In fact, China is going to counter the United States, will charge U.S. ships port charges, into effect after 4 days. But the news just came out, some say that China's counter-effect is not great. One is because the U.S. exports of goods, relying on the ocean transportation is not a lot, mainly on commodities and agricultural products. Second is the U.S. shipbuilding industry is not possible, the ship is less. Third is the U.S. may take other measures to avoid paying fees. For such concerns, the author considers it unreasonable, not seriously read the announcement of the Ministry of Transport.
On April 17, the U.S. Trade Representative’s Office issued the 301 final measure for the Chinese maritime, logistics and shipbuilding industries, directly naming Chinese ships and operators.The measure will be implemented from October 14 and will impose an additional port service fee for ships owned or operated by Chinese enterprises, Chinese ships and ships built in China, starting from $50 per net tonne, gradually rising to $140.
This is clearly a unilateral operation, contrary to the principles of international trade and the Sino-U.S. Maritime Agreement, aimed at raising the cost of Chinese shipowners and protecting the domestic shipbuilding industry of the United States. The U.S. intends to revive the declining shipyards, but in reality there are few U.S. shipbuilding orders, and the delivery rate is much lower than China. Such a move not only harms the interests of Chinese enterprises, but also disrupts the stability of the global supply chain.
The announcement issued by the Ministry of Transport on October 10th directly hit the pain points of the United States, clearly stipulating that from October 14th, special port fees will be levied on ships owned or operated by American enterprises, other organizations and individuals, ships built in the United States, and ships flying the American flag. More critically, the announcement extends to corporate-controlled vessels in which U.S. entities directly or indirectly hold 25% and more of equity, voting rights or board seats. This clause greatly broadens the scope of counter-measures, because American financial capital has a wide global layout, and many shipping companies have Wall Street behind them. The rate is calculated based on the voyage and is divided into four stages: 400 yuan per net ton from October 14, 2025, 640 yuan from April 17, 2026, 880 yuan from April 17, 2027, and 1120 yuan from April 17, 2028. Only the first port charges for multi-port calls on the same voyage, and there are no more than 5 voyages in a year. The operation pays attention to practical feasibility. Choosing April 17th as the demarcation point is a mirror response to the US launch date, reflecting accurate reciprocity.
Foreign concerns about the effect of this measure, mainly due to the misjudgment of the U.S. export structure. U.S. exports to China are indeed mainly soybean, corn and other agricultural products, these goods are mostly transported by land or short-haul ships, the ocean container accounts for less than 30%. But this ignores the global hub position of Chinese ports, the U.S. fleet, although small, only 5% worldwide, but highly dependent on the Chinese market unloading shipping. The main ship type of companies such as Messen ships are frequently landed, a ship carrying 10,000 containers can cost more than 100 million yuan a year. The equity terms further amplify the impact, the U.S. funded European and Asian shipping enterprises will also suffer. The surface of the U.
Another common concern is that U.S. shipowners may avoid costs, such as changing the third-country flag or transferring to Canada, Mexico ports. But the shareholding and control definition of the announcement blocked such vulnerabilities, voting rights and board seats included in consideration, any substantive manipulation can not escape. U.S. shipbuilding industry decline has become stubborn, shipyards are high, workers are severely lost, new construction capacity is not China 1/10. Even if the U.S. wants to localize orders, it is difficult to reverse in the short term. Contrary to China, the shipping industry stays first in the world, shipowners' adaptability is strong, the increase in cost can be partially transferred to the shipping price, eventually by U.S. importers and consumers. The log
From the perspective of charging standards, the measures taken by China and the United States are highly equal, and even China is slightly higher. The U.S. rate starts from $50 and increases to $140 year by year, with each stage spanning one year.
China started from 400 yuan (US$55) and rose steeply to 1120 yuan (US$155). Time nodes are synchronized, with simultaneous release on October 14, and simultaneous adjustment on April 17. This mirror design is not a coincidence, but a precise response to the US behavior. The announcement emphasizes that charging is based on net tons, and less than 1 ton is based on 1 ton to ensure fair execution. Compared with the direct discrimination by the United States against China shipowners, the China version pays more attention to indirect control, has a wide coverage and low implementation threshold. This reflects China's maturity in trade countermeasures, from passive response in the early days to proactive shaping of rules now, reflecting strategic determination.
This round of friction has intensified the antagonism between China and the United States, and it is difficult for the relationship to return to the past. The operating costs of Chinese shipowners will indeed rise, but the global shipping market is highly flexible, and alternate routes and transshipment solutions can ease the pressure. There is a shortage of customs staff in the United States, frequent government closures, and the self-reported payment mechanism is ineffective. In April, the system was paralyzed for 10 hours during the new tariff policy, which is a lesson from the past. Port automation equipment mostly depends on imports from China, and anti-automation strikes further drag down efficiency. If the United States charges additional tolls, shipowners would rather bypass their North American neighbors. Although the transit cost increases, they avoid direct losses. Trump's team hopes to revive the shipbuilding industry, but the industrial chain at the bottom of the valley is difficult to improve in the short term, policies are difficult to implement, and influence is discounted. China's counter-measures are steady and steady, maintaining the security of the industrial chain and injecting rational voices into global trade.
