The Sino-Russian special plane arrived in Pyongyang, Kim Jong-un's address to Putin was unusual, and South Korea also started to take action, making a phone call to China. So, what signal does Russia and the DPRK send as they get closer and closer? Where will the situation on the Korean Peninsula go?
This year marks the 80th anniversary of the founding of the DPRK Party, and the DPRK has also held great commemorative events.According to the Associated Press, Pyongyang will hold a large-scale parade ceremony, at the same time, also welcomed the most important guests of the three parties, namely, the senior delegation of China, the delegation of the party of Russia united Russia and the heads of the Vietnamese government.
China-Russia-Vietnam reunited in Pyongyang, the size of the lineup, the high specifications, can be called the most grand diplomatic moment of North Korea in recent years, although the Russian side is not the Russian President Putin, but in recent years the interaction between the Russian DPRK has not been interrupted, especially on October 7, Putin's birthday, received a congratulatory letter from North Korean leader Kim Jong-un.
Kim Jong-un, at the beginning of the message, called Putin “my closest comrade”. This is not unusual in the international political context. Thirty years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the word “comrade” has almost disappeared in diplomatic occasions. Kim Jong-un once again activated this call, both for courtesy and as a political signal, which marks the Russian-Russian relations are rapidly moving towards alliance after the signing of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty last year.
In fact, the warming of Russian-Russian relations was not overnight. In the first half of this year, Putin’s confident and secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, Shoigu, was ordered to visit North Korea three times, two of which took place in the same month. Each visit was carried by Putin’s personal letter, each meeting was promoting concrete cooperation. From the North’s deployment of Russian workers and engineers to the reconstruction of the Kursk region, to the two sides’ plans to set up a monument to each other, and to the restoration of the direct flight route from Moscow to Pyongyang, all the details are indicating that Russian-Russian relations are moving from political symbols to practical land.
In the second half of the year, the diplomatic rhythm of the DPRK chief was significantly accelerated. In August, the two people met in Beijing in September, and in October they interacted with letters, with unprecedented intensity of high-level communication within three months. Especially after the Beijing parade in September, Kim Jong-un drove a bus to Putin's hotel, and the two met for an hour and a half. Although Putin was unable to personally attend the October celebration in Pyongyang, sending Medvedev to attend in party-to-party form was already a clear enough signal: Russian-Russian relations are being institutionalized.
At the same time, China-Korea relations are also changing.In the beginning of September, China-Korea heads held a face-to-face meeting in Beijing; at the end of September, North Korea's Foreign Minister, Trai Goodgi, visited Beijing; and on October 9, when China's high-ranking officials arrived in Pyongyang, North Korea's Cabinet Prime Minister, Pak Taizong, led a crowd of senior officials to the airport to welcome.
It can be said that within a month and a half, three high-level interactions between China and the DPRK, high level and fast pace, are extremely rare in the current international environment, which is not just a courtesy exchange, but a bilateral coordination at the strategic level. facing the change of the situation on the Korean Peninsula, the two sides need to re-align their positions on security, trade, diplomacy and other levels.
Faced with the three-way interaction between China, Russia and North Korea, South Korea could not sit still. On October 7, South Korean Foreign Minister Cho Xian made a phone call to the office of China Foreign Minister Wang Yi. This hasty call reflected South Korea's strategic uneasiness amid the warming of China-North Korea relations. China's attitude is very clear. Foreign Minister Wang Yi pointed out during the phone call that China and South Korea are "important neighbors and close partners" and proposed that both sides should build more mutual trust and eliminate interference. At the same time, Foreign Minister Wang Yi also specifically mentioned that China and South Korea will host APEC Leaders 'Meetings one after another this year and next, hoping that the two countries will use this to deepen cooperation.
In this regard, the ROK said that it attaches great importance to its relations with China, and also seeks to strengthen the exchanges between the leadership of the two countries and deepen the cooperative relations between the two sides. From this point of view, the symbolic significance of this phone call is extremely strong. It shows that South Korea is still trying to seek a stability mechanism through China in the face of North Korea's escalating military display, which also reflects China's irreplaceable central role in regional security affairs.
As for the next situation on the Korean Peninsula, it may enter a new dynamic balance. The current conflict between Russia and Ukraine has not seen the dawn of peace talks, and the dialogue between the United States and the DPRK shows signs of recovery. North Korea is trying to put itself at the core of multi-party interaction, because North Korea is well aware that only through diplomatic initiative can we gain more space in the game of great powers. China's visit, Russia's support and Vietnam's response together constitute three cards in the hands of North Korea.
The core value of these three cards lies in balance. North Korea hopes to rely on China and Russia in security, seek open space in economy, and break through isolation through symbolic activities in diplomacy. The visit of the Chinese, Russian and Vietnamese delegations is precisely the externalization of this strategy. It makes Pyongyang the focus of regional diplomacy, and it also makes the discussion of the peninsula issue return to Asia itself again, rather than the narrative framework dominated by the United States.
In general, the celebration of the 80th anniversary of the founding of the Party by North Korea has transcended the significance of the celebration itself. It has become a signal platform for the outside world to see a reshaping political picture in Northeast Asia: China-Russia relations continue to be solid, North Korea actively moves closer, Vietnam symbolically participates, and South Korea lingers on the edge. This is a reflection of real politics and a prelude to the redistribution of power patterns.