is not so complicated, but not light.
This is not an ordinary policy adjustment, but a precise move directly into the international resource supply chain.
The foreign media's reaction was very direct, described as "setting up a big net" and seemed both shocked and helpless.
This network, fast and tight, has covered the U.S. military industry, energy, and new energy vehicle industries.
It seems that China has really made up its mind this time, no longer just to be a porter of resources, but to be a rule maker.
To put it bluntly, these 6 announcements came one after another from 9am to 5pm, and each one hit home.
In particular, the policy known as "No. 61" has drawn the question of "who used China's rare earth" from the domestic scope to the world.
No matter which country you are in, as long as you have a little bit of China's rare earth in your hand, you have to ask China for permission.
In the past, the practice of walking around and changing a shell is completely useless.
This is not a small move, but a move of the concept of "long-arm jurisdiction" to the resource field, and China this time is a real play.
One step closed, rare land is no longer the "public resources" you want to get.
In the past few decades, China's rare earth exports have been relatively loose, and China does not care about how others use them and transfer them.
But now that the situation has changed, this announcement makes it clear to everyone that China is no longer merely mining and selling mines, but that it is governing, using and protecting the strategic resources of rare earth.
The core meaning of the announcement is actually very simple: as long as your product contains China rare earth components, no matter how small the proportion is, as long as it exceeds 0.1%, you must obtain Chinese approval.
This is equivalent to extending China’s rare-earth “use rights” to the world.
This change has a direct impact on the United States.
Although the United States also has its own rare earth mines, it still relies on China for many key technologies, equipment, and even processing steps.
This is fine, China not only no longer sells equipment, no longer sends technical personnel, even your products made with Chinese rare earth, must look back and ask if China can use it.
This kind of control method has completely blocked the old path of the United States relying on "third parties to whitewash".
More importantly, China no longer allows rare earth technology to flow freely.
In the past, some countries developed rare earth processing by introducing China technology or using China experts as consultants.
These people are now on the control list.
In other words, technology, manpower, and equipment are closed at the same time, and the roots, stems, and branches of resources are all "locked".
Companies in the United States who want to build their own supply chains have fallen into passivity.
The United States did not expect that China this time was "locked" from the source to the end.
U.S. military and new energy enterprises have been deeply dependent on rare earth in China.
Although it is often said that "dispersed risk" is "autonomously controllable", it has not been able to jump out of the dependence on Chinese technology in action.
Once this policy came out, they suddenly discovered that it was not "China didn't sell" that simple, but "you used Chinese raw materials, used Chinese technology, used Chinese equipment, all have to listen to China."
The most embarrassing of these is a group of companies that originally planned to rebuild the rare earth industry chain in the United States.
They invested a lot of money, bought equipment, built factories, and thought of creating a complete chain of mines on their own.
As a result, there is no key purification technology, the equipment is banned, and it is impossible to even ask for guidance.
It costs money, and the result is only to watch the equipment fall.
For the United States, this is not a problem encountered by individual companies, but a "supply outage crisis" at the level of the entire industrial chain.
Many of the rare-earth materials used by military-industrial enterprises can not bypass Chinese patents and raw materials.
New energy vehicles, battery manufacturing, wind power equipment, these high-tech industries are also "heavy users of rare earths".
China is now not just tightening the raw materials, but incorporating the entire chain into regulation.
This caught many U.S. companies off guard, and the originally prepared "alternative plan" simply did not have time to implement.
Moreover, China has also included high-energy-density lithium batteries in the scope of export control this time.
This is also a big blow to the electric vehicle industry.
Automotive companies such as Tesla and Rivian, originally highly sensitive to the battery supply chain, now once the chain is broken, production capacity will not immediately follow.
Although the U.S. Department of Energy has launched emergency response measures, technical reserves and supply capabilities cannot be replaced in the short term.
The U.S. is pressuring, its allies are hesitant, but China’s position is unwavering.
Faced with this sudden resource blockade, the U.S. government and enterprises obviously panicked.
A number of commercial associations quickly pressured the White House to ask China to speak out for “military purposes” and exempt from export restrictions.
However, there are no signs of compromise from China.
After the announcement was issued, the Ministry of Commerce's attitude was very clear: rules are rules and there are no special channels.
Tesla’s goalkeepers even shouted in public that they couldn’t do without China’s rare earth.
Even then, China did not make any concessions.
This shows that China's policy this time is not a temporary idea, but a systematic adjustment after a long period of preparation.
Whether it is military demand or emergency orders for new energy vehicles, it is not included in the "exemption" list.
What's more interesting is that some of the United States 'allies have also begun to waver.
Some large European chemical companies, which originally cooperated with American companies to develop rare earth batteries, have now suddenly announced the suspension of cooperation and turned to negotiations with Chinese companies.
Japan and South Korea have not made any public statements, but have been in private contact with China in the hope of resuming imports of some key rare-earth products.
This series of actions demonstrates the vulnerability of the so-called “United Front” in the face of resources.
China's announcement this time actually sends a clear signal: China is no longer satisfied with "exporting for money," but wants to manage resources as strategic assets.
Anyone who uses Chinese things must abide by Chinese rules.
This logic was previously a U.S. patent and is now being used by China.
This is not just a trade counteraction, but also a re-charting of industry rules.
On the surface, the six announcements seem to be a “strengthening” of resource exports, but the deep logic is far more than that.
This is a new "rule-making" way, a manifestation of China's upstream movement in the global industrial chain.
In the past, China played the role of raw material supplier, but now it is trying to become a rule-setter through technology, patents and standards.
This change is actually in response to the United States 'suppression of China companies in the past few years.
The United States has used "long-arm jurisdiction" to block China technology companies, and now China has responded with a similar logic: If you want to use my things, you have to listen to my rules.
This is no longer a matter of negotiation by lip service, but a real control right in your hands.
Moreover, the changes that this strategy brings are systematic.
The global resource supply chain is being redistributed, and many countries are beginning to realize that rare earth is no longer a commodity to be “buy at will” but a strategic resource to reserve and negotiate.
Some resource powers in the Middle East have begun cooperation talks with China in exchange for China’s technology and infrastructure support for rare earth resources.
The supply chain is moving closer to China, not because of political pressure, but because technology and resources are inseparable.
This change is a double blow to the United States.
On the one hand, it has lost control of critical resources.
On the other hand, its strategic allies have also begun to reassess the possibility of cooperation with China.
This “centricity” is gradually weakening America’s dominance in the global industrial chain.
Whoever can control resources can write the rules
China's six announcements this time are not just a country's act of protecting its own resources, but a reorganization of the rules of the global supply chain.
From the extraction of raw materials to the use of technology, to the export of the final product, each link is included in the controllable scope.
This comprehensive "locking" approach, although controversial, also reflects a country's intention and ability to take the initiative in key areas.
The United States used to rely on global resource allocation, but now it is caught between "self-sufficiency" and "technological blockade."
China, on the other hand, has extended the initiative from the raw material side to the upstream of the industrial chain through a combination of policies.
This is not only a response to the U.S. technology blockade, but also an action by China to strive for the right to speak in the global industrial structure.
In the long run, this “resource war” around rare land will not end soon, but the pattern has begun to change.
China is no longer just the workers carrying ore, but the people who are beginning to hold the keys.
Whoever can control resources is qualified to rewrite the rules of this game.