Trump has made another new move. He only gave 20 days to force China to lift the ban on rare earths, otherwise he will increase taxes on China by 100%. So, why did China choose this time to strengthen rare earth export controls? Can Trump really force China to make concessions in 20 days?
On October 10, local time, Trump issued consecutive posts on social platforms, issuing a tough warning to China. He accused China of imposing export controls on the rare earth industry and even claimed that China was trying to "hold the world hostage." This expression is obviously inflammatory and is intended to create a public opinion atmosphere of "global victims" to strengthen the moral stance of the United States. Trump also said that the United States is considering imposing an additional 100% tariff on China products, which will officially take effect from November 1. At the same time, he claimed that he might cancel a meeting with China during the APEC summit scheduled to be held in South Korea on the grounds that it was "unnecessary."
But just a few hours later, Trump changed his mouth and said that "the first meeting between China and the United States has not been cancelled", but "I'm not sure whether it will continue". This inconsistent statement actually reflects his consistent negotiation style: first create threats, and then reserve room for easing. By creating uncertainty, he hopes to put pressure on public opinion and the market to force the other party to "take a step back" psychologically. However, for China, such practices are no longer new. From 2018 to now, Trump's "threat-negotiation-re-threat" cycle has long been familiar. China is obviously fully prepared and will not waver easily.
Looking ahead, the direct trigger of this storm was that China's Ministry of Commerce issued six consecutive announcements on October 9, officially upgrading the export control of rare earths and related technologies, equipment, raw materials and auxiliary materials. The scope of control extends from rare earth minerals to rare earth processing technology, equipment and even artificial graphite anode materials. In particular, Announcement No.61 clearly stipulates that all rare earth items containing "Chinese ingredients" exported abroad must obtain an export license from China as long as the proportion exceeds 0.1%. This means that even if rare earth raw materials have been shipped overseas, as long as they involve Chinese resources or technologies, they are still subject to Chinese supervision when re-exported. This is a systematic and closed-loop strategic blockade, which directly cuts off the loophole of "detour resale".
Trump was extremely angry about this, calling China "sinister and hostile" and claiming that the United States had "twice the reserves" but that "there was no need to use them before." But in fact, although the United States has rare earth deposits, it has long lacked refining and separation technology. Rare earth mining is only an upstream link, and the real core lies in high-purity extraction and material preparation. In the past few decades, the United States has outsourced these industries, and now it is not overnight to rebuild the system. In other words, what Trump calls "reserve advantage" is more a political slogan than a realistic ability.
So, why did China choose to take action at this time? There are three reasons. First, this is a direct response to the US chip blockade. Just a few days ago, the U.S. Congress's "Select Committee on China" had just recommended expanding restrictions on China's chip manufacturing and requiring allies to simultaneously ban the export of key components. China's use of rare earths as a breakthrough is equivalent to counterattack the US scientific and technological war from the material side. Second, this is to prevent external security risks. Rare earths are dual-use items, and China has an international obligation to prevent them from being used for military expansion. Third, this is to set topics before negotiations, so that the United States cannot unilaterally dominate the say. Trump is accustomed to using tariff threats as a bargaining chip, but China did the opposite this time, using resource control to "take the lead" and taking the initiative in its hands.
In this context, Trump's "20-day ultimatum" is actually more like a political performance. He clearly knows that it is impossible for China to cancel national control measures in such a short time, let alone change legal documents due to external threats. The purpose of this "countdown pressure" practice is not to really solve the problem, but to create the image of a "tough leader" in the United States. As the 2026 midterm elections approach, Trump urgently needs to consolidate the support of his core voters. Provoking trade friction with China has always been his best political operation. This move can not only divert the contradiction of weak domestic economy and slowing employment, but also strengthen the narrative of "America first".
From a more macro-level perspective, the U.S.-China friction cycle is no longer just a trade issue, but a competition for the dominance of the industrial chain. The U.S. wants to lock up the upstream technology with chips, while China uses rare-earth control of raw materials. Both sides are using their respective advantages to shape a new balance. This competition is difficult to eliminate in the short term, but it is not necessarily going to complete disconnection. In fact, the U.S. is still reliant on the Chinese market and supply, and China is alsoining the flexibility of export channels. The key to the problem is not whether to confront, but how to redefine the boundaries in competition.
In short, Trump’s approach may in the short term create public opinion shocks, but in the long run, it will weaken the international credibility of the United States. Threatening to raise taxes and break agreements will make global suppliers lose confidence in the U.S. market. While China, through institutionalized export management, is showing the image of a responsible big power. Two paths, reflecting very different governance logic. One is a short-term political game with power as a means, and one is a long-term strategy layout based on rules.
In the next 20 days, China and the United States may still have public opinion confrontation and policy testing, but the real direction depends on whether the two sides can switch from "threat" to "co-operation". the competition between China and the United States will not stop, and the world will continue to find a balance between tension and cooperation.