This time, if Russia does not dare to attack France, then the Western countries will begin to seize the Russian shadow fleet-tanker!
The trigger for this disturbance was the encounter with the oil tanker Borokai.
The 244-meter-long giant ship flying the flag of Benin was carrying 750,000 barrels of crude oil from the Russian port of Primorsk to India. However, it was boarded and intercepted by French Navy special forces in the Atlantic Ocean and was eventually taken to Saint Nazaire Naval Base.
The reason given by France is that the tanker is suspected of being associated with drone activities in Danish airspace and belongs to a "shadow fleet" that circumvents sanctions. Macron publicly stated that such fleets brought tens of billions of euros in revenue to Russia and supported 40% of its war budget.
The formation of the Shadow Fleet was the product of the response to sanctions.
Russia has acquired second-hand tankers from the world, by repeatedly changing names, changing registration places, and by circumventing restrictions, Gabon, the Marshall Islands, Mongolia and other countries have appeared in the registration information of these ships.
According to data from the Brookings Institute, by the beginning of 2025, the fleet has grown to 343 ships, 77% of which are on the US-EU sanctions list.
The sizes of the 600 to 1,000 ships Macron mentioned include standby reserve ships, which are the life lines of Russian energy exports.
France's action is not an isolated example, but an escalation of NATO's containment of the "shadow fleet".
In the winter of 2024, NATO launched the “Baltic Guard Operation” to include the Baltic Sea in the “collective defense” priority area.
In April 2025, Estonia first intercepted the “Givala” flag of Djibouti, and subsequently passed legislative amendments that allowed the use of force and even sinking on suspicious vessels.
Britain announced sanctions on about 100 tankers allegedly circumventing the sanctions on the day of the red square parade, and Germany also confiscated the Eventin, which carried 100,000 tons of oil in March.
This French action is the first time that NATO military forces have directly seized a Russian-related oil tanker, breaking the previous boundary of relying solely on judicial and economic means to exert pressure.
In the face of the steady-step siege, Russia’s response has not taken a radical confrontation route.
The Kremlin first spoke through diplomatic channels, and President's press secretary Peskov said he did not grasp the information about the relevant vessels, cleverly avoiding the sharpness of direct conflict.
Meanwhile, Russia has sued France at the International Maritime Court for $12 billion in damages, using legal weapons to counter the legality of its actions.
The right to board the open sea does not apply to the “unity of unmanned bodies” alleged by France, and the tanker hangs the flag of a third country, France has not been authorized by the flag state.
Russia has accelerated its shift to the Arctic-Pacific route, which connects Russia, China and India, and is covered by the naval forces of the three countries, effectively avoiding NATO-controlled Baltic and Atlantic waters.
Since 2025, oil transportation on the Arctic route has increased by around 40 percent, and the supporting icebreaker fleet and port facilities are being upgraded to ensure winter navigability.
This adjustment is not a temporary emergency, but a long-term layout that shifts the scope of activities of the "shadow fleet" from high-risk areas to safe areas.
Russia is also taking precise countermeasures against countries involved in the detention operations.
France relies on Russian liquefied natural gas for 15% of its energy imports. Winter heating needs are urgent. Russia exerts indirect influence by adjusting the pace of gas transmission.
For Baltic countries such as Estonia, Russia has strengthened its military deployment in Kaliningrad Oblast while restricting its transit transportation rights. These measures avoid direct military conflicts, but accurately hit the other side's weaknesses.
The competition in the international public opinion field is equally important.
Russia has exposed French intelligence agencies to information surveillance from EU member states, shaking the foundation of trust within NATO.
At the same time, it was emphasized through the media that the seized oil tanker was transporting oil purchased by India. The French action actually harmed the interests of third parties and aroused dissatisfaction among energy importing countries such as India.
This operation has shattered NATO’s “sanctions alliance” and many countries have begun to worry that the escalation will affect their own energy security.
Through a combination of legal rights protection, channel diversion, precise countermeasures and public opinion guidance, Russia has not only maintained the basics of energy exports, but also prevented the situation from slipping out of control.
The safety of the "shadow fleet" can not only be guarded by force, but also by reducing exposure risks through strategic adjustments and compressing the opponent's action space through rule games.
This game around tankers is essentially a wise match between sanctions and counter-sanctions. Russia’s response has demonstrated modesty and flexibility, making the prediction of “no longer safe” difficult to come true.
In a context where energy demand remains the most needed in the world, any unilateral action to disrupt the order of transport will eventually reflect its own interests, which is the deep logic of Russia not choosing to confront itself with hardship, but adhering to a pluralistic response.