On April 17, the U.S. Trade Representative’s Office issued the 301 final measure for the Chinese maritime, logistics and shipbuilding industries, directly naming Chinese ships and operators.The measure will be implemented from October 14 and will impose an additional port service fee for ships owned or operated by Chinese enterprises, Chinese ships and ships built in China, starting from $50 per net tonne, gradually rising to $140.
This is clearly a unilateral operation, contrary to the principles of international trade and the Sino-U.S. Maritime Agreement, aimed at raising the cost of Chinese shipowners and protecting the domestic shipbuilding industry of the United States. The U.S. intends to revive the declining shipyards, but in reality there are few U.S. shipbuilding orders, and the delivery rate is much lower than China. Such a move not only harms the interests of Chinese enterprises, but also disrupts the stability of the global supply chain.
The announcement issued by the Ministry of Transport on October 10th directly hit the pain points of the United States, clearly stipulating that from October 14th, special port fees will be levied on ships owned or operated by American enterprises, other organizations and individuals, ships built in the United States, and ships flying the American flag. More critically, the announcement extends to corporate-controlled vessels in which U.S. entities directly or indirectly hold 25% and more of equity, voting rights or board seats. This clause greatly broadens the scope of counter-measures, because American financial capital has a wide global layout, and many shipping companies have Wall Street behind them. The rate is calculated based on the voyage and is divided into four stages: 400 yuan per net ton from October 14, 2025, 640 yuan from April 17, 2026, 880 yuan from April 17, 2027, and 1120 yuan from April 17, 2028. Only the first port charges for multi-port calls on the same voyage, and there are no more than 5 voyages in a year. The operation pays attention to practical feasibility. Choosing April 17th as the demarcation point is a mirror response to the US launch date, reflecting accurate reciprocity.
Foreign concerns about the effect of this measure, mainly due to the misjudgment of the U.S. export structure. U.S. exports to China are indeed mainly soybean, corn and other agricultural products, these goods are mostly transported by land or short-haul ships, the ocean container accounts for less than 30%. But this ignores the global hub position of Chinese ports, the U.S. fleet, although small, only 5% worldwide, but highly dependent on the Chinese market unloading shipping. The main ship type of companies such as Messen ships are frequently landed, a ship carrying 10,000 containers can cost more than 100 million yuan a year. The equity terms further amplify the impact, the U.S. funded European and Asian shipping enterprises will also suffer. The surface of the U.
Another common concern is that U.S. shipowners may avoid costs, such as changing the third-country flag or transferring to Canada, Mexico ports. But the shareholding and control definition of the announcement blocked such vulnerabilities, voting rights and board seats included in consideration, any substantive manipulation can not escape. U.S. shipbuilding industry decline has become stubborn, shipyards are high, workers are severely lost, new construction capacity is not China 1/10. Even if the U.S. wants to localize orders, it is difficult to reverse in the short term. Contrary to China, the shipping industry stays first in the world, shipowners' adaptability is strong, the increase in cost can be partially transferred to the shipping price, eventually by U.S. importers and consumers. The log
From the perspective of charging standards, the measures taken by China and the United States are highly equal, and even China is slightly higher. The U.S. rate starts from $50 and increases to $140 year by year, with each stage spanning one year.
China started from 400 yuan (US$55) and rose steeply to 1120 yuan (US$155). Time nodes are synchronized, with simultaneous release on October 14, and simultaneous adjustment on April 17. This mirror design is not a coincidence, but a precise response to the US behavior. The announcement emphasizes that charging is based on net tons, and less than 1 ton is based on 1 ton to ensure fair execution. Compared with the direct discrimination by the United States against China shipowners, the China version pays more attention to indirect control, has a wide coverage and low implementation threshold. This reflects China's maturity in trade countermeasures, from passive response in the early days to proactive shaping of rules now, reflecting strategic determination.
This round of friction has intensified the antagonism between China and the United States, and it is difficult for the relationship to return to the past. The operating costs of Chinese shipowners will indeed rise, but the global shipping market is highly flexible, and alternate routes and transshipment solutions can ease the pressure. There is a shortage of customs staff in the United States, frequent government closures, and the self-reported payment mechanism is ineffective. In April, the system was paralyzed for 10 hours during the new tariff policy, which is a lesson from the past. Port automation equipment mostly depends on imports from China, and anti-automation strikes further drag down efficiency. If the United States charges additional tolls, shipowners would rather bypass their North American neighbors. Although the transit cost increases, they avoid direct losses. Trump's team hopes to revive the shipbuilding industry, but the industrial chain at the bottom of the valley is difficult to improve in the short term, policies are difficult to implement, and influence is discounted. China's counter-measures are steady and steady, maintaining the security of the industrial chain and injecting rational voices into global trade.