Russian warships opened fire on warships of NATO member countries. If this kind of incident had happened a few years ago, it would have caused an uproar. However, this scene in the Baltic Sea on October 3rd was exchanged for an unusually "calm" response from NATO and the European Union.

According to Reuters, citing the Danish military intelligence agency, the Russian Navy not only fired weapons and threatened collisions, but also interfered with the navigation system that connects the Baltic Sea with the North Sea Strait.

The Russian ship involved was accused of being the dreadnought-class large anti-submarine destroyer "Vice Admiral Kulakov". Why didn't this major challenge to NATO's reputation receive a tough response?

On October 3, 2025, a news in the Baltic Sea broke the geological calm of Europe. According to Reuters, citing the Danish Military Intelligence Service, the Russian Navy's Dauntless anti-submarine destroyer "Lieutenant Admiral Kurakov" took a series of extremely provocative actions against Danish warships and accompanying helicopters on patrol missions in the waters:

Not only did direct weapons warning, but also deliberately took a dangerous route, the two ships approached the edge of the collision at a time, while implementing powerful electromagnetic interference to the Danish ship's GPS navigation system, causing its sonar and other equipment to be paralyzed.

The sensitivity of this incident is self-evident. Denmark is one of the founding members of NATO, Its security is included in the protection of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which states that an armed attack on one of its member states will be considered an attack on all of its members.

In accordance with NATO¡¯s past practice of responding to similar incidents, such military provocations directly targeting member states should have triggered urgent consultations and even launched collective defense mechanisms.

But the reality is that within 48 hours after the incident was exposed, NATO headquarters neither held an emergency meeting nor issued any condemnation statement. It only prevaricated outside inquiries with a vague response that "the incident is still under investigation." This abnormal silence was interpreted by public opinion as "collective pretending to be blind."

The head of the Danish military intelligence agency, Thomas Aaronkil, made a clear definition of this, qualifying a series of Russian actions as ¡°hybrid warfare¡± ¨C a grey-zone operation between traditional military conflict and the state of peace, which is Russia¡¯s usual strategy in recent years to cope with Western sanctions.

The Russian military's provocation was very proportional: the weapons launched did not directly hit the target, and the risk of collision was finally eliminated through emergency evasion. Electromagnetic interference did not cause casualties, and dismantling each operation separately was not enough to do the "armed attack" as defined in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which turned NATO's collective defense clause into a "button you can't press".

In fact, the Baltic confrontation was not an isolated event, but a miniature of a series of recent Russian hybrid operations against the West. Many important ports and airports in Europe frequently encounter drone nuisances. Even in the space field, Russian satellites have been detected interfering with British military satellite signals.

In the face of these escalating provocations, Russia has always insisted that all actions "strictly abide by international maritime law." Behind this seemingly contradictory statement is Russia's accurate insight into the internal cracks of NATO.

NATO¡¯s collective silence is essentially a direct expression of a partial split within the alliance. A clear ¡°fear axis¡± is being formed within the alliance: Eastern Europe¡¯s Poland and the three Baltic states due to historical complaints and geographical neighbourliness. We are extremely vigilant against Russia, always calling for tough confrontational measures, and even proactively expanding the scale of conscription to deal with potential threats.

However, core countries such as France and Germany in Western Europe are cautious. These countries have countless links with Russia in the fields of energy and trade and are wary of any move that may intensify conflicts.

The EU has been debating for several months whether to use the frozen 140 billion euros of Russian sovereign assets to aid Ukraine, and the differences are difficult to bridge.

Behind this confrontation is the shipping control game extended from the Russia-Ukraine conflict. As Western countries step up inspections of Russia's "shadow fleet" in an attempt to curb its energy shipments that circumvent sanctions, the Danish Strait, as a key waterway, has become the core area of inspections.

France, Estonia and Finland have previously taken action to detain Russian vessels, while the Russian Navy has strengthened its presence in the region in the name of escort, thereby putting pressure on NATO countries carrying out control missions.

