2 October 2025Less than two weeks have passed since the official entry into force of the "additional port charges" imposed by the United States on Chinese shipbuilding, but the first shots on the battlefield were fired by China.

Just on September 30th, China announced countermeasures, and they took effect earlier than the US policy. Chinese is very direct: ¡°If you dare, I¡¯ll pay you four times.¡±

This is not a simple verbal statement, but a combination of legal provisions, administrative discretion and industry regulation.This is an unexpectedly rapid counter-conflict for the international shipping industry.

The U.S."port fee" plan, approved by the Trump administration, took effect on October 14, charging an additional discriminatory fee for all China-built ships when entering U.S. ports. The official U.S. reason is vague, saying it is to "protect the local shipbuilding industry," but the industry is more clear that this is an opportunity to attack China's dominant position in the global shipbuilding industry.

On the 14th day of the policy countdown, the State Council of China publicly released the latest revised version of the Regulations of the People's Republic of China on International Maritime Transport. This release has two highlights:

[First, the regulatory tentacles extend to the "international shipping trading platform"], plugging the gap in digital shipping supervision, setting information reporting obligations, illegal punishment mechanisms, etc. -providing a legal bottom line for the transparent and fair operation of the platform.

The new counter-clause states that any country or region may take discriminatory measures against Chinese international maritime operators, ships or crew members, and the Chinese government may take counter-measures according to law.

This means that once the United States starts to collect port fees, China has a complete legal basis to fight back immediately and does not require temporary approval.

Countermeasures: "Four times the price" is not just hard words

According to the amendment, the countermeasures listed by China include:

1. Special charges for target country vessels£»
2. Prohibit ships from target countries from entering and leaving Chinese ports£»
3. Restrict target countries 'access to information related to China's international shipping£»
4. Prohibiting or restricting the target country from operating China's international shipping and auxiliary business¡£

This is not a blunder, but a list of practical operations.Once the U.S. charges, China can overlap several measures to double or even quadruple the cost of U.S. shipping companies on the route to China.

Industry insiders put it more bluntly: [This time China has "clockwork" in advance. The moment the United States takes action, the counterattack will immediately bite down.]

The actions behind the implementation of the policy

Imagine when the management of the shipping company opened the system on October 14 and saw the subsequent shipping to China suddenly increase a considerable special cost, and some ships were even denied landing in Chinese ports, the schedule was instantly chaotic.

That kind of chaos is not only economic losses, but also the collapse of market confidence. The cargo owner will wonder: Is there a problem with the order in the China market? Investors will worry: Will trade frictions escalate again?

In Beijing¡¯s State Council press office, officials were calm: ¡°This is a defensive measure, not aimed at normal trade.¡±

The silence of the US and the silence of China.

The Trump administration¡¯s port fee plan began to boom in the middle of the year, when U.S. manufacturing lobbying groups continued to emphasize that ¡°Chinese ships¡± should not undermine U.S. shipbuilding market share.

But the truth is that the U.S. shipbuilding industry has long since ebbed sharply in the commercial shipping sector. According to a report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in the United States, a large number of global commercial ship orders are concentrated in China, especially in the field of bulk carriers and container ships. The United States has no competitive advantage with China in terms of shipbuilding capacity, cost and delivery speed.

So, the port fee is more like a ¡°policy symbol¡± used to show domestic voters that the government is ¡°anti-Made in China¡±.Trump is thinking of two steps: on the one hand, boosting U.S. port revenue, and on the other hand, forcing international shipping companies to reduce the purchase of Chinese ships.

China's previous attitude was very thought-provoking-it did not immediately publicly criticize or take measures, but instead wrote countermeasures clauses into law and waited for them to be implemented directly at the right time.

Three overlooked facts: Why the US move is "stinky chess"

First, China¡¯s shipbuilding technology is too advanced. Not only does it have high production efficiency and excellent cost control, but it also masters new technologies for dual fuel and environmental protection. Many international shipping companies would rather face overcharges from the United States than give up orders from China shipyards.

