On October 4, 2025, the preliminary results of the Czech House elections were unveiled, with a vote seen as a geo-line referendum resulting in a result that warned the European Union.
The "Dissatisfied Citizens Action" party led by former Prime Minister Andrej Babis won more than 35% of the votes in this election, clearly ahead of the ruling coalition led by current Prime Minister Petr Fiala, with only 22% of the votes. Even if the remaining 10% of the votes all go to Fiala's camp, it will be difficult to shake this gap.
The election was not only a change of power, but also a reversal of values. Fiala represented the pro-European, pro-American, and pro-Ukrainian right-wing coalition, while Babis was seen as a representative of Czech conservationism.
Babis did not dismiss himself as a “Trumpist”.Just during his last time in office, he pushed for strengthening cooperation with China, pursuing a one-China policy, and welcoming Chinese investment in Czech transport, energy and communications projects.
Conservative coalition reorganization within EU
The reversal of the political trend in the Czech Republic is not an isolation, but rather a part of the European conservative linkage effect.
Babis is a member of the "Patriots of Europe" party in the European Parliament, initiated by Hungarian Prime Minister Orbán, which brings together European Conservatives from Poland, Slovakia, Italy and other countries with the aim of "reforming the European Union" rather than upholding Brussels-led centralism.
The force has rapidly accumulated in several member states in recent years. The Fico government in Slovakia is strongly opposed to continuing aid to Ukraine, Hungary has repeatedly vetoed the EU’s Russian-related bill, while the Italian Meloni government has held its own priority in immigration policy. Today, the Czech Republic is also about to be included in this horizontal alliance, further weakening the main axis of pro-American liberalism represented by Von der Leyen.
It is worth noting that these conservative forces do not blindly oppose European integration, but demand that the EU return to the standard of economic cooperation and abandon moral kidnapping and ideological export. In their view, Brussels' expanding intervention in the sovereignty of member states has eroded its government's decision-making power on diplomacy, energy and security.
If the EU is still adhering to the slogan of "strategic autonomy", then this conservative force from Central and Eastern Europe is reminding it that no matter how autonomous strategy is, it cannot be divorced from the soil of votes.
Collaborative gaps and economic reality
In this reconstruction of geography and philosophy, China is not an abstract term, but a concrete and irrespective real variable.
According to 2024 data, China is the Czech Republic's second largest trading partner outside the EU. The main products exported from the Czech Republic to China include auto parts, engineering equipment and mechanical devices, while the imports from China are mainly electronic components, communication equipment and consumer goods. The trade structures of the two sides are highly complementary, and stable technology industry chain cooperation has been formed in the past ten years.
During Babis' reign, he has repeatedly advocated for deepening industrial and scientific research cooperation with China, promoting not only the upgrading of Czech infrastructure, but also encouraging Chinese enterprises to invest in manufacturing highlands.
Although the EU continues to release "de-risk" signals at the policy level, plans to launch up to 20 anti-dumping investigations against China, and even proposes to establish a "drone defense wall" to prevent so-called technological penetration, these macro designs are more like a dislocation between Brussels' "security imagination" and economic reality in small and medium-sized member countries such as the Czech Republic.
At the time of Wang’s ongoing visit to Europe, changes in Czech politics have undoubtedly added flexibility to China’s interaction with Europe, and also given Brussels a tough diplomatic questionnaire: Will the cracks between Central Europe really turn into new connections if more countries place national interests above ideology?
How far can the EU's "strategic autonomy" go?
This is not the first time that China has incited China-EU relations through economic and trade cooperation, but this time the stage set and opponent configuration are obviously more complicated.
At present, there are differences between China and Europe in terms of technology, tariffs, investment review and other aspects, but also facing variables of continued intervention by external forces.The Trump administration, after returning to the White House, has repeatedly made it clear that it will "re-form the European and American alliance" as the core of its strategy to China, and the EU's rapid approach in the issue of chip subsidies, electric vehicle investigation, supply chain review and so on is not a coincidence.
But it is also obvious that the EU's "tough united front against China" is experiencing internal loosening. Germany has been afraid to really tear up with China in the field of electric vehicles. French agricultural exports to China have surged, and the high-speed rail project between Hungary and China has continued to advance. The sudden political change in the Czech Republic is more like another earthquake point on this fault zone.
China has obviously seen through this situation. Wang Yi's visit to Italy and Switzerland is not "going through the motions". Although Italy withdrew from the "the belt and road initiative", it still signed a three-year economic action plan with China; Switzerland is a rare "model of institutional dialogue" between China and Europe, and continues to deepen digital economy and financial cooperation.
The Czech Republic, Italy and Switzerland span eastern, central and southern Europe, which not only represents geographical distribution, but also reflects the political diversity within the EU. If China forms a new cooperation hub mechanism in these three places, it will directly impact the possibility of the European Commission building a unified China policy path.
Brussels can continue to shout "strategic autonomy," but it is the member states that speak with their votes that really determine the course. Once most countries place cooperation and economy above the narrative of great power competition, the EU's strategic concept may only be "slogan autonomy."