Preliminary
The scene after the Russian missile was dismantled completely caught the West unprepared. It originally thought that multiple rounds of sanctions had "run out of food" for the Russian military industry, but missiles and drones seemed to have been on an "unlimited battery life" and flew into the battlefield continuously.
Following the backdrop, it was discovered that the high-end components that were labeled “Russia is strictly prohibited from exporting” were mostly from three countries: the United States, Japan and Germany.
Whose "fingerprint" is hidden in the missile?
The Kh-101 cruise missiles,"Iskander" ballistic missiles, and "Lancet" drones flying from the Russian-Ukrainian battlefield continue to refresh the pressure on the Ukrainian air defense system.
The West looked wrong, and just started to “dismantle” — using technical means, one by one, to smash the missiles from top to bottom to the sky, to see who is quietly “giving blood.”
A report led by the Royal Joint Service Institute (RUSI) showed that among the core components of these missiles, Manufactured in the United States accounted for 67%.。Yes, it is the United States that took the lead in sanctioning Russia.
Immediately afterwards, Japan and GermanyAround 7% of the components are disassembled. 155 companies in 19 countriesTotal 1057 products, a missile, has almost become a "global platter".
Looking more closely, the MCU of Texas Instruments in the United States, the signal processing module of Analog Devices, the processor of Intel, the image sensor of Sony in Japan, the capacitor of Murata, the power chip of Infineon in Germany, and the sensor of Bosch...
These parts, which should have appeared in home appliances, cars and mobile phones, were stuffed into missiles by Russia, realizing the reverse operation of "military-to-civilian". In layman's terms, the parts originally prepared for washing machines ended up being the eyes and brains of missiles.
Unable to handle washing machines.
Many people wonder: since these countries have joined the export controls on Russia, how did these parts slip away? Third-country entrepot + grey trade + regulatory loopholes。
Russia has a complete set of mature "washing" system in its hands, since the 2014 Crimean crisis began to be built, the middle place of circumvention includes Turkey, the UAE, Singapore, Kazakhstan and other countries, in these transitions, parts changed packaging, new labels, from "washing machine accessories" to "civil electronics", and the imperial land entered Russia.
What makes people even more helpless is that all this is not secretly smuggled, but takes advantage of Grey Zones of Legality in Global Supply Chains, companies circumvent sanctions and supervision through shell companies, intermediaries, and false end-user certificates. Some even place orders through cross-border e-commerce and dark web platforms, and the logistics efficiency is comparable to "next-day delivery".
When held accountable, the company's response was also very uniform: "We didn't know that the product was used to make missiles, we just sold it to middlemen, and the procedures were all legal." Texas Instruments, Infineon, Bosch and other companies all said that they complied with export regulations, and the responsibility was "downstream". But the problem is that this "downstream" has become a river, and no one dares to really block it.
Are sanctions useless? The West is caught in the dilemma of "beating itself"
The missile dismantling report came out, the entire Western public opinion circle fell into embarrassment, originally through sanctions to "hunger death" Russian military workers, as a result of finding that the parts of their own country in turn supported the skeleton of Russian missiles.
The governments of the United States, Japan, and Germany have stated as always: to strengthen supervision, to expand sanctions, to censor exports, but in short, to really take action finds that the difficulty is too big than imagined.
First, the global supply chain is too complex, parts from design to production often cross several countries, who can guarantee the "final use" of each capacitor? second, the control of the "two-use technology" itself is vague, many chips and sensors can be placed on the car, can also be installed in the missile, can easily pass by the "civil" label alone.
In addition to the differences within some countries, such as Germany has to consider the impact on Russian trade on its own economy, sanctions policy will always be difficult to “bite a piece of iron.”
At the same time, the realities on the battlefield are becoming increasingly ironic, with Russia using these weapons containing Western parts to carry out long-range strikes on Ukraine, and the Ukrainian army has to deal with Russian missiles, which cost only $ 100,000 at a time, while the West provides air defense systems, while "my own parts" shine in the enemy missiles and prevent defenses.
From the battlefield to the factory, the "paradox" of globalization is playing out
This missile demolition incident not only hits the face of sanctions, but also exposes a deeper problem: In the era of globalization, war has been fought from the front to the bottom of the supply chain.
Russia can maintain the continued production of missiles under the pressure of sanctions, relying not only on the gray trade, but also on the early layout of the “emergency system”. From cost control to local replacement, from technology integration to channel management, the Russian side is showing a reason with practical actions: if you break my way, I will make another milestone. for example, the manufacture of “calibration” missiles was pressed to one-fifth of the original, this is not a simple “robbery reduction”, but a precise integration of global parts.
Western countries also have to face a reality: if they want to completely "lock up" a big country with resources and experience by sanctions, it doesn't mean that they can be blocked, especially in the global industrial chain where you have me and me. Under your structure, it is almost impossible to completely cut off the channel.
In a larger dimension, U.S. arms traders supply weapons to Ukraine while indirectly participating in the production of Russian weapons through parts exports.This is not a conspiracy theory, but a realistic business logic: as long as it is profitable, the gray zone will exist forever.
conclusion
The Russian missile was disassembled to find out why it was still "alive and kicking". Now the truth is on the table. The three "sanctions pioneers" of the United States, Japan, and Germany accidentally became "technology suppliers" behind the scenes. This is not The conspiracy of aid is a paradox under globalization.
War has changed, and sanctions are no longer absolute weapons. Today you block Port A, and tomorrow Road B will be open. In this world of multiple links, multiple transfers, and intertwined interests, it is far from as easy as you might imagine to "pull off power" to make a country stop working.
In the end, whether missiles can stop is not on the dismantling table or on the sanctions list, but at the negotiating table. But the prerequisite is that all parties must first clarify their own "supply lists". Otherwise, the sanctions will become more and more like "left-hand hitting the right-hand", leaving only the smoke on the battlefield and the bright lights in the supply chain behind them.
References:
"In this batch of Russian weapon samples, 67% of foreign components came from the United States."
Reference News 2023-08-15
EU suspends discussion on new round of sanctions against Russia
Beijing News Network 2025-09-16
EU suspends discussion on new round of sanctions against Russia
Central TV News Client 2025-09-16