Second, rising transportation costs will backfire the U.S. economy. As the world's two largest economies, once trade transportation costs rise sharply, the prices of imported goods in the United States will inevitably rise, which will aggravate inflation and hit voters 'wallets.

Third, the competitiveness of U.S. ports will be damaged. If China¡¯s countermeasures lead to some U.S.-made ships being denied access to Chinese ports, cargo owners may choose to transfer them through ports in other countries, leaving the U.S. long-term port hub.

In the face of these three realities, the U.S. port charges plan is like digging holes in its own economic structure, which is why many in the industry privately call it "special shit".

The results behind the port war

Similar port fee disputes occurred in the 1980s. At that time, friction broke out between Japan and the United States over the berthing fees of car carriers. As a result, American ports swallowed a lot of losses from the loss of Japanese routes.

Compared with today's Sino-US relations, the difference is that China's share of global shipping and supply chain role are larger today than those of Japan back then, and the actions of the United States will trigger a wider chain reaction.

Market response in advance: Capacity adjustment and increase in non-US routes

Within 48 hours after the promulgation of the Chinese regulations, some Chinese shipping companies have adjusted their routes and shifted more capacity to Asia, Africa and markets along the "the belt and road initiative". Doing this has two effects:

1. Reduce dependence on U.S. ports in advance and reduce losses during the implementation of countermeasures;
2. Improve shipping service capabilities in these new markets and prevent short-term shocks from causing order disconnections.

This also allows the outside world to see that China is not only legal countermeasures, but also proactively optimizes it at the operational level to avoid being passive.

Two-way: Who is the winner and who is the loser?

the short runU.S. ports may cost a bit more, but if China responds in advance, the increase in revenue will not compensate for the loss of ships unable to enter Chinese ports; international shipping companies will have to take a position in a complex policy setting.

See also Medium.Shipping in non-U.S. markets will increase, China¡¯s port influence in these regions will increase, and the attractiveness of U.S. ports will decline, with some routes likely to be permanently withdrawn.

Looking long term., this is a redistribution of the global shipping landscape. The port confrontation between China and the United States will prompt more countries to seek diversified transportation channels and reduce their dependence on either side's port policies.

The Chinese Chess.

This early counteraction is essentially a trio of laws, strategies, and market movements:

• Laws: Ensure the legality of counter-measures and do not require temporary amendments to the law;
• tactically: Let the countermeasures take effect earlier than the other party and break the other party's rhythm;
• The market: Adjust transportation capacity in advance to minimize the impact of shocks.

Trump has always liked to create "accidents" in trade policy, but this accident was turned into a strategic advantage by China-let the bullets fly before the other side shoots, and the other side's psychology and market expectations were disrupted at the same time.

As October 14th approaches, the countdown to this port fee confrontation enters. Several key suspenses deserve attention:

• Will the United States delay or revise its port fee policy at the last minute?
• Will China directly implement multiple countermeasures on the same day?
• How will international shipping companies operate their fleets to reduce the policy impact of both sides?

It can be assured that this is not just a single China-U.S. friction, it could be a trigger for a new round of rising shipping costs and the restructuring of global transport channels.

As one old captain in the industry said: ¡°The real storm is not in the sea, but in the port policy.¡±

What do you think of this Sino-US port fee confrontation? Will China's early counterattack make it difficult for the United States to ride a tiger on the 14th? Welcome to leave your opinion in the comment section, and we will follow up on the policy landing and its market impact.

References:

1. Amended text of the International Maritime Transport Regulations of the People's Republic of China (published September 30, 2025)
2. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) "Global Shipbuilding Industry and Port Competition" report
3. The Trump administration will impose tariffs on Chinese ships on October 14
4. Minutes of the press conference of the State Council of China, September 30, 2025