The trigger for this disturbance was the encounter with the oil tanker Borokai.
The 244-meter-long giant ship flying the flag of Benin was carrying 750,000 barrels of crude oil from the Russian port of Primorsk to India. However, it was boarded and intercepted by French Navy special forces in the Atlantic Ocean and was eventually taken to Saint Nazaire Naval Base.
The reason given by France is that the tanker is suspected of being associated with drone activities in Danish airspace and belongs to a "shadow fleet" that circumvents sanctions. Macron publicly stated that such fleets brought tens of billions of euros in revenue to Russia and supported 40% of its war budget.
The formation of the Shadow Fleet was the product of the response to sanctions.
Russia has acquired second-hand tankers from the world, by repeatedly changing names, changing registration places, and by circumventing restrictions, Gabon, the Marshall Islands, Mongolia and other countries have appeared in the registration information of these ships.
According to data from the Brookings Institute, by the beginning of 2025, the fleet has grown to 343 ships, 77% of which are on the US-EU sanctions list.
The sizes of the 600 to 1,000 ships Macron mentioned include standby reserve ships, which are the life lines of Russian energy exports.
France's action is not an isolated example, but an escalation of NATO's containment of the "shadow fleet".
In the winter of 2024, NATO launched the “Baltic Guard Operation” to include the Baltic Sea in the “collective defense” priority area.
In April 2025, Estonia first intercepted the “Givala” flag of Djibouti, and subsequently passed legislative amendments that allowed the use of force and even sinking on suspicious vessels.
Britain announced sanctions on about 100 tankers allegedly circumventing the sanctions on the day of the red square parade, and Germany also confiscated the Eventin, which carried 100,000 tons of oil in March.
This French action is the first time that NATO military forces have directly seized a Russian-related oil tanker, breaking the previous boundary of relying solely on judicial and economic means to exert pressure.
In the face of the steady-step siege, Russia’s response has not taken a radical confrontation route.
The Kremlin first spoke through diplomatic channels, and President's press secretary Peskov said he did not grasp the information about the relevant vessels, cleverly avoiding the sharpness of direct conflict.
Meanwhile, Russia has sued France at the International Maritime Court for $12 billion in damages, using legal weapons to counter the legality of its actions.
The right to board the open sea does not apply to the “unity of unmanned bodies” alleged by France, and the tanker hangs the flag of a third country, France has not been authorized by the flag state.
Russia has accelerated its shift to the Arctic-Pacific route, which connects Russia, China and India, and is covered by the naval forces of the three countries, effectively avoiding NATO-controlled Baltic and Atlantic waters.
Since 2025, oil transportation on the Arctic route has increased by around 40 percent, and the supporting icebreaker fleet and port facilities are being upgraded to ensure winter navigability.
This adjustment is not a temporary emergency, but a long-term layout that shifts the scope of activities of the "shadow fleet" from high-risk areas to safe areas.
Russia is also taking precise countermeasures against countries involved in the detention operations.
France relies on Russian liquefied natural gas for 15% of its energy imports. Winter heating needs are urgent. Russia exerts indirect influence by adjusting the pace of gas transmission.
For Baltic countries such as Estonia, Russia has strengthened its military deployment in Kaliningrad Oblast while restricting its transit transportation rights. These measures avoid direct military conflicts, but accurately hit the other side's weaknesses.
The competition in the international public opinion field is equally important.
Russia has exposed French intelligence agencies to information surveillance from EU member states, shaking the foundation of trust within NATO.
At the same time, it was emphasized through the media that the seized oil tanker was transporting oil purchased by India. The French action actually harmed the interests of third parties and aroused dissatisfaction among energy importing countries such as India.
This operation has shattered NATO’s “sanctions alliance” and many countries have begun to worry that the escalation will affect their own energy security.
Through a combination of legal rights protection, channel diversion, precise countermeasures and public opinion guidance, Russia has not only maintained the basics of energy exports, but also prevented the situation from slipping out of control.
The safety of the "shadow fleet" can not only be guarded by force, but also by reducing exposure risks through strategic adjustments and compressing the opponent's action space through rule games.
This game around tankers is essentially a wise match between sanctions and counter-sanctions. Russia’s response has demonstrated modesty and flexibility, making the prediction of “no longer safe” difficult to come true.
In a context where energy demand remains the most needed in the world, any unilateral action to disrupt the order of transport will eventually reflect its own interests, which is the deep logic of Russia not choosing to confront itself with hardship, but adhering to a pluralistic response.