Leaders of the 27 EU countriesGathering with dignitaries from many countries Copenhagen.
Facing Russia " The Mixed War »Europe is preparing to transition from passive defense to active assault, to the inevitable. The crossroads .
Situation nears border-Europe faces a new security paradigm
The meeting, defined as an informal meeting, was opened with the participation of all 27 leaders, as well as dozens of countries outside the EU.
The location is in Copenhagen. There is not much news, but the main axis is clear: it is not discussing the European debt crisis, nor is it immigration policy, but "Russia".
In the past year, from the Baltic Sea to the Nordic border, there have been waves of Russia's "blurring border operations".
Danish military bases were hit by drones "pretending to be misappropriated", Swedish submarine optical cable connectivity was disrupted, and Finland suddenly discovered that the network system was continuously attacked.
There was no direct exchange of fire in these matters, but they clearly conveyed hostility.
The Danish intelligence agency issued an internal early warning ahead of the meeting: Russia is testing whether European countries' defence lines are loose and testing the red lines with a series of "appearing civilian, practically military" moves.
This is called “mixed warfare.”
This is not new in the early days of the Ukrainian crisis.
But Europe now realizes that it’s not just Ukraine’s problem.
French President Emmanuel Macron said: “Putin wants to overthrow not one regime, but the entire Western order.
German Prime Minister Scholz did not say "dialogue priority" this time, but instead supported the establishment of a "drone defense wall".
This strategic consensus has been growing in Europe for months.
Especially Poland, Finland, Estonia, countries close to Russia, have long shouted loudly.
They demand that Europe no longer rely solely on NATO or just financial aid, but truly build a defense system.
So far, however, Europe is still stuck in the “safe anxiety” phase.
Every time I was harassed, a meeting was held, a communique was issued, and there was a lot of thunder and little rain.
This time, Copenhagen seems to be turning over.
Some even call it the first meeting of the “European Strategic Awakening.”
Europe’s Strategic Choices – Tensions Between “War” and “Peace Talks”
Within the EU's top leaders, the war in Ukraine is no longer a "Eastern European problem", but a stress test that tests the determination and capabilities of the entire European Union.
The options at hand seem clear, either putting more aggressive pressure on Russia or leaving room for future negotiations.
Reality is not so simple.
In fact, Europe has reached a fork in the road of "choose one from three":
The first way is to continuously upgrade support for war resources.
For example, using frozen Russian assets to buy weapons and supply them to Ukraine.
Accelerate the construction of local military industries in Europe and get rid of dependence on the United States;
Set up a unified air defense network to connect Poland to the Baltic Sea into a military warning zone.
The problem with this road is that the cost is extremely high.
Weapons are not printed in banknotes.
The defense budgets of Germany, France and Italy are less than half the U.S. budget.
Now the prices are rising, the unemployment rate is also under pressure, and the forced transfer of money to Ukraine in exchange for the loss of votes is a real question.
The second way is to bring diplomacy back to the table.
Both France and Hungary said negotiations with Russia should not be ruled out.
The premise is that Russia promises not to continue attacking, not to use energy coercion, and not to interfere with Western elections.
This path is also risky.
Talking means giving in.
Even if you give in one step, you will be suspected whether the EU is ready to "surrender".
Countries such as Poland and Lithuania are even more opposed, believing that negotiations are tantamount to being betrayed again.
The third way is the "two-handed preparation" strategy - on the one hand, strengthening arms support, while drawing the bottom line of negotiations, and pulling the code again.
This is the direction most countries currently recognize and also means “high-risk balance”:
Once the pace is not controlled properly, it may trigger a larger upgrade.
This Copenhagen meeting did not set the tone of "negotiation", but raised one key point:
It is necessary to set up a "Joint Intelligence Processing Center" to deal with "hostilities in the gray areas" such as cyber attacks, energy coercion and drone invasions.
The center will be located in Brussels, coordinated by the European Political Community and the EU Defence Council, and thus shed light on the attitude – later mixed warfare, no longer vague response.
There is another detail that deserves attention:
During the meeting, representatives from several countries proposed the establishment of a set of “asset freezing operating mechanisms” to address the issue of the movement of assets under economic sanctions against Russia.
Simply put, it means legally transforming frozen money into aid funds for Ukraine.
Once this mechanism is established, it will not only be a matter of money, but it will also touch the bottom line of Europe’s own rule of law and the principles of private property protection.
Europe is struggling with this.
On the one hand, I am afraid of being called a "pirate" by Russia, but on the other hand, I feel that it is a waste not to use this money.
In other words, they want to use the law to fight the war decently.
European capabilities and fragility-who can support strategic transformation?
Europe finally realized that it could no longer "rely on the U.S. parachute", but when it was really ready to look up to the sky, it was only when it found that its armor was not wearing properly.
First, the issue of military spending. Although NATO and the European Union constantly encourage member states to invest 2% of their GDP in national defense, they can achieve less than half of it.
