1. Overview of Events

About 20 September 2025, exiled Russian former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad suddenly developed severe symptoms of poisoning in a strictly secured villa outside of Moscow, was urgently sent to a highly secret hospital ICU in the outskirts of Moscow, after about 11 days of treatment, escaped the hospital on 2 October. Detection showed that his body contained unknown toxins, symptoms including severe coughing, breathing difficulties, nervous system disorders, and so on, allegedly a well-planned poisoning assassination.

Suspicions and reactions of the parties

Official Russian attitude: The Russian government has remained silent on the matter, has not made any public comments, nor has it officially acknowledged or denied the incident.

Visit restrictions: During Assad¡¯s hospitalization, his brother, former Syrian Republic Guard commander Mahmoud al-Assad, was banned from visiting, while former Presidential Secretary-General Mansour Azam was allowed to visit, which was interpreted by the outside as Russia¡¯s intention to cut off the Assad family¡¯s power network and control its influence.

The incident occurred as Russia and the new Syrian regime (Juliani government) negotiated key issues such as Russian military bases, debt, new currency printing, and coincided with Julian¡¯s imminent visit to Russia and participation in the Russian-Arab summit, so it was widely seen as a complex political game.

3. Analysis of poisoning suspects and motives

(1) The new Syrian regime (Julani government)

-Motivation: Julani hopes to completely eliminate Assad's influence, consolidate the legitimacy of the new regime, and prevent Assad from "making a comeback" or becoming a symbol of opposition forces at home and abroad. At the same time, Julani repeatedly asked Russia to extradite Assad, and used the right to use Russian military bases as a bargaining chip.

- Ability: Although Djulani has motives, it is extremely difficult to poison the core security area of Moscow, and it is almost impossible without internal cooperation from Russia.

(2) Western intelligence agencies (such as Israel's Mossad, CIA, etc.)

Motivation: The West may use Assad¡¯s poisoning to create a public opinion that ¡°Russia cannot protect its allies,¡± undermine Russia¡¯s international credibility, and further isolate Russia¡¯s presence in the Middle East.

Capacity: Technical strength, but extremely high risk, once exposed will trigger serious diplomatic conflict.

(3) Russian internal forces

- Motivation:

-Political burden: Assad has become a "negative asset" in the negotiations between Russia and the new Syrian government, and Russia may intend to "abandon the car to protect the handsome" in exchange for practical benefits such as the right to use the base and debt relief.

Economic benefits: The Assad family has huge assets in Russia and overseas, and some Russian forces may confiscate their wealth and legalize it through ¡°unfortunate¡± means.

Ability: In Russia, poisoning is most likely to be carried out under strict security guards, and the methods are similar to the KGB tradition.

The geopolitical game behind the incident

Russia has two difficulties: a surrender of Assad would undermine the international credibility and shake the confidence of its allies; a continued asylum could lead to the loss of military bases in Syria (Tartous Naval Base, Hemeim Air Force Base) and economic benefits.

Julian¡¯s calculation: Using Assad as a negotiating code to put pressure on Russia while delivering a ¡°voting note¡± to the West in exchange for international recognition and economic assistance.

Assad has gone from a ¡°chess player¡± to a ¡°chess player¡±, whose life and future depend entirely on the exchange of interests between the great powers and regional forces.

5. Conclusion and impact

- The greatest possibility: Russia's internal forces carried out a "controllable assassination" on Assad out of "abandoning the car to protect the commander" or economic interests, which neither completely killed him, but also completely lost his political influence, making it easier to reach a deal with the Julani government.

- The future: Assad is likely to be in house arrest for a long time, becoming the invisible code for Russian-Syrian negotiations. Russia and the new Syrian government will have a new round of play on issues such as bases, debt, economic aid, and Assad's fate will depend on the outcome of the negotiations.