As a member of NATO and a member of the Joint Expeditionary Force, Denmark has provided weapons assistance to Ukraine since 2023 and has regularly dispatched warships to patrol the Baltic Sea. It has naturally become a key target of Russian pressure. The Russian ship even shut down the tracking system on the edge of Danish waters and stayed in a concealed posture for more than ten days. Its reconnaissance and interference intentions were obvious.

After the incident was exposed, doubts about "NATO collectively pretending to be blind" began to spread in the public opinion field. However, judging from actual actions, NATO's response showed the dual characteristics of "tough stance and restrained action".

On the same day, on 3 October, the NATO Secretary-General urgently convened a meeting of representatives of the member states in Brussels, but ultimately failed to initiate the fifth clause, which is seen as the bottom line of collective defense ¡ª¡ª The provision applies only when a member state is subjected to an explicit armed attack, and a series of Russian actions are precisely navigated in the ¡°grey zone¡± and do not constitute substantial personal casualties or equipment damage.

In an official statement, the NATO chief described the actions of the Russian navy as ¡°irresponsible provocation¡± and stressed that it would ¡°react with a strong defensive gesture¡±, but concrete measures remained focused on strengthening surveillance and deployment.

The "Baltic Guard" mission, launched at the end of September, expanded rapidly during this period, the U.S. Navy destroyer "Burkeley" emerged into the Strait to join patrol, Britain and Germany also sent vessels to support, and the Swedish Coast Guard even authorized more vessels to participate in surveillance operations through legislation.

On the air level, German and British warplanes have encrypted the frequency of patrols in the Baltic Sea, NATO's joint radar network tracks the movements of Russian troops 24 hours a day, and electronic reconnaissance aircraft and satellites continue to collect signal data in the area. Denmark itself has taken a targeted response: the escort ships immediately upgrade anti-interference software after returning to the port of Kordou, the crew carries out special electronic warfare training, and establishes real-time intelligence sharing mechanisms with Finland and Germany, exchanging radar monitoring data.

Russia denied the provocation. In a response on October 4, a spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that all actions were in compliance with international law, emphasizing that Russian ships have legal freedom of navigation. While Putin did not refer directly to the Danish incident in his speech at the Vardy Club, he hiddenly criticized Europe's "excessive response", suggesting that Russia's move was a response to NATO's eastern expansion.

The Russian Mission to the United Nations also submitted a statement reiterating its position of maintaining the openness of the Baltic Sea waterway, while refusing to respond positively to the question about jamming technology in the note submitted by the Danish Embassy on October 5th. It is worth noting that the Russian ship involved sailed into the dock for maintenance after the confrontation, triggering speculation about whether it was damaged in the conflict.

The complexity of the regional situation far exceeds the single incident itself. The Baltic countries and other countries on the eastern flank of NATO called for more resolute countermeasures, while the core Western European countries such as Germany and France advocated restraint. Fear of out-of-control affects the main battlefield of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict.This internal divide makes it difficult for NATO to form a unified and tough response.

The binding of economic factors makes the game more difficult. The Danish report specifically mentioned that natural gas pipelines and submarine cables in the Baltic Sea region are extremely fragile. Any military conflict may impact European energy supply and Internet communications. This potential risk makes all parties None dare to break through the bottom line easily.

As of October 4, Danish intelligence reports showed that although there were still sporadic interference signals in the strait, no new close confrontations occurred. The Russian Northern Fleet and NATO patrol ships still maintain a state of "mutual deterrence" in the waterway. The ship formations of both sides maintain a distance of 10 nautical miles to exchange positions in real time to avoid escalation of misjudgments.

This ¡°conflict¡± that has not really opened fire, in fact, is the abbreviation of Russia¡¯s and NATO¡¯s strategic trials ¨C one side by precision pressure testing the bottom line, the other side by finding a balance between solidarity and restraint, the tension in the Baltic Sea is still difficult to alleviate in the short term.

Official sources and links

Danish Defense Intelligence Agency: [Baltic Region Security Situation Report (Third Quarter 2025)](https://www.forsvares
Efterretningstjeneste.dk/da/publications/tryk-og-presse/2025/10/03/rapport-om-sikkerhedssituationen-i-baltiske-havet)