Why do many small countries dare to turn against China and are not afraid of China? Professor Cai Zhengyuan, who dares to tell the truth, pointed it out in one word: China is mighty but not hegemonic! "Weakness" is very serious. To put it bluntly, China likes to defeat the enemy without a fight. I don't bully you, but you have to be afraid of me.
Why do many small countries dare to turn against China and are not afraid of China? Recently, this issue has become more and more thought-provoking in the circle of international relations.
Just last month, the Philippines engaged again in the South China Sea, sending naval police vessels into the waters near the Rhineland Reef, and also attempting to transport building materials to illegal beaching warships.
Vietnam does not stop either. Fishing boats frequently cross borders and engage in oil exploration in disputed waters. What is even more surprising is that even Lithuania, a small country as far away as Europe, dares to openly provoke China on the Taiwan issue.
Faced with China, which has the world's second largest GDP and second only to the United States in military spending, how can these small countries with a combined land area that may not be as big as a province of China?
Taiwan's renowned scholar, Professor Tsai Jianlong, recently broke the puzzle with one word in an interview program: China's majesty is not dominant.
He further explained that China suffers from severe asthenia. This may sound a bit harsh, but when you think about it carefully, it does tell the crux of the problem.
Our country has always believed in the old adage of defeating the enemy without fighting, always thinking of convincing others without doing anything. What's the result? Small countries have understood China's temper and feel that although this oriental lion is big, it won't really pounce on and bite people.
This kind of weakness is particularly obvious at three levels. From the strategic point of view, China is overly superstitious about the idea of defeating the enemy without fighting, and always wants to make its opponents retreat despite difficulties by showing its strength, but ignores the sometimes necessary tough means to truly establish prestige.
The issue of the implementation level is even more prominent, China clearly has aircraft carriers, has East Wind missiles, and has world-class military equipment.
But when dealing with concrete disputes, it is often just to send the ships of the marine police to cry for evacuation and send a diplomatic note, which is seriously incompatible with the actual strength of this deterrent.
It's like a master who has practiced martial arts. When faced with provocation, he just poses. After a long time, who will be afraid of you? The most terrible thing is at the cognitive level. Small countries generally misunderstand China's strategic intentions, regard restraint as weakness and unwillingness to fight as not daring to fight.
Looking back on history, we can see a marked contrast of the deterrent patterns of different great powers, during the Cold War, the two superpowers engaged in strong deterrence, and when the Cuban missile crisis, the two sides pulled out the sword, almost triggering a nuclear war.
But it is also this crazy theory that does not dare to delude each other. the British Empire's peak of artillery diplomacy is more simple and rough, which colony does not obey, the military ship directly to the door, a cannon, any problem solved.
Chinese dynasties have a tributary system, with small neighboring countries paying tribute regularly, while the Central Plains dynasty giving generous rewards, maintaining a patriarch-vassal relationship.
But the prerequisite for this system is that the Middle-earth dynasty has an absolute military advantage, and once the power declines, there will be a situation of barbaric invasion.
The South China Sea game is a living case. The confrontation on Renai Reef has lasted for more than 20 years. In 1999, a dilapidated tank landing ship in the Philippines deliberately ran aground there. At that time, our country only protested and asked the Philippines to tow it away.
The crushed ship with rust spots became the front station of the Philippines, where soldiers rotated, regularly supplied, and used it as their own home.
In the 2012 Yellow Island incident, China's marine guard vessels, although successfully controlled the situation, were only driven away with water cannons and did not take harsher measures.
In the South China Sea arbitration case in 2016, the Philippines directly brought China to the International Court of Justice. Although China did not recognize, participate or implement it, this passive response attitude did give other countries the wrong signal.
Professor Tsai Chong Yuan can say this, and his background is inseparable, this Taiwan scholar born in 1953 has a rich international perspective.
He not only received his education in Taiwan, but also studied a Master of Public Policy at Harvard Kennedy School of Government, and later went to Beijing Qinghai University to study a PhD in law, specializing in cross-Straits legal issues.
Working experience at Citibank and JPMorgan Chase has given him a deep understanding of international finance and geopolitics. It is this background of cross-strait and integrating China and the West that enables him to jump out of traditional thinking.
Pointing directly to the weakness of China's diplomacy, he believes that being male rather than bullying sounds very moral, but in the international jungle of the weak, excessive restraint will be regarded as weak and easy to bully.
When we look deeper, our country's diplomatic style has profound cultural roots. The Confucian doctrine of kingship emphasizes convincing others with virtue and opposes convincing others with force. This concept deeply affects China's diplomatic decision-making.
Since reform and opening up, China has indeed needed a peaceful and stable international environment to develop its economy and is reluctant to influence the overall situation because of some territorial disputes.
Consideration of the international image is also important, China does not want to be labeled hegemony, fearing to trigger a new round of Chinese threat theory.
