On February 21, 1972, in the cold wind of the Beijing airport, a special aircraft printed with the word "President of the United States" slowly landed and descended the ladder, was then President of the United States Richard Nixon.
This scene marked the beginning of the melting of the iceberg of Sino-American relations, and also rewrote the diplomatic pattern of the entire Cold War era.
From that moment on, Nixon was labeled as an "old friend of the Chinese people". He was the first sitting American president to set foot on Chinese soil and one of the key figures in the normalization of Sino-US relations.
But no one could have imagined that decades later, the protagonist of this historic visit would show a sense of regret in a private conversation.
Why did Nixon say that?
The "breaker" in the dilemma
In the early 1970s, the United States was experiencing the most difficult diplomatic and domestic crisis in its history.
The Vietnam War has become an unbearable burden for the United States.The battlefield is muddy, the soldiers tired, and the hearts of the people are broken.Since its intervention in 1955, the United States has invested more than 500,000 and $250 billion in military resources in Vietnam, but has not seen the dawn of victory.
Domestic anti-war emotions continued to rise, student movements and peaceful rallies flooded, and the White House's credibility fell to the bottom.
Externally, the pace of Soviet expansion has put the United States on pins and needles. Around 1968, the number of intercontinental missiles in the Soviet Union was close to 1000, exceeding the number deployed by the United States.
The wrestling between the United States and the Soviet Union in Europe, the Middle East and Africa is constantly escalating, and the arms race is in full swing. On the one hand, the United States wants to maintain its global deployment, but on the other hand, it suffers from fiscal deficits and domestic turmoil, and is simply unable to fight on two fronts.
Even worse, the U.S. allied system has also begun to crack. Japan has rapidly advanced economically, Europe has engaged in a common market, and Germany and other countries have increased their "independence" in foreign affairs with the U.S.
The United States finds itself no longer the leader of the alliance, but increasingly like a "middleman" who needs to appease its allies.
At this point, China became an unexpected “strategic opportunity.”
The Zhenbao Island conflict in 1969 completely torn apart between China and the Soviet Union, and the war once burned to the border. Facing the military threat of the Soviet Union, China urgently needs a strategic buffer; The United States has also found that it may be able to take advantage of the Sino-Soviet contradiction to play a new card on the Cold War chessboard.
So, in 1971, Kissinger secretly visited China under the code name "Operation Polo", and through Pakistan's matchmaking, he set up the stage for Nixon's official visit the following year. For the United States, this is not only a diplomatic breakthrough, but also a high-risk strategic gamble.
The chess game is undecided, China stabilizes first
Nixon hoped to several goals through his visit to China: first, to ease Soviet military pressure on the United States, second, to strive for China's cooperation in the Vietnam War, and third, to hope that China will accept the United States "protection" to some extent and become a controllable "part allies".
But he ignored China's strategic independence. Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou have already seen through this logic. Although China needs to break its isolation, it never intends to be anyone's pawn.
Chairman Mao's remark that "we are friends who have fought in wars" is not only a joke, but also a reminder: We have a common enemy, but it does not mean that we have to choose sides. What China wants is equal exchanges, rather than being drawn into the whirlpool of the US-Soviet game.
During the talks, Chairman Mao did not follow Nixon's topic to talk about "uniting China and resisting the Soviet Union". Instead, he frequently mentioned "old friend Chiang Kai-shek" and pointed directly to the Taiwan Province issue.
In subsequent talks, Mr Zhou made it clear that China’s position on the Taiwan issue is irresistible.China is not seeking cooperation, but negotiating conditions.
The U.S. originally wanted to provide China with a “nuclear umbrella” in exchange for its strategic cooperation, but China was not impacted by this “security commitment.” China wanted respect rather than asylum.In the end, although the two sides reached the Shanghai Communiqué, China-U.S. relations broke the ice, but the U.S. was not cheap on critical issues.
More importantly, this visit enabled China to successfully break the Soviet Union's strategic siege. In the following years, the Soviet Union's attitude towards China significantly turned cautious and no longer easily provoked borders. With the help of Sino-US contacts, China not only gained diplomatic initiative, but also created a more relaxed international environment for subsequent reform and opening up.
On the U.S. side, the Vietnam War did not end so quickly, but it only ended in 1975, eventually with the withdrawal of U.S. troops and the fall of the South Vietnam regime.Nixon wanted to solve the triple crisis with a diplomatic visit, and found that the game was much more complicated than he imagined.
The truth behind the remorse
Decades later, it is not difficult to understand that Nixon revealed his "regret" for this visit in private. He did not deny the importance of establishing diplomatic relations between China and the United States, but deeply reflected on its "side effects".
He originally thought that China would gradually integrate into the Western system and evolve ideologically with the economic and technical support of the United States.
But he wasn’t expecting that China was not only “transformed”, but instead rapidly emerged into a global manufacturing hub within a few years, and in the decades that followed, participated in globalization in its own way, gradually growing into a power sufficient to challenge U.S. hegemony.
In Nixon's view, this development was "derailed". At first, he hoped to establish a controllable cooperative relationship, but the result was to inspire a new type of power that was difficult to predict and control.
Nixon said in private that China’s development exceeded his initial strategic vision.
What made him feel even more out of control was the changes in domestic politics. After the Watergate Incident broke out, he became the first president in American history to resign due to scandal.
He originally hoped to regain his reputation through diplomatic achievements, but was criticized by political opponents as "compromising on communism" and "betraying Taiwan." His planned visit to China became a controversial symbol in his political career.
From an ideological perspective, Nixon himself was a typical conservative, always emphasizing "containing communism." But he chose to cooperate with China for strategic goals.
This inherent contradiction also made it difficult for him to let go of this experience in his later years. He wants to be seen as a realist with strategic vision, but is reluctant to admit that he may have contributed to the rise of an "uncontrollable opponent."
His regret was both a reflection on his personal political legacy and a delayed warning of America's global strategy.He realized that the door he opened in the year, which eventually came out, was not a "obedient partner", but a confident and firm global competitor.
The echo of history, more than one sigh
Nixon’s “repentance” is not a mere denial, but a complex historical regret.
He opened the diplomatic door, but did not think the outcome was completely out of control.China did not become the "jacket" in U.S. strategic design, but instead, in the storm, took the path of a firm, independent and independent development.
From a Chinese perspective, Nixon’s visit to China is undoubtedly a historical opportunity that has been heavily exploited.
China has not been led away or loosened its stance ideologically. Instead, with its super strategic determination and diplomatic wisdom, China has found the most suitable rhythm between hostility and cooperation. This calmness and tenacity are the key to China's ability to gain a firm foothold in the game of major powers.
Today, although Sino-US relations are complex and changeable, Nixon's visit is still regarded as one of the most important diplomatic events of the Cold War era.
Nixon’s regrets can’t hide his vision, but this vision demonstrates the fact that history has never favored any empire, but only those who have patience, wisdom, and control of their own destiny.
He opened a door, but the world behind the door was no longer what he could decide. In the game between major powers, the success or failure is uncertain. What really matters is not who reaches out first, but who can stabilize his feet.
Reference literature: Red Song Network, Encyclopedia - Nixon's visit to China