Germany just passed a special military budget of €100 billion last year, and it is not really used yet.
France’s defense spending is on the rise, and Spain’s budget is on the rise.
If there is not enough money, the so-called joint defense system is just an empty drawing.
Equipment is also a problem.
Most countries still rely on the United States for key tactical equipment such as drones, radars, and long-range rockets.
Once the United States turns to Asia-Pacific, even if Europe has money, it may not be able to buy it.
Europe’s own military factories are very decentralized, with Italy making artillery, Sweden making systems, and France making heavy weapons, having difficulty coordinating.
Some people propose to integrate it into the "EU Military-Industrial Community", which involves industrial interests, and no one is willing to give up the dominance.
The most typical example is the "Leopard 2" tank, which Germany is willing to sell and not want to be imitated by Poland.
Poland has its own projects, even the most basic ammunition, almost always relying on emergency supplies from the United States.
Vulnerability lies not only in equipment, but also in networks and infrastructure.
Russia has continued to interfere with European power grids, oil and gas pipelines and optical cables in the past two years.
The Finnish-Estonian gas pipeline, the Swedish-Polish optical cable, and the Norwegian-British submarine data line were all “mysteriously destroyed.”
Although there is no direct evidence pointing to Russia, there are a number of European countries in the heart.
This is also the reason why the Copenhagen Conference listed "infrastructure protection" as an independent topic.
Another difficulty is the public opinion and political cycle.
France, Germany and Belgium are all facing domestic inflation and employment problems.
On the one hand, saying to go to war, while people protest on the streets to raise electricity charges and rents, it is difficult for politicians to agree.
Parliamentary countries such as Germany and Italy, in particular, could have any major military spending in Congress.
This makes it difficult to coherent the strategy.
Saying sanctions today, talking dialogue tomorrow, and looking deeper, Europe’s problem is the lack of a unified command.
Every country has its own military, intelligence systems, and its own red lines.
But once multinational linkage is really needed, the response speed is much slower than that of NATO.
The defence coordination agencies at the EU level are small, with fewer budgets and fewer people.
If we really want to face Russia's global combat model, if Europe is not integrated, it will be defeated one by one.
The Copenhagen conference proposed the establishment of a "Defense Action Coordination Group". The initial plan is to be composed of liaison officers from each of the 10 countries, but this is only a temporary response.
To turn it into a normal mechanism, it has to pass the legislation of the European Council and go through the budget review.
This is the embarrassment of Europe: it realizes the problem, but it does not change faster than the United States, and crisp actions still rely on the consciousness of all countries.
War, peace talks, or are you ready?
At the Copenhagen summit, no decision was announced.
There was no new aid program, no new sanctions on Russia, no announcement of a coalition.
It sends a signal that Europe is no longer just waiting for the U.S. to say something, but is ready to do it itself.
It is a matter of gesture and also a game strategy.
What Europe currently prefers most is not "all-out war" or "compromise peace talks", but layout while exerting pressure.
It not only retains channels for diplomatic negotiations, but also uses war means to increase costs against Russia.
This approach is not without risks.
If Russia responds too strongly, such as heightening energy sanctions, doing business on the western line, and supporting the European far-right to interfere with domestic politics, Europe may not be able to stand up.
If we keep waiting for Russia to stop, we won't be able to wait.
Judging from the current situation, Europe may make three moves:
The first step is to unify the basic defense.
For example, promote the concept of "drone wall" and link air defense on the eastern line to prevent hackers, harassment, and assault.
The second step is to establish a stable support mechanism.
It is no longer a "temporary bill to aid Ukraine", but a long-term military support fund is established with frozen assets.
This will solve legal issues, investor confidence, and money circulation mechanisms.
The third step is to incorporate diplomatic negotiations into strategic planning.
Set a bottom line for “acceptable outcomes,” such as asking Russia to recognize Ukraine’s sovereignty, withdraw from parts of the war zone, and join energy rules negotiations.
What Europe wants is to pack it up with joint results and negotiation conditions when the time comes.
If successful, it is to turn the war into a political victory;
If you fail, prepare for the next game.
The most important thing is internal unity.
Today, Europe is known as the “27 mouths of the twenty-seven countries.”
If a common mechanism can really be achieved at the security level, that is a historic breakthrough.
This is what the Copenhagen Conference is about.
It is not whether to fight or not, but to what extent, what results, who will pay the bill, and who will coordinate.
War or peace, no one can tell the conclusion.
But at least one thing is certain: Europe no longer intends to continue to be an outsider.
The reference information:
European Political Community Summit in Denmark Focus on Security and Defence Cooperation · CCTV · 2025-10-02
European Union to hold informal summit in Copenhagen to discuss policy and joint defence with Russia · 2025-10-02
Russia and Europe's "mixed war" escalates Europe plans to establish a defense coordination mechanism·Reference News· 2025-10-03
Putin faces European "legal counterattack" EU proposes to use Russian frozen assets · Global Times · 2025-10-04