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Editor | L.Y.

Preliminary

On September 27, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov, speaking at the United Nations General Assembly, said with a rather resentful voice: ¡°Russia will respond resolutely to any act of aggression!¡±

Lavrov did not name specific threatening parties in his speech, but the "multi-directional security pressure" mentioned was clear. According to a report released by the Russian Federal Security Service on September 25, in the past month, the frequency of attacks by Ukrainian armed forces on Russian border areas has increased by 60% compared with the previous month. Among them, the raid on Belgorod Oblast on September 18 was the most serious. The Ukrainian army used drones and armored vehicles to break through the border defense line, causing casualties to 12 Russian soldiers and damage to 3 civilian facilities.

Russia is also concerned that NATO member states¡¯ military moves are getting closer to Russia ¨C on September 20, NATO¡¯s ¡°Operation in the Baltic Sea ¨C 2025¡± military exercise was launched in waters near Oklahoma, attracting a force of up to 150,000 troops, including 23 ships, including the U.S. Ford aircraft carrier, directly near the Russian territorial sea line, the largest NATO military deployment in the region since 2022.

On September 26, Putin signed a presidential decree raising the Russian western military district to a level of ¡°strengthened alert¡± and deploying three more mechanized brigades to the Russian border regions of Kursk and Braunschweig. Russian Defense Ministry spokesman Konashenkov explained at a news conference that the measures were in response to ¡°NATO¡¯s military pressure on Russia through Ukraine¡± and ¡°any act of aggression across the border would trigger a strong Russian counterattack.¡±

Multi-directional pressure

Russia's risk of "being invaded" is not a single threat, but a joint pressure from the east, west and south directions, and it presents the compound characteristics of "military deterrence + proxy attacks + sanctions containment".

NATO pressure in the west is the most direct. In addition to the Baltic military exercises, Poland has recently accelerated the deployment of Patriot air defense systems and M1A2 main battle tanks on the Polish-Russian border. As of September 28th, Poland's troops in the border areas have increased to 42,000, an increase of 80% over the beginning of the year.

More importantly, NATO launched on September 22 the "enhanced front presence" program, expanding the scale of multi-national combat groups deployed in Estonia, Latvia and other countries to 3,000 people per group, and equipped with more heavy equipment, forming an "arc circle" on the western border of Russia.Alexander Bartosh, a researcher at the Russian Academy of Military Sciences, noted that NATO's deployment has shifted from "defensive presence" to "offensive deterrence", "his armored forces depart from the Polish border and can reach Kaliningrad in 24 hours."

The Ukrainian army, with the aid of the West, launched a ¡°autumn counterattack¡± in mid-September, focusing on the Russian defense line in the Baltic region, although no major breakthrough has been made, the daily Russian military casualties and equipment losses still constitute long-term pressure on Russia. Ukrainian President Zelensky said in a video speech on September 25 that ¡°continuing attacks on military targets within Russia until the Russian forces completely withdraw from Ukrainian territory¡± is seen by Russia as a ¡°open declaration of aggression¡±.

Putin's appeal for cooperation

Faced with multi-directional pressure, Russia has begun to actively strengthen cooperation with China, North Korea and Iran, seeking to build a ¡°network of strategic cooperation¡± to hedge risks.This cooperation is not a simple ¡°call for help¡±, but a pragmatic link based on the common interests of all parties, and has a focus in the military, economic, energy and other fields.

China is Russia's most important economic and energy partner. From January to August 2025, the bilateral trade volume between China and Russia reached US $192 billion, a year-on-year increase of 15%, of which Russia's energy exports to China accounted for 58%. China has become the largest buyer of Russian oil and natural gas. This kind of energy cooperation not only brings stable foreign exchange income to Russia, but also builds an energy export channel that does not rely on the West through projects such as the "Power of Siberia-2" natural gas pipeline.

In the military field, although China-Russia did not establish a military alliance, the series of military exercises continued to deepen, and in May 2025, the Chinese-Russian Navy held a joint exercise in the Sea of Japan for the first time on the subject of "joint anti-submarine and maritime blockade", demonstrating synergies in response to the threat in the eastern direction.

The value of North Korea's cooperation in the field of military security is prominent. In August 2025, during the visit of North Korea's top leader Kim Jong Un to Russia, he and Putin reached a number of military cooperation consensus, including North Korea providing Russia with conventional weapons such as artillery shells and rockets, while Russia assisting North Korea in improving satellite launch and missile technology.

According to South Korean intelligence agencies, as of mid-September, North Korea has sent more than 1 million artillery shells to Russia, effectively alleviating the Russian army's ammunition shortage on the Ukrainian battlefield. This kind of cooperation creates a win-win situation for both sides-North Korea receives key technical support, while Russia supplements urgently needed materials on the battlefield, and the military interaction between the two sides can also distract South Korea and the United States from the Far East and reduce the pressure in the eastern direction of Russia.

A bit of a ¡°deep depth.¡±

While cooperation with the DPRK could support Russia, there is still a ¡°risk of out-of-control¡± and any misjudgment or excessive response could drag Russia into the ¡°abyss.¡±

The risk is a direct conflict with NATO. NATO¡¯s military deployments in the Baltic Sea and Eastern Europe have formed the hidden danger of ¡°pushing fire,¡± and on September 24, when a Russian Su-27 fighter aircraft intercepted the U.S. RC-135 spy aircraft over the Baltic Sea, the two sides were just 15 meters away, the risk of collision was less. If similar events escalated into a future air or sea conflict, NATO¡¯s ¡°collective defense clauses¡± could be triggered, leading to a direct confrontation between Russia and NATO, which is Russia¡¯s most unwilling situation to see.

Russia needs the support of three countries, but excessive reliance on it can lead to its own strategic autonomy being limited. For example, if Russia overuse North Korea¡¯s weapons on the battlefield in Ukraine, it could trigger further international sanctions on Russia; military cooperation with Iran could exacerbate its conflict with Israel, leaving the Middle East out of control and instead diverting Russia¡¯s strategic attention.

Risks in the economic field cannot be ignored either. Western sanctions against Russia are still going on. In the second quarter of 2025, Russia's GDP grew by only 1.2% year-on-year, but the inflation rate was as high as 7.8%, and the real income of residents fell by 3.5%. Although trade with China can partially offset the impact of sanctions, the Russian economy's dependence on energy exports has not changed, and fluctuations in international oil prices may directly affect Russia's financial stability. If oil prices fall sharply, Russia will face the dual pressures of "reduced fiscal revenue and increased military expenditure", which will aggravate domestic economic difficulties.

conclusion

Risks to domestic public opinion. Long-term wars and sanctions have led to rising public dissatisfaction in Russia. On September 25th, small-scale protests broke out in Moscow, St. Petersburg and other cities, and people demanded "stopping the war and improving people's livelihood". If the situation continues to deteriorate, the pressure of domestic public opinion may force Putin's government to adjust its strategy and fall into a situation of "internal and external difficulties".

As of September 28, Russia¡¯s cooperation with the DPRK continued to progress steadily, and the Putin administration alsoined limited communication with the West through diplomatic channels in an attempt to avoid further escalation of the situation. Lavrov¡¯s ¡°resolute response to aggression¡± in the UN General Assembly speech was emphasized as a warning against external threats as well as a reassurance for the domestic population. This strategic game built around ¡°anti-aggression¡± is still in a critical phase of ¡°risk and balance¡±, and any mistake could trigger a chain response, pushing the region and even global security into an unknown abyss.

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