Edited by Editorial Spectrum.
«--[· Preface ·]--»
The United Nations Conference week was opening, and the Trump administration suddenly dropped out of the Middle East "21" and threw a heavy-pound bomb to the burning situation, which is endless to Israel: with a ceasefire, to gradually withdraw troops from Gaza, and to pave the way for the Palestinian state.
What makes Netanyahu even more aggrieved is that after the war, he had to rely on international power to govern, let the Palestinian Authority enter Gaza, release hostages within 48 hours, cease fire immediately, ban the annexation of the West Bank, and provide 120 million aid. This is clearly the list handed over by the United States to change.
The sudden introduction of the "21", in fact, is that the United States is paying for its past diplomatic actions, apparently to promote peace in the Middle East, actually more like a rushing "check", used to clear those years of accumulated diplomatic debt.
The pressure on the international stage is the most straightforward. Not long ago, the United Nations General Assembly voted on the ceasefire resolution in Gaza. The voting result was extremely dazzling, with 149 votes in favor and only 12 votes against. The United States and Israel were crowded in those lone 12 votes and became a complete minority.
This feeling of isolation has become even heavier because more than 150 countries around the world recognize Palestinian sovereignty. This is no longer a simple political difference, but a real moral pressure that weighs down Washington.
To make matters worse, even their own allies are on the other side. On the 21st of last month, traditional allies such as Britain, Canada, Australia, and Portugal joined forces to announce their recognition of the Palestinian state, exposing the cracks within the Western camp to the world.
The United States has discovered that if the policy is no longer adjusted, it is likely to be isolated by the closest partners, the domestic pressure is not small, the general election is near, and the Trump team must face public opinion shock.
Surveys show that about 60 percent of U.S. voters, especially young people, have made it clear that they no longer want to pay unconditionally for Israeli military operations, especially for shaking up state Arab and ethnic minority voters, whose votes are a key political asset that the Trump team must carefully calculate.
This "21" scheme, in fact, to a certain extent is the "olive branch" that the United States has thrown simultaneously to the international community and domestic voters: to ease the pressure of isolation on the outside, calculate a pragmatic approach, to win the key votes on the inside, is a strategic means.
In the end, America’s real determination to “strike” Israel depends on tangible interests, not just on moral pressure.
When the "firewall" in its backyard is about to be burned through, Washington's calculations are better than anyone else. These "21 Rules" are essentially to protect the economic lifeline of the United States in the Middle East.
The most direct trigger is the security issue of the Red Sea Channel. The attack by the Houthi armed forces almost paralyzed the artery of global trade. Freight volume has directly dropped by half. Transportation costs have soared like rockets. Every cargo ship that detours the Cape of Good Hope is severely damaging the commercial interests of the United States.
Therefore, the United States did not pass Israel, through third parties and the Houthis talked about a ceasefire, in the face of navigation safety, Israel's "completely remove Hamas" idea, obviously backwards, the navigation is a lifeline, broken but troubled.
Energy security is also the soft spot of the United States, with Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, the Gulf countries, talking together that if the United States does not come up with a plan that contains the contents of the Palestinian state, they will probably rethink energy cooperation.
As soon as this warning was issued, the Trump administration immediately became alert: no one could touch the energy red line, so the "Article 21" specifically mentioned the establishment of a Palestinian state and the prohibition of annexation of the West Bank, which were actually responding to the concerns of the Gulf countries.
Don’t forget that the U.S. and these countries just signed an energy trade deal worth more than $1.2 trillion, which needs stability, not war, and a little bit of Gaza Mars could shake trillion business.
To put it bluntly, this plan is urgent for a ceasefire and has nothing to do with humanitarianism. Its main purpose is to create a buffer zone for the economic interests of the United States.
The "21" scheme came out, the warm veil of the so-called "value alliance" between the United States and Israel was completely torn, and the scheme clearly indicated that the era of unconditional support has ended, and now everything must be "coded".
The root cause of the conflict between the two sides is simple: strategic priorities are different. The United States looks at the macro stability of the entire Middle East, focusing on the Iranian nuclear issue and the security of the Red Sea Channel, while Israel is only concerned about local goals and completely eradicating Hamas.
The plan directly ties the Israeli extreme right to withdraw troops and pave the way for a Palestinian statehood, with the urgent needs of society such as ceasefire and hostage release.
In other words, Netanyahu would either accept the proposal and see his own far-right coalition collapse and the government collapse, or reject the proposal and completely lose America’s most important dependence.
Netanyahu also has his own coping strategy. On the one hand, he adopts a tough stance at home, emphasizing that "no compromise on security issues" and hinting that he will not withdraw troops easily. On the other hand, he secretly sends envoys to Washington for negotiations, trying to "accept some of the terms" in exchange for more U.S. support on the Iran issue.
The United States 'approach is a typical "carrot and stick" approach. On the surface, it urges Israel to cease fire and exercise restraint, but orders to sell missiles, bombs and other lethal weapons to Israel have never been interrupted.
Military aid, from friendship gifts in the past, has become a bargaining chip in exchange for policy concessions. Support is not free, you must give in.
In the plan, sensitive issues such as Palestinian borders and the status of Jerusalem are vaguely dealt with, leaving enough room for the United States to operate. When the negotiations break down, it can easily pass the responsibility on both sides, claiming to "do our best" and have no responsibility for self-protection.
In the end, Article 21 is not a major turning point in the Middle East policy, but a clever account of U.S. priorities, it is not an idealistic peace plan, but a cold-ice list of national interests, peace is only a possible by-product, and is by no means a core goal.
Regardless of the success of the plan, this operation exposed the essence of the US diplomacy, but also permanently reshaped the US-Israel alliance, once seen as an unbreakable alliance, has embarked on a completely new path, the Middle East pattern is therefore destined to profoundly change.