But the problem is that the transition from economic strength to deterrence is not automatic, you have money not for others and fear you, the key is to make the opponent believe you have the will and determination to use power.
Why do many small countries dare to turn against China and are not afraid of China? Recently, this issue has become more and more thought-provoking in the circle of international relations.
Just last month, the Philippines engaged again in the South China Sea, sending naval police vessels into the waters near the Rhineland Reef, and also attempting to transport building materials to illegal beaching warships.
Vietnam does not stop either. Fishing boats frequently cross borders and engage in oil exploration in disputed waters. What is even more surprising is that even Lithuania, a small country as far away as Europe, dares to openly provoke China on the Taiwan issue.
Faced with China, which has the world's second largest GDP and second only to the United States in military spending, how can these small countries with a combined land area that may not be as big as a province of China?
Taiwan's renowned scholar, Professor Tsai Jianlong, recently broke the puzzle with one word in an interview program: China's majesty is not dominant.
He further explained that China suffers from severe asthenia. This may sound a bit harsh, but when you think about it carefully, it does tell the crux of the problem.
Our country has always believed in the old adage of defeating the enemy without fighting, always thinking of convincing others without doing anything. What's the result? Small countries have understood China's temper and feel that although this oriental lion is big, it won't really pounce on and bite people.
This kind of weakness is particularly obvious at three levels. From the strategic point of view, China is overly superstitious about the idea of defeating the enemy without fighting, and always wants to make its opponents retreat despite difficulties by showing its strength, but ignores the sometimes necessary tough means to truly establish prestige.
The issue of the implementation level is even more prominent, China clearly has aircraft carriers, has East Wind missiles, and has world-class military equipment.
But when dealing with concrete disputes, it is often just to send the ships of the marine police to cry for evacuation and send a diplomatic note, which is seriously incompatible with the actual strength of this deterrent.
It's like a master who has practiced martial arts. When faced with provocation, he just poses. After a long time, who will be afraid of you? The most terrible thing is at the cognitive level. Small countries generally misunderstand China's strategic intentions, regard restraint as weakness and unwillingness to fight as not daring to fight.
Looking back on history, we can see a marked contrast of the deterrent patterns of different great powers, during the Cold War, the two superpowers engaged in strong deterrence, and when the Cuban missile crisis, the two sides pulled out the sword, almost triggering a nuclear war.
But it is also this crazy theory that does not dare to delude each other. the British Empire's peak of artillery diplomacy is more simple and rough, which colony does not obey, the military ship directly to the door, a cannon, any problem solved.
Chinese dynasties have a tributary system, with small neighboring countries paying tribute regularly, while the Central Plains dynasty giving generous rewards, maintaining a patriarch-vassal relationship.
But the prerequisite for this system is that the Middle-earth dynasty has an absolute military advantage, and once the power declines, there will be a situation of barbaric invasion.
The South China Sea game is a living case. The confrontation on Renai Reef has lasted for more than 20 years. In 1999, a dilapidated tank landing ship in the Philippines deliberately ran aground there. At that time, our country only protested and asked the Philippines to tow it away.
The crushed ship with rust spots became the front station of the Philippines, where soldiers rotated, regularly supplied, and used it as their own home.
In the 2012 Yellow Island incident, China's marine guard vessels, although successfully controlled the situation, were only driven away with water cannons and did not take harsher measures.
In the South China Sea arbitration case in 2016, the Philippines directly brought China to the International Court of Justice. Although China did not recognize, participate or implement it, this passive response attitude did give other countries the wrong signal.
Professor Tsai Chong Yuan can say this, and his background is inseparable, this Taiwan scholar born in 1953 has a rich international perspective.
He not only received his education in Taiwan, but also studied a Master of Public Policy at Harvard Kennedy School of Government, and later went to Beijing Qinghai University to study a PhD in law, specializing in cross-Straits legal issues.
Working experience at Citibank and JPMorgan Chase has given him a deep understanding of international finance and geopolitics. It is this background of cross-strait and integrating China and the West that enables him to jump out of traditional thinking.
Pointing directly to the weakness of China's diplomacy, he believes that being male rather than bullying sounds very moral, but in the international jungle of the weak, excessive restraint will be regarded as weak and easy to bully.
When we look deeper, our country's diplomatic style has profound cultural roots. The Confucian doctrine of kingship emphasizes convincing others with virtue and opposes convincing others with force. This concept deeply affects China's diplomatic decision-making.
Since reform and opening up, China has indeed needed a peaceful and stable international environment to develop its economy and is reluctant to influence the overall situation because of some territorial disputes.
Consideration of the international image is also important, China does not want to be labeled hegemony, fearing to trigger a new round of Chinese threat theory.
But the problem is that the transition from economic strength to deterrence is not automatic, you have money not for others and fear you, the key is to make the opponent believe you have the will and determination to use power.